# Negative

## Labor Advantage

### 1NC---Defense: China

#### China won’t risk conflict with the U.S. – economic and military interdependence, international legitimacy, overriding domestic concerns.

Sutter 14 (Robert Sutter, Prof @ George Washington University, China-U.S. Focus, Why China Avoids Confronting the U.S. in Asia, 3/19/14, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-the-u-s-in-asia-2/)

Forecasts talk of U.S. retreat from domineering China or an inevitable U.S.-China conflict. However, enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America, the regional leader.¶ Domestic preoccupations¶ Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability. And protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern. Though China also has regional and global ambitions, domestic concerns get overall priority.¶ President Xi Jinping is preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy, pervasive corruption, widespread mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijing’s reform agenda requires strong leadership for many years. Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually accommodating in meeting President Obama in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship. Xi also presides over China’s greater assertiveness on territorial issues that involve the United States, but thus far Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.¶ Mutual interdependence ¶ Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces constructive relations. Respective “Gulliver strategies” tie down aggressive, assertive, or other negative policy tendencies through webs of interdependence in bilateral and multilateral relationships. ¶ China’s insecurity in Asia ¶ Nearby Asia is China’s top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g. Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world (China is Africa’s biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea). Asian stability is essential for China’s economic growth—the lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery, China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the United States poses grave dangers. ¶ Chinese strengths in Asia include extensive trade and investment; webs of road, rail, river, electric power, pipeline and other linkages; leadership attention and active diplomacy; and expanding military capabilities. Weaknesses are:¶ 1. Chinese practices alienate near-by governments, which broadly favor key aspects of U.S. regional leadership. Leadership involves costly and risky efforts to support common goods involving regional security and development. China avoids such efforts unless there is a payoff for a narrow Chinese win-set. It “cheap rides,” hoarding resources to deal with serious domestic challenges. ¶ 2. Chinese assertiveness toward neighbors puts nearby governments on guard and weakens Chinese regional influence. It revives the PRC’s justified Cold War reputation for disruption, domination and intimidation. ¶ 3. China achievements in advancing influence in Asia since the Cold War are mediocre. China promotes an image of consistent and righteous behavior in foreign affairs; this is believed in China but is so far from reality that it grossly impedes effectively dealing with disputes. The PRC has the truly exceptional position among major powers as having never acknowledged making a mistake in foreign policy. When China encounters a dispute with neighbors, the fault never lies with China. If Beijing chooses not to blame the neighbor, it blames larger forces usually involving the United States. The noxious mix also emphasizes China’s historic victimization. In sum, Beijing is quick to take offense and impervious to recognizing China’s fault and needed change. ¶ State relationships vacillate and remain encumbered. Relations with Japan are at their lowest point. India is more wary of China today than ten years ago. Russian and Chinese alignment waxes and wanes; it’s waning over Ukraine and Crimea. Taiwan moves closer to China, but its political opposition remains opposed. ¶ South Korean opinion of China declined sharply from a high point a decade ago and struggles to recover. Disputed claims in the South China Sea seriously complicate often close economic relations with Southeast Asian countries. China’s remarkable military modernization seriously concerns major trading partners; Australia is much more wary of China than ten years ago. ¶ Trade in Asia remains heavily interdependent. Half of Chinese trade is conducted by foreign invested enterprises in China. 60 percent of the goods that are exported from China and ASEAN are ultimately manufactures that go to the United States, Europe and Japan. Only 22 percent of these goods stay in the China-ASEAN region. Actual Chinese aid (as opposed to financing that will be repaid in money or commodities) to Asia is very small, with the exception of Chinese aid to North Korea. ¶ China has shown no viable way of dealing North Korea, perhaps the largest foreign insecurity for the Xi Jinping government. ¶ Chinese insecurities are reinforced by U.S. strengths as America influences and leads in Asia: ¶ Security guarantor. Most Asian governments stress development that requires a stable and secure environment. Unfortunately, Asia is not particularly stable and Asian governments tend to distrust one another. They rely on the United States to maintain regional stability. The U.S. security role is very expensive and involves great risk, including many casualties if necessary. Neither China nor any other Asian power or coalition of powers is able or willing to undertake even a fraction of these risks and costs. ¶ Essential economic partner. Most Asian governments depend importantly on export oriented growth. Growing Asian trade relies on the United States. Most notably, Asian exports lead to a massive trade surplus with the open U.S. market. China consistently avoids such costs that nonetheless are very important for Asian governments. ¶ Government engagement. Apart from China, the Obama government’s rebalance has been broadly welcomed in Asia. U.S. military, other security and intelligence organizations have developed unprecedented wide ranging relationships with almost all regional governments, a posture strongly shaping Asian security. ¶ Non-government engagement. America is extraordinary in longstanding business, religious, educational, media and other non-government interchange which is widespread, uniquely influential and strongly reinforces overall U.S. sway. Generally color-blind U.S. immigration policy since 1965 means that millions of Asian migrants call America home and interact with their countries of origin in ways that undergird U.S. interests. ¶ Asian hedging. As China’s rises, Asian governments seek to work pragmatically with China, but they also seek the reassurance of close security, intelligence, and other ties with the United States, especially as China becomes more assertive. ¶ Bottom line. The Obama government rebalance seeks stability while fostering economic growth and overlaps constructively with the priorities of the vast majority of regional governments. China seeks advantageous economic interchange, but its remains insecure as its ambitions, coercion, intimidation and gross manipulation come at neighbors’ expense.

### 1NC---Defense: Economy

#### No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

Drezner 14 Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses **a dog** that **hasn't barked**: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. **During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force** as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—**whether through** greater internal **repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict**. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. **The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however**. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "**the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007**."43 **Interstate violence** in particular **has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures** in most sampled countries. Other **studies confirm that** **the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict**, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 **The** secular **decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed**. Rogers Brubaker observes that "**the crisis has not** to date **generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected**."43

### 1NC---Turn: Employment

#### Their labor shortage arguments are lies used to justify undermining domestic labor

**Whitaker et al 17** (Bill, CBS correspondent, 3/19, "Are U.S. jobs vulnerable to workers with H-1B visas?" https://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-u-s-jobs-vulnerable-to-workers-with-h-1b-visas/)

Protecting American jobs was a signature theme of President Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" campaign. A frequent target of candidate Trump was the H-1B visa program. The program, created more than 25 years ago, allows American companies to fill gaps in the workforce from overseas with highly skilled employees, who can't be found in the U.S. Many businesses use the program as intended, but we discovered more and more are taking advantage of loopholes in the law to fire American workers and replace them with younger, cheaper, temporary foreign workers with H-1B visas. But before the American workers walk out the door they often face the humiliating prospect of having to train the people taking their jobs.

Last October, Robert Harrison, a senior telecom engineer at the University of California San Francisco Medical Center, was called to a meeting at the university with about 80 of his IT co-workers.

Bill Whitaker: What did they say to you?

Robert Harrison: We are sorry to inform you that as of Feb. 28, you'll no longer have a job. We're going to outsource your position to this company in India.

Bill Whitaker: To a company in India.

Robert Harrison: Yes, sir.

Harrison was told he could stay on the job, get paid for four more months, and get a bonus if he trained his replacement.

Robert Harrison: And now I'm being told that I h-- not only gonna lose my job, but also have to train these people to take my job.

Bill Whitaker: Are you angry?

Robert Harrison: Pissed. That exceeds angry. I'm really not a violent guy. I love people. But I've envisioned myself just backhanding the guy as he's sitting next to me, trying to learn what I know. And I was like, God, please don't let them send anybody to sit next to me, to shadow me. I don't want to do this. I really don't.

Harrison and his colleagues staged a protest outside the Medical Center. His fellow worker, senior systems administrator Kurt Ho is losing his job too. He had just trained his replacement from India.

Kurt Ho: I think, for once, we're gonna stand up as Americans and say enough is enough. We're not gonna take it anymore.

Sara Blackwell: Thank you for standing up for what you believe in.

Their rally was organized by this woman: Florida attorney Sara Blackwell.

Sara Blackwell: This is about the companies making the decision that you are worthless to them.

She represents hundreds of U.S. workers who were fired and replaced by foreign workers with H-1B visas.

Sara Blackwell: When you tell someone their real reason for getting rid of these jobs is for cheap foreign labor that should offend everyone.

Bill Whitaker: They have to train the worker who's going to take their job?

Sara Blackwell: Right. They are told by their company: if you don't train this person in a way that we approve of them being trained, then you don't get your severance.

The UCSF Medical Center is a highly regarded state-run institution. Administrators say outsourcing the IT jobs could save $30 million taxpayer over the next five years. That's a fraction of the university's $5.8 billion annual budget, but to Robert Harrison, it's his job.

Robert Harrison: I can't wrap my mind around training somebody to take my position. You know, it's my livelihood. How am I supposed to feel?

Bill Whitaker: I've heard some workers say this is like digging your own grave. Is that what it feels like?

Robert Harrison: It feels worse than that. It feels like not only am I digging the grave, but I'm getting ready to stab myself in the gut and fall into the grave.

When the H-1B visa was created in 1990, it was intended to help the U.S. attract and hold onto the best and brightest foreign graduates – like engineers and scientists – and provide a pathway to citizenship. At the time, members of Congress promised U.S. workers would be protected.

(On the floor of the House in 1990) Bruce Morrison: This legislation protects American jobs.

Former Congressman Bruce Morrison, then Chairman of the Immigration Committee, authored the bill.

Bill Whitaker: You came up with this legislation. What do you think of what it has become?

Bruce Morrison: I'm outraged.

Bruce Morrison: The H-1B has been hijacked, as the main highway to bring people from abroad and displace Americans.

Businesses insist the visas are absolutely necessary to compete for the best global talent and that even more H-1B workers are needed to fill job shortages. Nearly every major high-tech company, including Apple, Google, Facebook, has employees here on H-1B visas. Media companies too, including CBS.

Bill Whitaker: The argument you hear from the high tech firms is that they can't find enough qualified American workers.

Bruce Morrison: Well, there are a lot of qualified American workers, but the companies will do better financially if they hire the foreign worker rather than the American.

Bill Whitaker: The American workers are just as skilled as you are? Perhaps even more skilled?

Rajesh: Yes. That's true --

Rajesh works at a major Wall Street bank on an H-1B visa. To protect his job, and personal safety, he asked that we change his appearance and name.

He was placed at the bank by one of the growing number of outsourcing companies. Most of these global staffing firms are based in India, they've become multibillion dollar enterprises supplying American companies with H-1B workers, like Rajesh, to replace American workers. Rajesh said he was never told in India he'd be taking Americans' jobs.

Rajesh (Translator): I have to take all of their knowledge in –basically I have to steal it. That's my job description.

Bill Whitaker: And the American worker is let go?

Rajesh (Translator): Yeah. The American workers -- lose their job and -- they also -- cry while leaving the job.

Bill Whitaker: They cry?

Rajesh (Translator): They've been working there for 20 years, and suddenly I have taken their job. If I lose a job I can go back to India. But where can they go?

Bill Whitaker: You must know that when most native-born Americans see this going on, they blame you.

Rajesh (Translator): Yes, but I am not the enemy. The main villains are the Indian companies and their American Corporate clients. They are exploiting us.

Bill Whitaker: Why can't we just say we're going to give jobs to Americans first?

Bruce Morrison: Well, that's what the statute says, but --

Bill Whitaker: But?

Bruce Morrison: They put in a loophole. And the loophole says, "If ya pay over $60,000, ya can do that." And besides that, you don't have to try to find Americans. Well, $60,000 is not high pay for this kind of work. People doing this work today easily make $120,000-140,000.

Bill Whitaker: Who put in that loophole?

Bruce Morrison: Well, the-- it was done by Congress. But obviously the industry lobbied for it. It's really a travesty that should never have been allowed to happen.

### 1NC---Turn: Growth

#### Growth now makes war more likely—globalization is becoming militarized

Capie, prof IR, 11—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, Visiting Scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, Research Associate in the ASEAN Studies Centre at American University, co-editor of the journal Political Science, member of the editorial board of Asian Politics and Policy (David, 7/16/2011, “Welcome to the dark side? Mittelman's encounter with global insecurity”, Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis, AL)

The book's thesis is that there are two systemic drivers of contemporary security and insecurity. The first is what Mittelman calls hypercompetition, the ‘intensified competition that agglomerates markets’. Accelerated by ‘new technologies, the rise of transnational capital and increasing labour mobility’, national production systems are giving way to global firms with supply chains extending across the world. The language of war has permeated commerce, with corporations embracing aspects of a Hobbesian ‘warre of all against all’ as they seek to cut costs, raise efficiency and dominate markets. Hypercompetition is ‘heavily but not totally American’ in several of its facets, including the long reach of US markets, investment in R&D, the prevalence of neoliberal ideas about the ordering of the economy and society as well as the prevalence of American popular culture.

The second is the concentration of power in an historically unprecedented hegemonic actor: the United States of America. The book puts aside the traditional vocabulary of geopolitics, arguing that the USA is not a superpower or even a great power enjoying a unipolar moment. Rather, ‘in light of the large distance between the United States and the other major powers in a globalizing world’, the preferred term is hyperpower.3 The idea builds on the notion of hyperpuissance coined by French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine in 1998, but, drawing on Gramscian notions of consensual hegemony and Foucauldian biopolitics, Mittelman gives it more precision and extracts greater analytic leverage from it. Notably, in his vision, although there can be only one hyperpower, the concept extends beyond the USA as a state. Instead, hyperpower is imperial in character, a ‘weblike structure, including a net of overseas military bases, a clutch of allies, aspects of ideological appeal, and an educational system that widely propagates values associated with those at the epicentre of globalization’.4

When hypercompetition and hyperpower converge (or coincide), the conditions point to the book's third core concept: hyperconflict. This arises ‘out of the tension between the logic of statecentric and polycentric worlds’ and when ‘a medley of nonstate actors both accommodates and more assertively resists state initiatives’.5 Although only in a ‘nascent’ phase, hyperconflict expresses itself as ‘heightened coercion and weakening consensus’, ‘pervasive uncertainty’ and ‘a rising climate of fear’.6 Contrasting the ‘old’ order of war with the ‘new’ order of militarized globalization, Mittelman argues that the old order was ‘permeated by wars between states and within them, as well as partial safeguards with rules to manage them’. This has been ‘partly supplanted by hyperpower enmeshed in various conflicts, but the most flagrant conflicts deny military solutions. In fact, the application of more and more coercion inflames tensions, emboldens unconventional enemies, and inspires recruits for their causes.’7 The three concepts serve less as a model or formal explanation of contemporary insecurity and work more as a heuristic, ‘a grammar for thinking about evolving forms of world order’.8 The author seeks to provide a vocabulary through which the links between globalization and insecurity can be understood holistically and critically explored. One of Hyperconflict's most significant contributions is the wide-ranging theoretical discussion that fills its first two chapters, offering a sophisticated distillation of the vast literatures on globalization and peace and conflict to form a compelling and provocative account.

### 1NC---Turn: STEM

#### Government expansion of STEM supply kills STEM

Macilwain, 13- Colin Macilwain writes about science policy from Edinburgh, UK (“Driving students into science is a fool’s errand” Nature, 5/13, <http://www.nature.com/news/driving-students-into-science-is-a-fool-s-errand-1.12981>

The United States spent more than US$3 billion last year across 209 federal programmes intended to lure young people into careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). The money goes on a plethora of schemes at school, undergraduate and postgraduate levels, all aimed at promoting science and technology, and raising standards of science education. In a report published on 10 April, Congress’s Government Accountability Office (GAO) asked a few pointed questions about why so many potentially overlapping programmes coexist. The same day, the 2014 budget proposal of President Barack Obama’s administration suggested consolidating the programmes, but increasing funding. What no one asked was whether these many activities actually benefit science and engineering, or society as a whole. My answer to both questions is an emphatic ‘no’. Taken individually, of course, these programmes are all very cuddly and wonderful. They are keenly pursued by governments around the world — particularly in countries that fret about their economic competitiveness, such as the United Kingdom and the United States. But taken together, these schemes — which allocate perhaps $600 to each child passing through the US education system — constitute bad public policy. Government promotion of science careers ultimately damages science and engineering, by inflating supply and depressing demand for scientists and engineers in the employment market. Start by asking why no such government-backed programmes exist to pull children into being lawyers or accountants. The obvious answer is that there is no need: young people can see the prospects in these fields for themselves. As a result, places to study these subjects tend to be fiercely competitive. But in many science and engineering disciplines, college places are ten-a-penny after decades of sustained government efforts to render them more attractive. The dynamic at work here isn’t complicated. By cajoling more children to enter science and engineering — as the United Kingdom also does by rigging university-funding rules to provide more support for STEM than other subjects — the state increases STEM student numbers, floods the market with STEM graduates, reduces competition for their services and cuts their wages. And that suits the keenest proponents of STEM education programmes — industrial employers and their legion of lobbyists — absolutely fine. It’s not as if $3 billion is spent on promoting STEM education each year because US parents demand it. “I just wish little Mary got the chance to do science at school” is not a phrase, I would submit, that politicians often hear on the doorstep. Nor do universities ask for programmes to encourage more kids to enter undergraduate science. It is true that some of the larger STEM programmes — notably those at the US National Science Foundation — were backed historically by the Congressional Black Caucus and other organizations in a laudable, but thus far unsuccessful, effort to bring more under-represented minorities into science and engineering. But the main backing for government intervention in STEM education has come from the business lobby. If I had a dollar for every time I’ve heard a businessman stand up and bemoan the alleged failure of the education system to produce the science and technology ‘skills’ that his company requires, I’d be a very rich man. I have always struggled to recognize the picture these detractors paint. I find most recent science graduates to be positively bursting with both technical knowledge and enthusiasm. If business people want to harness that enthusiasm, all they have to do is put their hands in their pockets and pay and train newly graduated scientists and engineers properly. It is much easier, of course, for the US National Association of Manufacturers and the British Confederation of British Industry to keep bleating that the state-run school- and university-education systems are ‘failing’. The GAO report on STEM education points out that few of the “complicated patchwork of overlapping programmes” are ever assessed for their effectiveness. Now the Obama administration is proposing, in its 2014 budget, that the existing spread of programmes be consolidated within just three agencies. This proposal sounds eminently reasonable — but is unlikely to happen, given the congressional appropriations process and the sheer impossibility of transferring resources from, say, the National Institutes of Health to the Smithsonian. Instead of playing political games with the issue, the Obama administration should take a closer look at whether this cluster of activity is worth $3 billion — especially when essential spending is being cut across the board. The state can’t manage or second-guess the labour market, and its efforts to do so are doomed to failure. Government policy should be to tell the education system what most parents tell their own kids: if you love immunology or geophysics, go ahead and do it; if your love is music or investment banking, do that instead.

### 1NC---UQ: Growth Down

#### Growth peaked – immigration is the boost to avoid a recession

Bell 6/6 (2018, Mike, Financial Adviser contributor, “Has US economic growth peaked?”, FT Adviser, https://www.ftadviser.com/investments/2018/06/06/has-us-economic-growth-peaked/?page=1)

Surveys in the US indicate that business optimism and the pace of economic growth are most likely peaking. With the US unemployment rate at only 3.8 per cent, fast approaching the lowest level seen in the last 50 years, economic growth should naturally slow as the economy starts to run out of workers who are available and sufficiently trained to fill the increasing number of job vacancies. There are currently over 6.5m unfilled job openings in the US, the highest level on record. The percentage of people who think it is hard to get a job at the moment has fallen to 15 per cent, the lowest level since 2001. To keep growing at the pace it has been, the US needs either more immigration or an increase in worker productivity. But, the political environment has clearly shifted in favour of less rather than more immigration. Productivity growth, getting more output out of existing workers, could be the knight in shining armour which comes to the rescue. Business investment intentions surveys give some hope that a potential rise in productivity is a possibility. However, this has historically been remarkably rare, with productivity growth tending to decline when unemployment rates are low, with the notable exception of the late 1990s. So while a productivity pickup is a possibility, it may not materialise in a meaningful enough way in time to save this economic cycle. If so, growth rates will likely peak soon. With US corporate earnings growing by 24 per cent year-on-year in the latest quarterly reporting season, helped by the sugar rush of tax cuts, it is also almost inevitable that the pace of US earnings growth will peak this year. Even excluding the effect of tax cuts, US companies will probably struggle to continue to grow earnings at the strong pace they currently are. In the eurozone, unemployment has more room to fall than in the US, and earnings are rising off of a lower base. As in the US, business surveys suggest the pace of growth may have peaked, but the economy will grow less quickly rather than contract in the coming months. Key points The US economy needs either more immigration or an increase in worker productivity to keep growing at the same pace A peak in the pace of growth need not be bad for equity markets What were the warning signs of past bear markets? Still high consumer confidence suggests that equities have not yet peaked. Eurozone data has been disappointing relative to expectations since the start of March. However, since 2005 as long as the economy does not head into recession and the data merely stops disappointing by as much as it has been, eurozone equities have always made gains over the next six months. This suggests that while the political situation in Italy poses some downside risks, eurozone equities probably have not peaked and are most at risk from an eventual US recession dragging them lower. With US economic growth and corporate earnings peaking, is that a reason to fear that January’s high for the S&P 500 was the high point for this cycle? If we look at the previous cycle, the pace of US economic growth peaked at the end of 2003 and then slowed pretty consistently all the way into the recession in 2008. Despite the pace of growth peaking in late 2003, US equities did not peak until October 2007. So clearly a peak in the pace of growth, need not be bad for equity markets, as long as the economy continues to grow. Investors also worry about the peak in the US Institute for Supply Management’s (ISM) surveys as they have historically been a good lead indicator for growth. The ISM manufacturing survey peaked in February at 60.8, consistent with very strong growth, and has since fallen to 58.7, consistent with still healthy but slightly less strong growth. Since the 1950s, once the ISM manufacturing survey hit 60, the S&P 500 made gains nearly 70 per cent of the time over the next six months. Historically, the peak in equity markets, has normally required not just a slowdown in growth but for there to be a recession on the horizon within the next year. The flash crash of 1987 is the only equity bear market since the 1970s that was not followed by a recession within a year. While medium term recession risks are clearly rising as interest rates rise, the probability of the US entering recession by this time next year remains quite low given that the boost from the US administration’s fiscal stimulus is only just beginning to filter through into the economy. So if peak economic and earnings growth are not signals for a peak in equity markets,what were the warning signs of past bear markets? In both of the last two, the conference board’s leading economic indicator peaked before equity markets. The three month average of initial jobless claims troughed at or just before the point at which equities peaked. The conference board’s measure of consumer confidence also peaked around the same time as equities and was falling sharply by the time equities entered a bear market. At the moment, these economic indicators are not suggesting that US equities have already peaked. When the facts change, we should change our minds but not until then. With the unemployment rate at such low levels and wages and interest rates rising, the probability of a US recession at some point in the next two to three years seems pretty elevated. However, with the economic data still positive it is probably too early to call the peak in equities just yet.

#### Long run growth is down – immigration solves

Noorani 6/12 (2018, Ali, executive director of the National Immigration Forum and author of the 2017 book “There Goes the Neighborhood.”, “To succeed economically, we need sound immigration policies — not scare tactics”, The Hill, <http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/391884-to-succeed-economically-we-need-sound-immigration-policies-not-scare>)

The U.S. economy is picking up steam in the short term — a very good thing. But it also means that the economy isn’t positioned to remain competitive in the long term — a very bad thing. Because if firms can’t fill all the orders, provide all the services, or sell all the products that they could with a fully-staffed operation, the economy starts to stall. Business owners, many of whom voted for President Trump, are rightly worried they won’t be able to keep their shops open without a growing workforce. And immigration will be a leading factor in whether our economy can continue full-steam ahead. Our ability to meet America’s future workforce depends, in no small part, on ensuring the U.S. has sound immigration policies that meet the economic needs of small business owners on main street and public company CEOs on Wall Street. The challenge isn’t in today’s numbers, it’s in the trajectory looking forward: The government has projected that the economy will add 9.8 million jobs between 2014 and 2024, but the labor force will grow by only 7.9 million workers. Instead of separating young children from their parents to “send a message” at the border, and instead of deploying sting operations to instill fear in immigrant communities, we need to reform the system to ensure the U.S. attracts and retains workers — and their families \_ who want to contribute. This would not represent a new approach to immigration policy, it would represent an American approach: Immigrants always have helped to build this country. They built — and still build — roads, buildings, restaurants and companies. In 2017, 216 companies on the Fortune 500 list were founded or co-founded by immigrants or their children, including Apple, Amazon and AT&T. Those immigrant-founders created $5.3 trillion in global revenue and employed 12.1 million workers worldwide. But it’s not just about the next Albert Einstein or Sergey Brin ushering in a new wave of innovation, it’s also about ensuring we have an adequate workforce at every level — in the fields, on the manufacturing floor, and in the classroom. We should be making it easier, not harder, for American businesses to hire workers. And between now and 2035, we will have immigrants and their children to thank for all growth in the U.S. workforce. While Trump moves to prevent talented immigrant entrepreneurs from launching new American businesses, and while some members of Congress attempt to curb legal immigration, Canada, China, South Korea, and other competitor nations are doing everything they can to lure talent. Demographics tell the story, as our new report at the National Immigration Forum notes. As baby boomers leave the workforce (10,000 a day turn 65), we simply don’t have the numbers of American-born workers to fill the gap. Immigrants tend to participate in the labor force at higher rates than U.S.-born workers. What’s more, among immigrant workers, a third are not documented. We have to provide better ways for all employers, and employees, to fill jobs legally. Most members of Congress want to see a sensible solution on the immigration debate. One that sends a clear message to the global community that we are a nation of laws and a nation of grace. As other countries recruit immigrant workers — from the farmer to the engineer — we need to come together and do the right thing. If we don’t, it’s the American worker and the American family who lose.

#### **Tariffs deck growth**

Bryan 6/7 (2018, Bob, “Trump's own economic team has a study that undercuts his main arguments on tariffs”, Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tariffs-trade-war-cea-study-shows-hurt-economy-2018-6)

President Donald Trump says his recent tariffs are designed to protect US workers and industries. An internal report from the White House Council of Economic Advisers, however, showed that the tariffs will be a drag on US economic growth. Many economists and trade experts estimated that the tariffs would cause the US economy to grow at a slower pace. Even President Donald Trump's own economic team thinks the president's new trade policies are likely to hurt the US economy. According to The New York Times, an internal report prepared by the White House Council of Economic Advisers showed that the tariffs would be detrimental to US economic growth. The report, like many CEA studies, has been kept private by the administration. Such a report would concur with analyses from Wall Street economists, academics, and trade experts. It would also confirm the fears of CEOs, manufacturers, and leading business groups. But the report would also hurt the argument of many in the Trump administration that the US economy can still see robust economic growth even with the tariffs in place. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross told CNBC that the tariffs would have a negligible effect on growth, claiming that GDP growth over 3% is "very, very achieveable." In March, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the administration was "comfortable with the economic impact" of the tariffs. CEA Chair Kevin Hassett, whose office is responsible for the internal analysis, avoided answering numerous questions about economic effects of Trump's tariffs during a White House press briefing on Tuesday. Hassett, a former economist at the pro-free trade American Enterprise Institute, would only say that the president is working "to get fair trade deals." Much of the Trump administration repeatedly argued that the tariffs will encourage other countries to lower their trade barriers on US goods, thereby boosting the economy. "If you model a future where everybody else reduces their trade barriers to ours, then that's massively good for the global economy and massively good for the US economy," Hassett told reporters. But rather than lower trade barriers, so far the countries that Trump has gone after are taking things in the opposite direction. After the president imposed steel and aluminum tariffs on key allies, Canada, Mexico, and the European Union responded with tariffs of their own. Economists have warned that Trump's policies could push the US economy could fall into a recession in the event the tensions escalate into an all-out trade war.

### 1NC---AT: Innovation

#### H-1B immigrants don’t increase innovation – patenting rates.

Doran et al 16 [Kirk Doran, University of Notre Dame, Alexander Gelber, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, and NBER, Adam Isen, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries”, February 2016, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/h1b.pdf]

Firms have often argued that shortages in high-skilled immigrants with unique skills prevent innovation, including patenting in particular (e.g. Gates 2008, Case 2012). Following much previous literature, we study patenting as a measure of innovation because it is an innovation outcome we can readily observe and is sometimes seen as an observable proxy for innovation more broadly (see the surveys by Nagaoka, Motohashi, and Goto 2010, and Hall and Harhoff 2012). Our patenting specifications examine the impact of additional H-1B visa wins on the firm’s approved patents up to nine years after the start of the visa. The point estimates are near zero, and are insignificantly different from zero. We focus on the confidence intervals, which show that any increase in patenting is at most small in small and medium-sized firms. For example, in firms with 10 or fewer employees, we bound any increase in patenting at or below 0.47 percent, on a base mean of only 0.023 patents per year; one of our intriguing findings is the simple descriptive fact that even among firms applying for H-1Bs, patenting rates are low. Thus, we find little effect on our observable measure of innovation even relative to the small baseline number of patents. The small absolute patenting levels and small percentage effects together imply at most little absolute increase. We are interested in the maximum absolute increase, as increasing the quantity of innovation is often seen as desirable. Similarly, we bound in level regressions the yearly increase in patents at 0.0021 or below. Such results also hold when we exclude firms that likely provide temporary technical support services. The confidence intervals similarly rule out more than a modest positive percentage or absolute impact on these firms’ use of the research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit, another measure of innovative activity.

### 1NC---AT: Business Certainty

#### No impact to uncertainty – doesn’t explain the recession and doesn’t affect business

Fridson 10 (Martin, “Business isn’t paralyzed by uncertainty,” Forbes, September 8, [http://blogs.forbes.com/investor/2010/09/08/business-isnt-paralyzed-by-uncertainty/)\*\*we](http://blogs.forbes.com/investor/2010/09/08/business-isnt-paralyzed-by-uncertainty/)**we) don’t endorse offensive language used in this evidence

Week in and week out pundits make the unchallenged assertion that business is paralyzed by uncertainty about taxes and regulation.  “It doesn’t matter to entrepreneurs what the rules will be,” claim the cable television talking heads. “All they’re looking for is predictability.  Without it, how can we expect them to invest for growth?” As explanations for the economy’s lethargy go, this one strikes me as highly improbable.  To begin with, there are simpler, more quantifiable explanations for companies’ hesitancy to step up production and hire additional employees.  For example, one-quarter of existing industrial capacity is currently idle.  It’s not attractive for companies to expand their facilities unless they have reason to expect a near-term surge in demand.  Unfortunately, consumers appear unlikely to provide that boost.  Instead, they’ll probably continue saving at a heightened rate, as long as unemployment remains high and housing prices show no clear sign of bottoming. Another problem with the “paralyzed by uncertainty” thesis is that uncertainty is a perennial challenge in business planning.  That’s a good thing, because economists tell us that under conditions of little uncertainty there is little margin for profit.  Managers can never be certain that a natural disaster won’t disrupt their production, that the price of oil won’t rise by 50%, or that the Federal Reserve won’t unexpectedly raise interest rates.  Why should government policy be uniquely paralyzing among all the uncertainties facing business? Furthermore, intelligent business leaders surely recognize that no administration can ensure continuity in government policy.  Every two years elections alter the political balance in Congress, potentially causing a reversal in direction on taxes and regulation.  In-between elections a financial crisis or a wave of financial scandals may create an unstoppable impetus for new legislation along the lines of Sarbanes-Oxley or Dodd-Frank. We can be fairly certain of one thing:  We will never hear business respond to a tax cut or a rollback of regulation by complaining to the government, “We weren’t expecting that! You’ve spoiled our carefully laid plans.”

### 1NC---AT: China Rise

#### China will never overtake the U.S. for economic dominance

Weinberger ‘10 (David-, Feb. 3, Heritage Foundry, “Why China is Not an Economic Threat to the United States”, http://blog.heritage. org/2010/02/03/why-china-is-not-an-economic-threat-to-the-u-s/)

Recent reports of China’s economic growth contrasted with the U.S. economic downturn have left Americans increasingly concerned that China is becoming a new superpower, controls American finances and will surpass the United States as the world’s leading power. The reality is that the fundamentals of the American economy are stronger than China’s, and U.S. prospects are better. Let’s take exhibit A. It may appear that China contributes the most to world GDP and leads global growth given its 10.7 percent growth last quarter, as well as its 8.7 percent average growth last year. However, that’s not an indicative measure of a strong economy. Aside from the fact that China’s GDP numbers are illusory (largely because of how the country calculates its GDP), a significant portion of the growth China is experiencing is not creating wealth, it is merely taking it from other countries. In other words, Chinese growth is partly the result of detraction from, not addition to, world GDP, which means much of its success is dependent upon others. This is because of the way China’s economy is set up. China relies on its trade surplus with the rest of the world as the lifeblood of its economy. It exports vastly more than it imports. Seen in this light, China sucks GDP from other countries in addition to creating its own. Therefore, while it may be leading the world in GDP growth, to a notable extent these GDP gains are the result of China using the world to boost itself higher. That does not mean, however, that China does not produce anything. To the contrary, over the last couple of decades, China has contributed to the world economy. While China’s production has historically met consumer demand to keep prices low around the globe, the world-wide recession is now causing China to oversupply due to weak global demand, which could lead to deflation. This is hardly an indication of a sound, robustly-growing economy. If China does not start developing more of its own domestic economy for its people, trouble looms. Further, China is not America’s banker, as many people believe. President Obama’s stimulus package was bad policy, but the notion that China is now funding our economy as a result is a fallacy. America could get by without China funding its debt. What’s largely unknown is that China officially holds less than 7 percent of U.S. treasuries, and that Chinese bond purchases declined in 2009, to under $100 billion, while our deficit soared to an all-time high of $1.4 trillion. Moreover, China does not buy our debt for our sake; it does so it because it depends on an economy as large and sound as ours for its own growth propelled through trade: The same set of rules that keep its currency undervalued means, by law, it can’t spend at home the huge pile of cash that it sits on. In that respect, China is more directly tied to us than we are to them. If the United States were to discontinue trade with China, it would hurt them more than us. Finally, China is not going to surpass the United States as the world economic leader any time soon. We control about a fourth of the wealth in the world – more than China, India, Japan and the rest of Asia combined. Other indicators are just as definitive. The average American earns close to fifteen times more than the average person in China. If the United States keeps tax rates low, shows spending discipline, and brings the deficit down to promote solid economic growth, there is strong reason to believe that China will never surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy.

#### No China rise – U.S. maintains economic and military primacy

Gayton 12/8 (2017, Melissa, Harvard Research Assistant at Access to Justice Lab, “Dispelling the Myth of the China Threat”, Harvard Political Review, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/dispelling-myth-china-threat/)

The Reality behind the Myth Despite popular perception, China has not yet overtaken the United States as the world’s top economy. Not only is China’s GDP growth slowing, but China’s GDP is still about 7 trillion dollars short of the U.S. GDP. That being said, China’s economic takeover of the United States in terms of GDP “almost surely will come, simply by the scope of the population, the scope of production in China and the level of investment in China,” according to Harvard professor William Kirby. However, Kirby also pointed to a couple of ways that GDP fails to tell the entire story of a country’s economic development. First, Kirby noted that “GDP is a very crude measure of growth, in the sense that it measures production more than consumption, even wasteful production.” In terms of China’s production, Kirby explained that since local and regional political officials are rated on the level of GDP growth in the area they supervise, there is incentive for wasteful expenditures. For example, “GDP growth can happen in a number of ways, but construction is an easy way to expand GDP, and in China there has been no shortage of wasteful construction.” While wasteful spending does not account for the entirety of China’s rapid growth rate, it does mean that not every dollar of GDP truly reflects productive economic activity. China’s per capita GDP also lags behind at $6,894.50, compared to the United States’ $52,194.90. The average American continues to enjoy a much higher income and standard of living than the average Chinese citizen. It must not be forgotten that while China has experienced rather rapid economic development, it is still a developing country with a large population and faces the rather serious challenge of providing services to care for its rapidly aging population. Second, Kirby highlighted the regional differences in economic growth in China. “China is one country, but it isn’t one economy. There’s nothing like 6.9 percent economic growth in Northeastern China,” said Kirby, “It’s much more interesting to look at this as a series of linked and powerful regional economies as well as a national economy.” In terms of China’s military, its growth has brought new challenges, yet it has not surpassed the U.S. military in quality. Focusing on the important competition over naval power, Professor Robert Ross of Boston College discussed the disadvantages of the Chinese navy in an interview with the HPR. “In terms of capabilities and technology, China has much catching up to do.” While the size of the Chinese military and its rate of growth do present challenges to the United States, these challenges are not insurmountable as long as the United States maintains advantages in technology. Besides these concrete measures of military strength, there is also the issue of combat experience, which the Chinese military currently lacks. China’s military has not seen major combat since the Vietnam War in 1979, and even Chinese military strategists point to this lack of actual combat experience as a point of concern. “The military has no real experience fighting,” said Professor Alastair Iain Johnston of Harvard. He explained that “The United States has been fighting wars continuously since at least 2003. It is a very experienced, tested military.” This may impact China’s ability to employ its military effectively, even if the quantity and quality of its military equipment has advanced. “There is this big question mark of how they would actually operate in an actual war,” said Johnston. Additionally, there is a debate to be had over whether China will continue to prioritize military expansion as the country is confronted with other costly social issues. “You’re going to have more and more demand for services for elderly people. The question is whether that will put pressure on the guns versus butter trade off,” said Johnston, referring to the trade-off between military and social spending. Dispelling the Myth While it is a myth that China has unambiguously surpassed the United States and become the new world hegemon, China’s economic and military growth certainly has changed the world. However, China’s growth is not necessarily a threat to the United States, and in some respects is quite positive. China’s economic growth in particular may be beneficial overall for the United States. “I think the history of the last 40 years would indicate that the world, including the United States, is much better off, broadly speaking, with a growing China than with a poor or less well-off China,” said Kirby. While some manufacturing jobs may have been lost to China, these jobs would have been lost to other nations anyway, and there are tremendous opportunities for U.S. investment in a growing China, according to Kirby. China’s military growth may be less ambiguously positive. A stronger China that is more willing to defend its interests poses a challenge to the United States in defending its own interests. China’s military growth may make it costlier for the United States to assert its interests in areas such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. However, China’s rise doesn’t necessarily make it a new world hegemon. “Hegemony, even in the 21st century, is still a question of physically showing up, and China doesn’t have the capacity to sustain a military security presence around the world the way the United States does,” said Johnston. China has only a single formal ally—the unstable and unpredictable North Korea—while the United States enjoys defense alliances with over 50 countries. While China’s growing capabilities have allowed the country to pose a challenge to the United States in nearby conflicts, the further away from China the conflict gets, the more clear the United States’ advantage becomes.

#### **China isn’t a threat to the U.S.**

Morris 11/2 (2017, Brett S., Jacobin, Vox, and CounterPunch writer, “China Is Not a Significant Threat to the United States”, Medium, https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/china-is-not-a-significant-threat-to-the-united-states-8593733e0080)

In September, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress he believes China will pose the “greatest threat” to the United States by 2025. It’s something we’ve been hearing a lot of from commentators: Is China a rising superpower? Will it someday displace the United States as the world’s most powerful country? Will the United States and China go to war? In short, the answers are: no, very unlikely, and probably not. Obviously, no one can predict the future, but the “threat of China” has been seriously overblown. To be sure, China is a rising power and expanding its global influence, but there is no reason to believe it’s on the cusp of becoming a superpower that could rival the likes of the United States. It’s true that China has the world’s largest population, and its economy has expanded rapidly over the past several decades. However, China has enormous problems that stand in its way of becoming a potential superpower. Furthermore, though the “decline of American power” is a real phenomenon, the United States is likely to remain the superior actor (though the decline is, in many ways, self-inflicted). China Is Still a Poor Country By many measures, China’s economy is doing quite well. Its GDP is worth $11 trillion (ranked second only to the United States), its economy grew 6.7 percent in 2016, and it has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of extreme poverty over the past few decades. However, a closer look reveals that China has significant problems. First, though the country’s economic growth is still quite impressive, the rate has slowed and is unlikely to reach double-digit growth again: Data: World Bank Furthermore, in per capita terms, China’s GDP is quite low: just over $8,000 and ranked below such countries as Costa Rica, Romania, and Equatorial Guinea. (The per capita GDP of the United States is more than $57,000.) In addition, China’s impressive GDP numbers are actually somewhat misleading. A substantial portion of China’s “exports” that drives its GDP are anything but. Take, for example, the iPhone — turn it over and you’ll see that it says “Made in China.” But this isn’t really true. The iPhone is designed in the United States, and most of its component parts are manufactured in Taiwan and South Korea. These parts are then shipped to China, where the iPhone is assembled by low-wage workers and then exported. It isn’t really “made in China”; it is merely assembled there. As the political economist Sean Starrs has pointed out, “China’s rise is assembled in China but designed in the United States.” This is because “it is foreign corporations — especially American — that ultimately own and profit by far the most from the bulk of the internationally oriented sectors in China.” As Starrs explains, “The traditional way of conceptualizing national power,” including a measure like GDP, is inadequate in the era of globalization when transnational corporations have operations spread across the world. “Even though China has a virtual monopoly on the export of iPhones, for instance, it is Apple that reaps the majority of profits from iPhone sales. More broadly, more than three-quarters of the top 200 exporting firms from China are actually foreign, not Chinese,” Starrs says. Overall, China is ranked 90th on the Human Development Index. Its two wealthy neighbors, Japan and South Korea, are ranked 17th and 18th, respectively. The United States is ranked 10th. (Norway is ranked first.) Though China continues to improve its HDI values, the rate of its progress has slowed and is mostly stuck at around its current numbers. Another problem China will have to confront is its aging population—a “looming societal crisis,” as Howard W. French explains in the Atlantic: China today boasts roughly five workers for every retiree. By 2040, this highly desirable ratio will have collapsed to about 1.6 to 1. From the start of this century to its midway point, the median age in China will go from under 30 to about 46, making China one of the older societies in the world. At the same time, the number of Chinese older than 65 is expected to rise from roughly 100 million in 2005 to more than 329 million in 2050 — more than the combined populations of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain. With more people exiting the workforce than entering it, economic growth will inevitably slow. Indirectly, it will probably also decrease the likelihood of a military conflict with outside powers such as the United States, because China will be forced to dedicate resources to care for its elderly instead of spending on the military. Beyond this, China has huge environmental problems. China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. As Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu write in a backgrounder for the Council on Foreign Relations: The country’s energy consumption has ballooned, with reports from late 2015 implying that it consumed up to 17 percent more coal than previously reported. In January 2013, Beijing experienced a prolonged bout of smog so severe that citizens dubbed it an “airpocalypse”; the concentration of hazardous particles was forty times the level deemed safe by the World Health Organization (WHO). In December 2015, Beijing issued red alerts for severe pollution — the first since the emergency alert system was established. The municipal government closed schools, limited road traffic, halted outdoor construction, and paused factory manufacturing. At least 80 percent of China’s 367 cities with real-time air quality monitoring failed to meet national small-particle pollution standards during the first three quarters of 2015, according to a Greenpeace East Asia report. As Albert and Xu write, water depletion and pollution are also major problems: 90 percent of its water supplies are dedicated to either the agriculture or coal industries, leaving two-thirds of China’s cities with water shortages. More than a quarter of China’s key rivers are “unfit for human contact” because of pollution, and more than a million square miles of China’s landmass is undergoing desertification because of “negligent farming practices, overgrazing, and the effects of climate change.” The United States Versus China China is aware of its problems and is doing what it can to solve and mitigate them; for example, becoming a leading investor in renewable energy. But the country clearly has a long way to go before it becomes as powerful and rich as a first-world country like the United States. That’s not to say that the “rise of China” — such as it is — isn’t in some ways threatening, with its island building and expansion into the South China Sea. It may also bring opportunities. China’s “Belt and Road” initiative — the country’s investment in numerous infrastructure projects along the old Silk Road across Eurasia — could lead to greater regional integration, more prosperity, and a decline in ethnic/religious tensions. China is similarly investing in infrastructure projects in Africa. In many ways, what China is trying to do is overcome its “century of humiliation” (when China was subject to Western and Japanese imperialism from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries) and reestablish something like the tributary system that used to exist in the region. To an extent, it’s probably inevitable, but it’s important to bear in mind all the problems China still faces, as discussed above. While the “decline of American power” is real, it is not as severe as some say, and there’s no reason to believe the center of world power will shift from the United States to China. When it comes to American power, it probably peaked at the end of World War II, when the United States emerged as the strongest and most economically dominant country, with much of the rest of the world in ruins. Soon, however, Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union recovered, and, naturally, U.S. power declined somewhat. When the communists emerged victorious in China’s civil war, U.S. power declined further. So the “decline of American power” is nothing new. To the extent that it’s happening, however, much of it is self-inflicted. Rather than fretting about China, the United States could instead look at what it is doing to itself: Its formal democratic institutions are increasingly failing to reflect popular opinion. It lacks the basic social safety-net programs that comparable countries have. It’s going backwards with climate change policy, leaving China to take the lead. Its wars in the Middle East have resulted in widespread devastation and growth in jihadist terrorism at the cost of trillions of dollars. Its animosity toward a declining power like Russia is only driving Moscow into Beijing’s arms. And apparently enough of the country’s citizens are so disgusted with the status quo that they are willing to vote for a narcissistic reality TV host for president. Despite all this, the United States will remain far more powerful. It spends far more on its military than China or any other country. In 2016, U.S. military spending was $611 billion (3.3 percent of U.S. GDP) while China spent $215 billion (1.9 percent of its GDP). In September, the Senate voted 89–8 to increase military spending to $700 billion, more than what President Trump wanted. (The American Empire is a bipartisan project.) While China is increasing its military budget as well, its increase is the smallest in decades. Beyond the actual spending, however, the U.S. military remains far better trained and technologically sophisticated, despite China’s increasing modernization of its military forces. Its single aircraft carrier — “a refurbished secondhand vessel” — doesn’t compare to the U.S. Navy’s multiple supercarriers that “dwarf all other flat-tops worldwide both in size and capability,” according to Popular Mechanics. China has a nuclear arsenal of 270 weapons, while the United States has about 6,800. Furthermore, U.S. military superiority in the region is amplified by arms sales and security agreements with various countries in the region: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In addition, the United States has more than 73,000 of its troops stationed in Asia, mostly in Japan and South Korea. China has nothing comparable — either in the region or near the United States.

### 1NC---AT: Competitiveness

#### Competitiveness is high and resilient.

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CHANGE VS. MORE OF THE SAME The national interests that the U.S. military needs to advance remain constant: protecting the homeland; safeguarding U.S. citizens at home and abroad; and ensuring the security of U.S. allies, the global economy, and international order more generally. These days, threats to those interests come from five sources: great powers (such as China and Russia), extremist nonstate actors (such as al Qaeda; the Islamic State, or ISIS; and the Taliban), rogue states (such as Iran and North Korea), pandemics and environmental turbulence, and developments in advanced technology that could increase U.S. vulner­abilities (especially those related to cyberspace, space, and weapons of mass destruction). Fortunately, the United States has many resources to draw on as it prepares for these threats, even beyond its military forces. The country’s high-tech and innovative sectors are the best in the world. It has solid economic fundamentals, including a gradually growing population base, the world’s best universities, and a large market at the center of global finance and commerce. And most important of all, the United States leads a globe-spanning system of alliances and partnerships that includes some 60 countries, collectively accounting for two-thirds of global economic output and military capacity.

### 1NC---AT: Labor Shortage

#### There is no labor shortage---companies exploit H1Bs to outsource and undermine American competitiveness

**Norlin 17** (Chase, CEO of Transmosis, an organization founded by Silicon Valley Technology Entrepreneurs, dedicated to the research and application of technology to strengthen the American workforce. Norlin was the founder and CEO of Emerge Digital Group, named the eighth fastest-growing company in America and the No. 1 fastest-growing company in Silicon Valley, based on revenue growth, by Inc. Magazine, "Don't Give Silicon Valley More H1B Visas," https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2017/01/14/dont\_give\_silicon\_valley\_more\_h1b\_visas\_132795.html)

In San Francisco a few years ago, my co-workers and I built a multi-million-dollar technology business without the traditional venture capital required to hire Silicon Valley’s “best and brightest.” With little money raised, we were forced to go in another direction.

We hired interns and displaced workers from other industries, ambitious and scrappy types who had not gotten the chance to shine. Then we trained them on the job and gave them increasing decision-making authority.

The results were inspiring: Emerge Digital Group revenue accelerated greatly, but equally dramatic was the transformation of workers into cutting-edge digital advertising professionals in one of the fastest-growing industries in the world. My “aha” moment came when Google and Facebook poached our employees. Helping almost anyone get a job and succeed in technology, especially if they wanted to, I realized, was possible.

My tech brethren, or the ones who run the biggest companies there at least, disagree. Increasing the number of H1B visas is their common position. Those are the federal waivers handed out to highly trained workers in fields such as technology who don’t plan to immigrate here. Already, Washington hands out 65,000 of these visas to specialist workers and another 20,000 to graduate students every year. Now Silicon Valley heavyweights are lobbying Washington for even more waivers.

In a letter dated November 14, a lobbying group whose members included Twitter, Netflix, Facebook, and Google urged President-elect Donald Trump to increase the number. “The U.S. immigration system must allow more high-skilled graduates and workers to stay in the United States and contribute to our economy,” wrote Michael Beckerman, president of the Internet Association. Last week, tech big shots like Apple CEO Tim Cook, Alphabet CEO Larry Page and Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella met with Trump in New York. You can bet the pitch was similar.

Their economic argument, that the industry suffers from a shortage of workers, is false and misleading. Big tech companies take advantage of the H1B program to drive their bottom line. The law permits companies to lay off their own employees in favor of foreign workers doing the work in the states or overseas. Think about that. The law does more than look the other way at firms that hire foreign workers instead of American citizens; it allows companies to ditch their own employees so they can hire foreign nationals. Remember the recent story about laid-off Disney workers who were forced to train their foreign replacements?

Not surprisingly, tech firms use the provision to their advantage. In late 2014, Microsoft laid off 21,000 workers. In September 2015, Hewlett Packard announced it was cutting 25,000 to 30,000 workers. That was on top of the 55,000 jobs it slashed the year before.

Another problem with the H1B program is the law rewards companies for outsourcing their training programs. About half, or 40,000 of the visas handed out each year, don’t go to firms such as Microsoft, Apple or Facebook, the companies we think about when we hear H1B. They go to professional offshore outsourcing firms such as Cognizant, which received 9,000 H1B’s last year.

Outsourcing firms operate an almost pyramid-like system: they bring foreign nationals to the United States, who then learn the jobs of American citizens. Then these foreign workers return home overseas. Many times, the best workers in India arrive in a tech-friendly city such as Seattle, learn the ins and outs of their host company, fly back to the subcontinent to run a call center or IT department, and train their workers with the skills they learned in the United States.

To be sure, this is capitalism at work, something I support as an entrepreneur. But it has gone too far. Allowing companies to outsource their training programs and lay off their own employees in favor of keeping cheap foreign labor undermines our visa program.

As a result, the H1B program does not foster or give priority to American job growth over the long run. Creating the industries of tomorrow, ensuring the next “big idea” happens here, creating a steady pipeline of future employment for U.S. workers each falls by the wayside.

### 1NC---AT: Manufacturing

#### Manufacturing not key to the economy

Wessel 12 (David Wessel, economics editor of The Wall Street, “Manufacturing Industry Gained Momentum In 2011,” 1-19-12, <http://www.npr.org/2012/01/19/145437593/are-more-u-s-manufacturing-jobs-being-created>)

WESSEL: Well, that's a good question. So basically, factories have added more than 300,000 jobs in the past two years, and that's pretty good news - certainly better than losing jobs. But it would take two million more jobs to get manufacturing back to where it was in 2007 before the recession. Factories are managing to produce more without hiring a lot more workers, because they're getting more productive; technology, reorganization, making people work harder, making them work smarter. It's all made for a remarkable surge of productivity. Factories get 40 percent more output out of every out of work today, compared to what they got 10 years ago. MONTAGNE: Still though, if sales keep growing, would factories not hire more? Maybe not as many workers as they had before, but more, and couldn't that be one part of the answer, at least, to the jobs problem? WESSEL: Well, it would definitely be one part, but it's a small part. For all the romance about manufacturing, we are no longer a manufacturing economy when it comes to jobs. Only nine percent of the jobs in America today are in manufacturing. It just isn't big enough to put Americans back to work. Even if factory employment doubled, which isn't going to happen, that wouldn't be enough new jobs to put all the 13 million unemployed people back to work. So yes, it's a plus. But no, it's not enough to solve our unemployment problem.

#### Labor and steel dumping thump—STEM can’t overcome.

Adams 16 (John, former Brigadier General, so he has some idea of what the military is up to. “What the Next President Should Do About U.S. Manufacturing: An Agenda for the First 100 Days” National Press Club, September 14, 2016 https://spea.indiana.edu/doc/mpp/adams-defense.pdf)

The Bottom Line The health of our defense industrial base is inextricably linked to our freedom and independence. The time to act is now – to head off destructive dependencies on foreign suppliers before they occur or get worse. It is in our national security interest to promptly and aggressively address the threats to our defense industrial base. To support the U.S. defense industrial base and our ability to respond to conflict and disasters, we must pursue all available means to maintain and expand a healthy defense industrial base. Key Observations • Global technological convergence has taken place as more countries have caught up in areas where the U.S. previously enjoyed clear advantages, building from the ground up to achieve technologically advanced export sectors that are eclipsing the U.S.2 • U.S. companies have steadily moved large chunks of their manufacturing supply chains offshore, a trend that started in the 1980s as a way to take advantage of cheaper labor costs in newly industrializing countries. U.S. government policies continue to offer tax-and revenue-based incentives for domestic industry to offshore manufacturing jobs. Other countries’ industrial policies, unfair trade practices and competition from State-Owned Entities (SOEs), notably in China and Russia, have created an unfair playing field for our defense industrial base manufacturers. In the 2000s, offshoring culminated in the relocation of high-tech manufacturing to emerging markets in order to take advantage of the special credits, grants, and subsidies these states offered as well as to gain proximity and greater access to other manufacturing facilities or large and growing consumer markets. Indeed, the U.S. now runs a more than $120 billion annual trade deficit with China in Advanced Technology Products. • U.S. policy responses to global economic challenges and associated growing pains have been awkward, insufficient, and often counter-productive. A largely unchallenged belief in neo-classical economics (rife with outdated assumptions) has resulted in muted responses to the gradual hollowing out of America’s manufacturing base. Although there have been voices arguing for a more interventionist and involved approach to nurture and protect manufacturing, the government response has tended to be ambivalent, to say the least. Of particular note is the current attack on our steel industry by imports of dumped and subsidized steel from China and others. Steel is an essential material for America’s national security infrastructure. It is used in the construction of everything from ships, tanks, and armaments to bridges, our electrical grid, and energy infrastructure. Continued imports of subsidized foreign steel erode the U.S. steel industry’s position as a fundamental building block of our nation’s defense industrial base. Geostrategic rivals, notably China, are practicing a 21st century form of mercantilist economic warfare in the steel sector, pushing U.S. steel manufacturers and their domestic supply chains, to the brink of irreparable damage. Left unchecked, plant closures, mass layoffs, and the loss of key technology and manufacturing know-how will continue. China’s largely state-owned steel companies are using predatory trade practices in violation of our fair trade laws, and in doing so weaken our domestic steel industry. China’s top steel producers, largely controlled by the communist regime in Beijing, are flooding international markets with subsidized steel. The potential loss of domestic steelmaking capability signals a dangerous dependence on potentially hostile foreign governments to supply the defense and critical infrastructure products necessary to equip our military, respond to disasters, and modernize our increasingly fragile infrastructure. The forces of globalization may be irreversible. However, it is not too late for businesses to stop the trend of putting short-term profit maximization ahead of long-term competitiveness. Lower production costs based on outsourcing and offshoring may lead to higher profits in the short-run, but they will continue to undermine our national security interests by diminishing productive capacity, transferring technology and putting at risk access to materials and supplies. In the long-run, this trend yields few winners among U.S. stakeholders – including management, workers, and the public at large. Our nation’s leaders should use all available legal and legislative tools to safeguard our domestic defense industrial base, ensuring that our industry will remain a strong and ready foundation for our national security and protection of critical infrastructure. We must identify and promptly address the vulnerabilities to our defense industrial base before we lose our core manufacturing capabilities – including the skilled workforce that is its backbone – especially to our most dangerous long-term strategic competitors like China and Russia. We must head off increasing dependencies on foreign suppliers before they become irreversible. Rebuilding our defense industrial base in a crisis remains an unrealistic option that risks supplies of our most important defense equipment and strategic materials at a time we need them most.

#### Trump thumps manufacturing

Duke 17 (Brendan, masters in public policy from Princeton. Associate Director of Economic Policy at Center for American Progress. “Trumps Budget is Breaking his Promises on Manufacturing” mar 27 2017 <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2017/03/27/429041/trumps-budget-breaking-promises-manufacturing/>)

One of the reasons President Donald Trump won the election was his promise to bring back American manufacturing jobs. Indeed, just a few weeks ago, [he told](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/23/remarks-president-trump-meeting-manufacturing-ceos) a group of manufacturing CEOs that “[b]ringing manufacturing back to America, creating high-wage jobs was one of our campaign promises and themes, and it resonated with everybody.” President Trump’s recent [budget proposal](https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget) breaks that promise. It would defund the [Manufacturing Extension Partnership](https://www.nist.gov/mep), or MEP, which has been proven to help manufacturers create jobs. It would also defund the [Economic Development Administration](https://www.eda.gov/), or EDA, which helps communities affected by the disappearance of manufacturing jobs recover. And it would defund the programs that will enhance the future competitiveness of American manufacturing. Trump’s budget is yet another example of his betrayal of working families. Eliminating Manufacturing Extension Partnership funding could cost 41,000 jobs The Trump administration budget eliminates federal funding for MEP, a 30-year-old public-private partnership that helps small- and medium-sized manufacturers compete. The program consists of a national network of centers that provide services to manufacturers, such as improving production processes, enhancing their technological capacity, and facilitating their product innovation. These cuts are a direct violation of President Trump’s promises to bring back manufacturing jobs. A [recent analysis](http://www.upjohn.org/national-level-economic-impact-manufacturing-extension-partnership-mep) of the program by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research shows that MEP generated an additional 82,000 jobs in 2016 that wouldn’t have existed otherwise. That amounts to more than 100 times as many jobs as the [800 Trump claimed to have saved](http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/08/trump-saved-800-jobs-indiana-but-least-2100-still-leaving/95034326/) in negotiating a deal with Carrier in Indianapolis. Given that the federal government pays up to half the cost of the program, Trump’s proposal to eliminate federal funding could cost 41,000\* jobs. Trump would have to negotiate more than 50 additional Carrier deals to make up for the job losses from defunding MEP. The job losses from eliminating MEP would also be concentrated in the swing states that elected President Trump. More than one-quarter of the job losses—11,000—would occur in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin alone. North Carolina—a state that [has seen its manufacturing industry collapse](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NCMFG) during the last 15 years—would experience the largest job loss—more than 5,000—of any state in the country. These job losses are even more inexcusable in light of the low cost of MEP: just $130 million in 2017, or 0.003 percent of total federal spending. And the Upjohn analysis of the program shows that it more than pays for itself—each dollar spent on the program increases tax revenue by $9\*\* as a result of the jobs, investment, and production it supports. Eliminating the Economic Development Administration would hurt states that elected Trump The Trump budget would also eliminate funding for EDA, an agency that specifically works to help struggling regions get back on their feet. Regions of the country that have been suffering from the disappearance of manufacturing jobs would no longer receive the support EDA provides. Indeed, EDA programs not only help communities transition away from manufacturing, they also help them transition toward the manufacturing jobs of the future. This support includes: [Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms](http://www.taacenters.org/), or TAAF: A program that provides technical assistance to companies that have been hurt by foreign competition. [Investing in Manufacturing Communities Partnership](https://www.eda.gov/imcp/communities/), or IMCP: A program that supports manufacturing in distressed communities. [Regional Innovation Strategies, or RIS, program](https://www.eda.gov/oie/ris/): A program that promotes clusters of innovation and entrepreneurship. These cuts would once again heavily affect the swing states that elected President Trump. Of the [$214 million](https://www.eda.gov/files/annual-reports/fy2015/EDA-FY2015-Annual-Report-full.pdf) in EDA funding that went to specific states in 2015, $42 million, or 20 percent, went to Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The biggest losers would be Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, which receive more than $10 million apiece. Examples of EDA funding in these states [include](https://www.eda.gov/files/annual-reports/fy2015/EDA-FY2015-Annual-Report-full.pdf): $1.4 million in disaster relief funds to assist in the renovation of the Florida Institute of Technology’s Center for Advanced Manufacturing and Innovative Design, or CAMID, in Palm Bay, Florida. Firms using space at CAMID will have access to workforce training, advanced software, and manufacturing equipment. $1 million to renovate and customize two buildings for workforce training in advanced transportation and industrial maintenance at Wilson Community College in Wilson, North Carolina. The project will provide training and retraining to local workers to address a local shortage of skilled workers in those fields. $500,000 to Pennsylvania State University’s TechCelerator, a preaccelerator designed for early tech-based startups, providing business and market research services to help entrepreneurs. The program is designed to develop a pipeline of startup activity in Centre County, Pennsylvania. Undermining the future of U.S. manufacturing competitiveness The Trump budget would also [undermine future manufacturing job creation](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/trump-budget-manufacturing-jobs-innovation/519816/) by defunding research programs that are critical to manufacturing competitiveness. Clean energy and efficiency technologies are central to the future of American manufacturing, including, for example, employing approximately [38,000 people](http://www.thesolarfoundation.org/national/) in solar power manufacturing and about [289,000 employees](https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/us_energy_jobs_2017_final.pdf) manufacturing energy efficient equipment, such as lighting, appliances, or HVAC equipment. The Trump budget proposal would defund U.S. Department of Energy projects vital to the future of American manufacturing, such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, or [ARPA-E](https://arpa-e.energy.gov/); the [Fossil Energy Office](https://energy.gov/fe/office-fossil-energy); the [Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy](https://energy.gov/eere/office-energy-efficiency-renewable-energy), which includes the [Advanced Manufacturing Office](https://energy.gov/eere/amo/advanced-manufacturing-office); and the loan programs, including the [Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Program](https://energy.gov/lpo/services/atvm-loan-program). The [loan programs](https://energy.gov/lpo/loan-programs-office) finance projects that re-equip, expand, or build new and innovative technologies across the efficiency, renewable energy, advanced fossil and nuclear energy suite, including manufacturing facilities that produce [advanced technology vehicles](https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/02/f29/DOE-LPO_Mini-Reports_004_ATVM-Driving-Economic-Growth_FINAL_Jan-2016.pdf). These investments enable manufacturers to demonstrate the commercial viability of new technologies or incorporate new technologies into their own supply chains, increasing confidence in private sector investors and boosting their adoption in the broader market. Defunding these programs is a decision not to compete in the manufacturing industries of the future. Conclusion President Donald Trump’s budget is a betrayal of his promises to workers who elected him into office. It cuts funding for [job training and enforcement of wage theft laws](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2017/03/17/428535/president-trumps-budget-breaks-promises-workers/) while [gutting funding for safety net programs](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2017/03/16/428315/10-ways-president-trumps-agenda-will-harm-supporters-rural-small-town-america/) on which working families rely. But it is perhaps the height of hypocrisy for a candidate who campaigned on Rust Belt anger regarding the disappearance of manufacturing jobs to propose the elimination of funding for federal programs that help manufacturing workers, companies, and communities.

### 1NC---AT: Skills Gap

#### No skills gap & employer coordination dooms the aff

Weaver 17 (8/25, Andrew, assistant professor in the School of Labor and Employment Relations at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “The Myth of the Skills Gap”, MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608707/the-myth-of-the-skills-gap/)

The idea that American workers are being left in the dust because they lack technological savvy does not stand up to scrutiny. Our focus should be on coordination and communication between workers and employers. The contention that America’s workers lack the skills employers demand is an article of faith among analysts, politicians, and pundits of every stripe, from conservative tax cutters to liberal advocates of job training. Technology enthusiasts and entrepreneurs are among the loudest voices declaiming this conventional wisdom (see “The Hunt for Qualified Workers”). Two recent developments have heightened debate over the idea of a “skills gap”: an unemployment rate below 5 percent, and the growing fear that automation will render less-skilled workers permanently unemployable. Proponents of the idea tell an intuitively appealing story: information technology has hit American firms like a whirlwind, intensifying demand for technical skills and leaving unprepared American workers in the dust. The mismatch between high employer requirements and low employee skills leads to bad outcomes such as high unemployment and slow economic growth. This view of the nation’s economic challenges distracts us from more productive ways of thinking about skills and economic growth while promoting unproductive hand-wringing. The problem is, when we look closely at the data, this story doesn’t match the facts. What’s more, this view of the nation’s economic challenges distracts us from more productive ways of thinking about skills and economic growth while promoting unproductive hand-wringing and a blinkered focus on only the supply side of the labor market—that is, the workers. Although much research touches on this topic, almost none of the existing studies directly measure skills, the key quantity of interest. I have conducted a series of nationally representative skill surveys covering a range of technical occupations: manufacturing production workers, IT help-desk technicians, and laboratory technologists. The surveys specifically target managers with knowledge of both hiring and operations at their businesses. The basic strategy is to ask: what skills do employers demand, and do the employers that demand high skill levels have trouble hiring workers? The results yield a number of surprises. First, persistent hiring problems are less widespread than many pundits and industry representatives claim. A few years back, Paul Osterman of MIT’s Sloan School of Management and I found that less than a quarter of manufacturing plants had one or more production-­worker vacancies that had lasted for three months or more. By contrast, industry claims at the time were that three-­quarters or more faced a persistent inability to hire skilled workers. More recently, I have looked for signs of hiring trouble in IT and clinical laboratory occupations. Given a tighter labor market and higher educational requirements for these entry-level technical jobs, it would be reasonable to expect hiring to be more difficult. Not so. Only 15 percent of IT help desks report extended vacancies in technician positions. While the results do show higher levels of long-term lab-tech openings, it turns out that many of these are concentrated in the overnight shift and thus reflect inadequate compensation for difficult working conditions, not a structural skill deficiency. A little over a quarter of clinical diagnostic labs report at least one long-term vacancy. The survey results do show some hiring challenges, but not for the reasons posited by the conventional skill-gap narrative. In fact, the data reveal that high-tech and cutting-edge establishments do not have greater hiring difficulties than other establishments. Furthermore, the data imply that we should be careful about calling for more technical skills without specifying which skills we are talking about. It is quite common to hear advocates—and even academics—assert that the answer to the nation’s labor-market and economic-growth challenges is for workers to acquire more science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) skills. However, my data show that employers looking for higher-level computer skills generally do not have a harder time filling job openings. Manufacturers requiring higher-level math do sometimes have more hiring challenges, but math requirements are not a problem for IT help desks or clinical labs. So what are the skill requirements most consistently associated with hiring difficulties? In manufacturing, it’s higher-level reading, while for help-desk technicians it’s higher-level writing. Proponents of the skill-gap theory sometimes assert that the problem, if not a lack of STEM skills, is actually the result of a poor attitude or inadequate soft skills among younger workers. But while demand for a few soft skills—like the ability to initiate new tasks without guidance from management—is occasionally predictive of hiring problems, most soft-skill demands, including requirements for cooperation and teamwork, are not. This is not to say that STEM or soft skills are not enormously useful. However, specific recommendations and courses of study need to be tightly connected to particular occupational requirements and employer needs. For example, although it may seem safe to recommend that students go learn some kind—any kind—of computer programming, following that advice won’t necessarily open up a job opportunity as, say, an IT help-desk technician, a position that happens to be the second-largest computer/mathematical occupation in America. Only 15 percent of computer help desks demand programming, a number that is slightly lower than the percentage of manufacturing plants that require programming skills for their production workers. Knowledge of networking processes and operating systems, along with writing skills, is far more likely to meet the requirements of help-desk hiring managers. There is also a lot of variation in skill levels demanded within each occupation. For example, only about a third of IT help desks and manufacturing plants require higher-level math, such as algebra or statistics. Thus, we cannot assume that a single occupational skill requirement applies to all establishments, or that workers in every market are getting a consistent signal about skill ­requirements. As a variety of results in economic and management research have shown, employers are surprisingly capable of designing jobs in different ways to make use of different skill sets. We would ultimately like to ratchet up both employer skill requirements and employee skill levels (and the corresponding productivity and wages), but doing so requires that we think not only about adjusting worker skill levels, but also about changing employer behavior. This points up the danger in the way we currently discuss the “skills gap.” Thinking about the nation’s economic and workforce challenges this way encourages us to believe that the root of all labor-market problems lies in the low quality of labor supply—that is, in workers’ lack of skills. However, pushing students and new workers to unilaterally make expensive investments in generic skill categories (or, worse, to just get “more education”) is likely to result in inefficient investments, mistaken choices, and a large number of dead-end paths. Even economists and labor-market experts don’t know the exact mix or level of skills that particular occupations demand. No regularly administered government survey can tell us, say, the percentage of clinical laboratories that require lab techs to know probability or statistics (55 percent, according to my research), or the percentage of IT help desks that demand knowledge of mobile operating systems (76 percent). Ultimately, there is no substitute for coordination between the supply side of the labor market (workers and their skill investments) and the demand side (employers and their skill requirements). Rather than blaming workers and schools, we should be focusing on labor-market intermediaries such as employment agencies or trade associations, employer relationships with technical colleges or other institutions, and employer-provided training. In this regard, my survey results do give cause for concern. The manufacturing survey data indicate that only half of U.S. plants provide formal training to their production workers. By contrast, in the 1990s—the last period for which nationally representative survey data on training are available—70 to 80 percent did so. Meanwhile, only 52 percent of IT help desks have relationships with institutions from which they hire workers or receive training services. For clinical labs, the absence of a local training institution is a significant predictor of hiring difficulties. Instead of fretting about a skills gap, we should be focused on the real challenge of knitting together the supply and demand sides of the labor market. Thinking about the real financial and institutional mechanisms necessary to make, say, apprenticeships work is far more productive than perennially sounding alarms about under-skilled workers. A final point is worth making on technology and the fear that robots will steal all the jobs. Occupations evolve as technology advances. Help-desk technicians once spent more time on tasks like password resets than they do today. Despite the automation of such functions, computer problems—and the occupation that tackles them—continue to expand. The danger is not that we will run out of tasks humans can usefully perform or that required skill levels will be catastrophically high; it’s that misguided anxiety about skill gaps will lead us to ignore the need to improve coordination between workers and employers. It’s this bad coordination—not low-quality workers—that presents the real challenge.

### 1NC---AT: Specific Sector Decline

#### Econ resilient and flexible – sector decline irrelivent

Joseph Lazzaro 13 (international business times, “Is The 'Great American Job Creation Machine' About To Rev Up?” http://www.ibtimes.com/great-american-job-creation-machine-about-rev-1130505)

The good news is, historically, the U.S.’s economic system has proven to be remarkably flexible and resilient -- able to withstand losses of whole sectors and, via ingenuity and new technologies, create new engines of both GDP growth and job growth.

### 1NC---AT: Stem K2 Growth

#### STEM isn’t the lynchpin to growth


Billimoria 17 (5/4, Jeroo, Founder of Child and Youth Finance International, “Is STEM education all it’s cracked up to be?”, World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/is-stem-education-all-it-s-cracked-up-to-be/)

STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) is a buzzword for economic development and growth, frequently touted as a many-fold solution to prepare young people for employment, support the national workforce, and promote innovation and explore methods for accelerating future development. But is STEM education really the silver bullet? Does it truly boost economic growth and support the nation’s workforce? And is STEM the best way to equip young people with the skills, knowledge and opportunities to ensure they can be capable and responsible citizens? I believe that focusing solely on STEM presents a one-dimensional “fix” which fails to consider the many other factors that influence economic growth and development from context to context. Instead, a holistic approach is needed to equip the future workforce and secure economic development for emerging and modern economies alike. To adequately invest in the future, the creation of a generation of economic citizens is key to boosting economic growth and breaking ongoing cycles of poverty. Putting all our egg(head)s in one basket Although there are many opportunities and benefits linked to a solid STEM infrastructure and development of skills within a country, the current emphasis placed on investment in this sector pays little regard to the limitations resulting from a reliance on this subject area. Regarding inclusivity and reach, across STEM subjects workers are predominantly male, from higher socio-economic backgrounds, while minority groups, women and low-income youth are often not adequately represented in STEM subjects. Known for being an elitist and exclusive subject area, it is surprising that the onus is being placed on STEM to fill gaps across national workforces – female students are 50% more likely to leave their STEM course than male counterparts and STEM students from Black, Asian and other minority ethnic groups are more likely to be in non-engineering jobs or unemployed six months after graduation. In addition, STEM offers only a one-dimensional solution, which is inadequate for the multi-dimensional reality of economic development and growth. Rapidly changing technologies and global competition make it very difficult to predict occupational needs. While there is a need for scientific and technological knowledge in all countries, it has been suggested that there is not as big a shortage of STEM-related workers as previously thought. In addition, too much focus on STEM alone runs the risk of over-saturating certain sectors rather than producing a well-rounded workforce. There continues to be heavy emphasis on supporting STEM education as an answer to contributing to educational opportunities, strengthening the national workforce and supporting the economy for both emerging and developed economies. However, focusing on STEM is not enough. Educating young people in these subject areas may ensure they are experts on specific topics, but it does not necessarily create conscientious citizens who are capable of making responsible social and financial decisions. If we look to the recent financial crisis, lax monetary policies and inadequate corporate governance, which contributed to the global recession, were exacerbated by poor assessment of risks and a lack of regulatory transparency. This suggests a deficiency in responsible decision-making rather than a lack of expert subject knowledge – and while most of today’s youth will not deal directly with macroeconomic issues, every citizen contributes to the social and economic wellbeing of their country.


#### STEM isn’t the future of economic growth

Millerd 17 (7/8, Paul, Editor of Boundless — Navigating The Future of Work and Boundless Reads, “STEM is overrated — why we shouldn’t be pushing everyone to get a degree in science”, Medium, https://medium.com/betterworkingworld/stem-is-overrated-why-we-shouldnt-be-pushing-everyone-to-get-a-degree-in-science-6f1f9876e258)

People love STEM — Science, Technology, Engineering and Math. The New York Times wrote an article earlier this year talking about efforts to incentivize people to pursue STEM fields and stay away from liberal arts. It passes the conventional wisdom test. In a time of rapid accelerating change and more technology, we surely need more people going into these jobs right? It turns out that STEM alone is not the perfect path to jobs in growing fields with good wages. Research by David Deming has shown that more importantly, social skills, are a leading indicator of fields of jobs that are growing and paying higher wages. His research looked at two factors — how math intensive the job was and the level of social skills required for the job (full paper here). His results found a clear hierarchy of the jobs that have been growing in the economy: Rank; Type; Employment Share (1980-2012) 1; High social skills, high math-intensive; 11.8% 2; High social skills, low math-intensive; 11.8% 3; Low social skills, high math-intensive; -3.3% 4; Low social skills, low math-intensive; -3.3% He found a similar pattern for wage growth, except with less of a gap between different types of high social skill jobs. In his research he found that many “STEM’ jobs are actually shrinking, which throws into question any policy aimed at incentivizing people to major in said degrees on that basis alone. While nobody would be surprised to learn that computer science jobs have been growing, many STEM jobs have not fared as well such as biologists and architects:



Source: David Deming Deming discussed these findings in a fascinating podcast with Jacob Morgan and I was left with more questions than answers about what we should be doing given these findings. Deming’s own paper leaves the questions of policy to others, but his research challenges a lot of the conventional wisdom over the past fifteen years. Pushing someone to major in engineering may not be the path to a success that it was in the past. One positive from this research is that one could make the argument that humans will not be replaced by technology as many are prone to fear. As technology automates more and more routine tasks, the value of highly cognitive and social tasks seems to be increasing. Deming’s research found that as routine tasks are decreasing, non-routine analytical tasks and social skills are becoming a higher and higher share of knowledge jobs:



Source: David Deming So should you drop out of engineering and change to a degree in communications? I’m not sure I would go that far — but a STEM degree alone is not the path for a vibrant career that it may have been in the past.

#### Econ resilient and flexible – sector decline irrelivent

Joseph Lazzaro 13 (international business times, “Is The 'Great American Job Creation Machine' About To Rev Up?” http://www.ibtimes.com/great-american-job-creation-machine-about-rev-1130505)

The good news is, historically, the U.S.’s economic system has proven to be remarkably flexible and resilient -- able to withstand losses of whole sectors and, via ingenuity and new technologies, create new engines of both GDP growth and job growth.

### 1NC---AT: Stem Solves DZ

#### Aff doesn’t solve pharma innovation impacts – pharma industries don’t invest in innovative drugs

Light, 2012 Donald W, professor, Department of Psychiatry, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Joel R Lexchin professor, York University School of Health Policy and Management, “Pharmaceutical research and development: what do we get for all that money?,” 344:e4348

The real innovation crisis More relevant than the absolute number of new drugs brought to the market is the number that represent a **therapeutic advance.** Although the pharmaceutical industry and its analysts measure innovation in terms of new molecular entities as a stand-in for therapeutically superior new medicines, **most have provided only minor clinical advantages over existing treatments.** The preponderance of drugs without significant therapeutic gains dates all the way back to the “golden age” of innovation. Out of 218 drugs approved by the FDA from 1978 to 1989, only 34 (15.6%) **were judged as important therapeutic gains**.12 Covering a roughly similar time period (1974-94), the industry’s Barral report on **all internationally marketed** new **drugs** **concluded** that only 11% were therapeutically and pharmacologically innovative.13 Since the mid-1990s, independent reviews have also concluded that about 85-90% of all new drugs provide few or no clinical advantages for patients.14-19 This small, steady increase in clinically superior drugs contrasts with the FDA granting “priority” review status to 44% of all new drugs from 2000 to 2010.20 The percentage of drugs with a priority designation began to increase in 1992 when companies started funding the FDA’s approval process. Other regulatory agencies have classified far fewer of the same medicines as needing accelerated reviews.21 Post-market evaluations during the same period are much less generous in assigning significant therapeutic advances to medications.18 21 **This is the real innovation crisis**: pharmaceutical research and development turns out mostly minor variations on **existing drugs**, and most new drugs are not superior on clinical measures. Although a steady stream of significantly superior new drugs enlarges the medicine chest from which millions benefit, medicines have also produced an epidemic of **serious adverse reactions** **that have added to national healthcare costs**.22 How much does research and development cost? Although the pharmaceutical industry emphasises how much money it devotes to discovering new drugs, **little of that money actually goes into** basic **research**. Data from companies, the United States National Science Foundation, and government reports indicate that companies have been spending only 1.3% of revenues on basic research to discover new molecules, net of taxpayer subsidies.23 More than **four fifths** **of all funds** for basic research to discover new drugs and vaccines come from public sources.24 Moreover, despite the industry’s frequent claims that the cost of new drug discovery is now $1.3bn (£834m; €1bn),25 this figure, **which comes from the industry supported Tufts Center**,26 has been heavily criticised. Half that total comes from estimating how much profit would have been made if the money had been invested in an index fund of pharmaceutical companies that increased in value 11% a year, compounded over 15 years.26 While used by finance committees to estimate whether a new venture is worth investing in, these presumed profits (far greater than the rise in the value of pharmaceutical stocks) should not be counted as research and development costs on which profits are to be made. Half of the remaining $0.65bn is paid by taxpayers through company deductions and credits, bringing the estimate down to one quarter of $1.3bn or $0.33bn.27 The Tufts study authors report that their estimate was done on the most costly fifth of new drugs (those developed in-house), which the authors reported were 3.44 times more costly than the average, reducing the estimate to $90m. The median costs were a third less than the average, or $60m. Deconstructing other inflators would lower the estimate of costs even further. Hidden business model How have we reached a situation where so much appears to be spent on research and development, yet only about 1 in 10 newly approved medicines substantially benefits patients? The low bars of being better than placebo, using surrogate endpoints instead of hard clinical outcomes, or being non-inferior to a comparator, allow approval of medicines that may even be less effective or less safe than existing ones. Notable examples include rofecoxib (Vioxx), rosiglitazone (Avandia), gatifloxacin (Tequin), and drotrecogin alfa (Xigris). Although the industry’s vast network of public relations departments and trade associations generate a large volume of stories about the so called innovation crisis, the key role of blockbuster drugs, and the crisis created by “the patent cliff,”28 **the hidden business model of pharmaceuticals centres on turning out** scores of minor variations, some of which become market blockbusters. In a series of articles Kalman Applbaum describes how companies use “clinical trial administration, research publication, regulatory lobbying, physician and patient education, drug pricing, advertising, and point-of-use promotion” to create distinct marketing profiles and brand loyalty for their therapeutically similar products.29 Sales from these drugs generate steady profits throughout the ups and downs of blockbusters coming off patents. For example, although Pfizer lost market exclusivity for atorvastatin, venlafaxine, and other major sellers in 2011, revenues remained steady compared with 2010, and net income rose 21%.30 Applbaum contends that **marketing** has become “**the enemy of [real] innovation**.”31 This perspective explains why companies think it is worthwhile paying not only for testing new drugs but also for thousands of trials of existing drugs in order to gain approval for new indications and expand the market.32 This corporate strategy works because **marketing departments and large networks of sponsored clinical leaders succeed in** persuading **doctors to prescribe the new productss**.33 An analysis of Canada’s pharmaceutical expenditures found that 80% of the increase in its drug budget is spent on new medicines that offer few new benefits.16 Major contributors included newer hypertension, gastrointestinal, and cholesterol drugs, including atorvastatin, the fifth statin on the Canadian market.

### 1NC---AT: Stem Solves Warming

#### Innovation alone fails to solve warming – they can’t change social problems or fix alt causes

Boucher and Loring 17 (Martin J Boucher – a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Saskatchewan’s School of Environment and Sustainability, Philip Loring – Doctor of Philosophy in Indigenous Studies, University of Alaska Fairbanks Master of Arts in Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Studies (Philosophy and Classic Studies), Florida Atlantic University; Article; 3/20/17; Ensia; “CLIMATE CHANGE IS MORE THAN A TECH PROBLEM, SO WE NEED MORE THAN A TECH SOLUTION”; <https://ensia.com/voices/climate-change-social-fix/>; accessed 7/10/17)

March 20, 2017 — At the COP 21 climate change convention in Paris at the end of 2015, leaders from 194 nations agreed to pursue actions that will cut greenhouse gas emissions enough to keep global warming within 1.5 °C (2.7 °F) above pre-industrial conditions. Meeting this goal will avoid continued and increasing harm to people and ecosystems around the world caused by a changing climate, and it is also a great opportunity to turn the world into a place that embodies our collective and pluralistic values for the future. Nevertheless, there remains a notable gap between current trajectories of global GHG emissions and the reductions necessary to see COP 21’s goals realized. Numerous technological and economic strategies for bridging that gap are currently being discussed, including transitions to renewable energy and/or nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, and cap and trade. However, many overlook the fundamental social issues that drive climate change: overconsumption, poverty, industrial agriculture and population growth. As such, even if these strategies succeed in mitigating CO2 emissions — renewable energies, for instance, seem to have achieved irreversible momentum — they leave unaddressed a second gap, a sustainability gap, in that they allow issues of ecological overshoot and social injustice to persist. We argue that there is an opportunity to reverse climate change by attending to these sustainability issues, but it requires that we reject the convenience of technological optimism and put aside our fears of the world’s “big” social problems. In 2004, Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow wrote in Science that it is possible to address climate change by breaking the larger problem of CO2 emissions down into a series of more manageable “wedges.” They offer 15 different solutions based on existing technology, including nuclear energy, coal carbon capture and storage, energy efficiency, and increased adoption of conservation tillage, for mitigating climate change one wedge at a time. Their pragmatic approach to the problem has been popularly received, as evidenced by the thousands of citations that the paper has received. However, their approach can also be critiqued for glossing over the immense costs involved and for its piecemeal and top-down nature. In other words, they assume that this complex global environmental problem can be fixed with a handful of standardized solutions. A systems approach to solving problems requires that we look to root causes and seek interventions that change patterns of outcomes. Climate change is just one of many related sustainability problems that the world faces. In addition to rising atmospheric CO2, we are approaching or have already exceeded multiple other planetary boundaries — such as fresh water, nitrogen, phosphorus and biodiversity loss — that CO2-mitigating technologies cannot solve. Solving climate change on its own would require immense investments but leave too many other problems unaddressed. That is not to say that these technological innovations are irrelevant; Pacala and Socolow’s desire to break down the challenge into manageable pieces is both valid and appreciable. What’s missing from their assessment is the fact that the world is a complex system, and systemic problems require systemic solutions. A Systems Approach A systems approach to solving problems requires that we look to root causes and seek interventions that change patterns of outcomes. The root causes of climate change are not technologies such as coal power and industrialized, chemical-intensive agriculture, but the underlying social and cultural systems that created and locked people into these technologies through unsustainable patterns of consumption, growth and inequity. It is possible to address other environmental and social issues and climate change together. Consider the issue of empowering women. We know population growth is at the epicenter of global overshoot; programs that empower women by creating equitable employment and education opportunities and recognizing their reproductive rights consistently lead to voluntary regional declines in population growth rates. Countries in which women have higher political status also emit less CO2 per capita. While empowering women may seem to many people to be an immense and somewhat intangible goal, successes have been made through small-scale economic and policy interventions that give women access to land and other capital. And communities that empower women also become more resilient and adaptable to challenges like environmental change. Or, consider the potential of transitioning agriculture and other land management systems away from industrial practices and toward agroecological ones. Agroecological systems of food production allow smallholders to improve food security while increasing household income potential. Olivier De Schutter, a former U.N. special rapporteur on the right to food, has argued that agroecological food production could double food production in 10 years while also mitigating climate change through reductions in fossil fuel inputs, sequestering carbon in soil, and alleviating rural poverty in developing nations. In Grass, Soil, Hope, author and rancher Courtney White similarly describes a portfolio of small-scale land management changes that add up to global impacts for carbon mitigation. Others have repeatedly shown that agroecological methods of land management and food production are at least as effective, if not more effective, than increased industrial intensification from the perspective of meeting human needs and protecting biodiversity. Also, decreases in meat consumption — another strategy for addressing climate change — will necessarily accompany agroecological reforms, because these modes of production simply do not produce meat in the same unsustainable quantities as industrial agriculture. It stands to reason that as people increasingly see the social and ecological benefits of alternative farming practices and choose to participate, their meat eating habits will decline. Finally, as these reforms address food security and hunger, population growth will also be reduced, because these are among its primary drivers. These are yet more examples of how thinking about the problem from a whole systems approach can yield solutions that seem small but, through feedbacks and interactions, can ultimately accumulate to significant gains. We are not arguing against technology reform. We are arguing that climate change is not, fundamentally, a technological problem. Other strategies include moving to decentralized energy generation and changing home-size preferences in the developed world. What they all have in common is that they attend to social and behavioral aspects of the problem. And rather than being piecemeal, such solutions can work together synergistically. For example, agroecological transitions at the community level have emerged as a successful venue for empowering women. Too Big, Too Wicked A common critique of our argument is that problems such as women empowerment and meat consumption are simply too big, too wicked, too complex to solve. This is, however, a psychological hang-up that is not backed up by evidence. The power of small-scale change, whether through incremental and place-based intervention or relatively innocuous “nudges,” is increasingly evinced in ongoing social change, including around issues such as women empowerment and meat eating. Additionally, psychological research suggests that people are generally more comfortable with small-scale change than they are with large-scale reform, which is salient in this age when environmental problems and their possible solutions are so heavily politicized. It is worth noting that for place-based solutions, the question of scalability is somewhat different than it is for technological fixes: Place-based strategies are rarely intended to scale in a uniform or industrial way. Rather, they scale in a more cultural sense, to create a heterogeneous landscape of solutions that are similar in philosophy but often quite different in implementation. In general, while social change is generally a slow process that happens through learning and innovation, research has shown that simple, incentive-based interventions through subsidies or taxes can encourage people to switch from one behavioral regime to another without the need for a fundamental change in their values. For instance, studies have shown that small taxes and increased knowledge about health risks both drive decreases in meat consumption. Many of today’s most widely debated solutions to climate change fall into a category that emphasizes technological optimism and top-down, engineered solutions. The strategies we highlight here largely fall into another category: solutions that emphasize place-based, social and behavioral innovations. We are not arguing against technology reform. We are arguing that climate change is not, fundamentally, a technological problem. To be sure, social problems are not easy to solve, but neither are they intractable, unless viewed only from a global, one-size-fits-all perspective. If we use the tools of social innovation alongside technological innovation and embrace a socially focused and place-based approach to our global climate change and sustainability challenges, we will be far better off for it.

### 1NC---AT: Trump Diversionary War

#### No diversionary war

Bershidsky 17 (Jan. 25, Leonid, Bloomberg View Columnist, “Trump's Forever War of Diversion”, Bloomberg News, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-01-25/trump-s-forever-war-of-diversion>)

There's even a term for the tactic: "diversionary conflict." Faced with economic difficulties or other problems potentially threatening to its survival, the regime starts a war somewhere or sharpens domestic ethnic divisions. Since the oil price plummeted in late 2014, the Putin regime has kept Russians on a steady diet of war news from eastern Ukraine and Syria (Russia and its allies have been winning). With the Syrian operation, Putin sharply raised his international standing, but a big reduction in protests against worsening economic conditions has probably been more important to him. In neighboring Ukraine, every time a government finds itself in trouble and particularly unpopular, the matter of the country's linguistic division surfaces, with various groups trying to promote or ban the Russian language. Former President Viktor Yanukovych used the language matter as cover for passing other unpopular legislation. Now, with president Petro Poroshenko's popularity at a nadir, reforms stalled and the cost of living rising sharply, Ukrainians are distracted by the discussion of a new language law that would make Ukrainian obligatory in public life, under threat of fines. Trump doesn't need to start wars: He and his team know how emotional many Americans are about him. He can choose what he wants to be hated for -- preferably for something silly and unrelated to his actual priorities at the moment. He used this to his advantage during the campaign: His alleged sexual misconduct took up so much media time and public attention than issues like his business history, his tax returns and his proposals. As the inauguration attendance argument played, Trump has been busy. Apart from starting the Obamacare rollback and withdrawing from the TPP, he has frozen a reduction of mortgage insurance premiums, allowed the Keystone Pipeline to go ahead and prepared to sign an executive order to begin construction of a border wall. Well aware that some of these important actions might cause indignation and targeted protest, Trump has tossed out another meaningless football for the media and the public to fixate on. "I will be asking for a major investigation into VOTER FRAUD, including those registered to vote in two states, those who are illegal and even those registered to vote who are dead," he tweeted. Sure enough, at the time of this writing, the CNN story about this was the most shared in the last 24 hours, with news about the border wall order coming a distant second. Just as it was unimportant how many people attended the inauguration, it doesn't matter at all at this point whether undocumented immigrants actually voted last November and whether any votes were cast for dead people. No one is challenging the results of the election. The wall and the Keystone Pipeline matter, yet are much smaller stories in terms of readership. **Trump and his team are** **already showing a flair for diversion**. Is it enough to discourage the kinds of mass protests that such aggressive moves on lightning-rod issues might spark? We'll know in the coming days and weeks, though protesters' energy was certainly sapped by the massive women's march, which took place before Trump actually did anything damaging to women's rights. Trump's and his team's communications look awkward, inept, gallingly primitive. It's time to wise up: **These people know what they're doing**. They want their political opponents to be confused, to flail at windmills, to expend emotions on meaningless scandals to distract them from any targeted, coordinated action against specific threats. There are going to be many of these: Trump appears intent on keeping his promises. Calm concentration is needed to counteract dangerous policies.

### 2NC---Defense: China

#### Economic interdependencies ensure China-US tensions will remain low

Follett 14–George Mason University (Andrew, 6/24/14, The Diplomat, “China and the US: Destined to Cooperate?”, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-us-destined-to-cooperate/>)

The 21st century will be defined by the relationship between the American superpower and rising China. A new Cold War would threaten the world order while a mutually beneficial association could bring all prosperity. The latter scenario is more likely. The geography, economies, and energy resources of the U.S and China align their “core interests.” First, geography. The U.S. is located on the most resource and capital-rich continent, North America. The American Midwest consists of valuable arable land and is bisected by the world’s largest navigable rivers, allowing the export of food and products at bargain prices. Nearby nations have either historically been on friendly terms (Canada) or lack the ability to present a threat (Central America and the Caribbean) without an external sponsor. This benign environment has allowed America to focus on projecting power and dominating global merchant marine traffic. Since China lies across an ocean dominated by the American Navy, neither directly threatens the other. China, meanwhile, is a populous and vast land power with a long coastline. Yet China’s focus has historically turned inward, with only sporadic efforts to build a naval presence. China’s heartland is exposed to Russia from the north, Japan to the east, various fractious states to the west, and the rising powers of Thailand, India, and Vietnam to the south. In other words, China is surrounded, and its biggest threats are from other land-based powers, particularly Russia and India. China therefore cannot afford to antagonize America, since it would require American support or tacit neutrality in any conflict with Russia or India. Geography ensures that China does not see American naval dominance on its shores as a comparable threat. A Chinese move against American interests would open it to aggression from its neighbors while simultaneously cutting off a needed ally. No Chinese government is foolish enough to risk multiple high-intensity wars. The geography of China and the U.S. dictate their “core interests” as mutually non-threatening states, and make cooperation more likely since both have an interest in opposing Russia. Secondly, the American and Chinese economies are destined to become more interdependent, and integrated economies usually lead to geostrategic alliances. The U.S. follows a laissez-faire economic model, entailing a boom-and-bust cycle that is harsher than in more planned systems. When the free market dictates economic apportionment, at the height of the cycle resources are often applied to unwise projects. During recessions, companies either downsize or go out of business, resulting in short spurts of high unemployment. America tolerates these fluctuations because she long ago decided to trade economic stability for higher long term growth. This has succeeded over the past century. This growth, combined with other advantages, ensures the U.S. will endure as a superpower. America utilizes its advantages to maintain a global maritime “trade order” in the form of organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, resulting in economic growth for the world and a successful consumption-based economy at home. Contrastingly, China’s economy is a sort of “state capitalism” distinct from the European “state champion” model. The economy is based around exporting finished manufactured goods to America, further integrating both economies. China’s two-decade-plus surge in economic growth will soon end, yet given the lack of progress in transitioning to a more consumption-based economy, China has not achieved what its large population considers an equitable distribution of resources and benefits. Such imbalances foster domestic tensions. The growth constraints facing China’s economy will only create additional problems with fewer new resources at Beijing’s disposal. The Chinese slowdown has already led to political infighting, and this is likely to continue in the future. Addressing this problem while transitioning to a consumption-based economy may reduce the ability of the ruling Communist Party to project power abroad while retaining it at home. Economically, America is strong in areas like food production, education, technology, and precision industrial manufacturing. China, by contrast, is strong in areas like heavy industry, light manufacturing, and cheap labor. This presents a recipe for complementary economic interdependence. Finally, both countries will move closer geopolitically due to their complementary energy interests. Most of China’s foreign policy centers on attempts to acquire new energy resources, particularly oil. Over the following decades, China will seek to become more self-sufficient by expanding its hydropower capacity and coal plants. America shares this goal, and with the shale revolution will likely end up exporting energy to China, including oil and liquid natural gas. This gives America a geopolitical “lever” over China by increasing economic interdependence. The American situation on energy resources, particularly oil and natural gas, outclasses China’s. Oil is non-renewable, and OPEC nations will likely be unable to meet China’s growing demand. However, America now controls the world’s largest untapped oil reserve, the Green River Formation. This formation alone contains up to 3 trillion barrels of untapped oil-shale, roughly half of which may be recoverable. This single geologic formation could contain more oil than the rest of the world’s proven reserves combined. As Chinese demand rises, Beijing will likely become the top importer of this oil. No other oil source can supply China’s needs as efficiently. Eastern European and Russian oil shale reserves are smaller and less politically and economically extractable than America’s emerging sources. If America invests a comparatively small portion of its new energy-based wealth into a larger Navy to secure a Pacific trade route to China, the economic integration of the two nations will be virtually irreversible. Already foreign investments are pouring into the “new Middle East” of America and Canada, despite strong opposition from the current administration. American control over future markets for natural gas is almost as certain as for oil. The U.S. produces natural gas abundantly and is building the facilities to export it to foreign markets, including China. China imports roughly 56 percent of its oil and this number grows each year. Beijing plans to increase reserves by acquiring new offshore resources and “secure” reserves abroad. Since between 60-70 percent of its imported oil originates in Africa or the Middle East, the only way to inexpensively transport it is by sea. This makes China vulnerable to economic warfare from India, which can sever much of its supply at will. This is a strategic concern and makes war with India more likely. China doesn’t have many other domestic energy options with the exception of coal, which carries high health and environmental risks. Renewable energy is too expensive, hydraulic power creates instability in rural areas, and social biases prohibit nuclear power. For technical reasons, China’s untapped oil shale reserves, though large, would be prohibitively expensive to process. They are estimated to be economically recoverable at $345 a barrel, more than triple the price of American oil shale. An American boom in natural gas cannot fully “bail out” China; nonetheless it will certainly be part of the solution. Domestic political pressures, environmental concerns and rising demand for portable fuels mean the crux of Chinese foreign policy for the foreseeable future will be aimed at acquiring new oil supplies and protecting existing supply lines across the Indian Ocean. The South China Sea is critical to China’s goals because most imported oil from Africa must cross it and the sea contains its own marginal reserves close to China. Inadequate naval forces guarantee China will continue to depend upon the American Navy to protect its oil trade. The dispute surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands does not change that. In any case, heightened regional competition for energy assets will diminish as American reserves come online over the next five to ten years. In the energy sector, America will ultimately transition to an energy and fuel exporter and China will ultimately import American resources. This will further connect their economies and build strong economic ties. Both China and America hope for a mutually beneficial arrangement to meet their security and development goals. Geographic, economic, and energy considerations ensure these two nations will become more interdependent throughout this century.

### 2NC---Defense: Cyber

#### No chance of successful cyberattacks --- defense is evolving faster than offense

Thomas Rid 12, PhD, reader in war studies @ King’s College London, former visiting scholar @ Hebrew University, has previously worked at the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins, and RAND, “Think Again: Cyberwar,” March/April, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,1>

"Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact, potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less.

#### Cyber-attacks “burnout” --- the bigger the impact, the faster it can be corrected --- checks escalation

Ian Brown 11, Associate Director of the Cyber Security Centre @ the University of Oxford, and Peter Sommers, Professor @ the London School of Economics, Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk,” OECD, 1/14, http://www.oecd.org/governance/risk/46889922.pdf

Pure cybersecurity risks tend to be localised and temporary rather than global and long - term. This is for two fundamental reasons:¶ The longer an attack persists, the greater the likelihood it will be detected, routed around, and become attributable to a specific party against whom actions can be taken (including disconnection, arrest and retribution). ¶ Larger-scale attacks result in more of the data needed to diagnose and fix system vulnerabilities, and provide a stronger incentive to system suppliers and administrators to do so (Libicki, 2009: xiv).¶ Even for the best-resourced and most determined attackers – nation states taking military action – these conditions are likely to hold. RAND Corporation recently reported to the US Air Force “operational cyberwar has an important niche role, but only that,” commenting:¶ “Investigation may reveal that a particular system has a particular vulnerability. Predicting what an attack can do requires knowing how the system and its operators will respond to signs of dysfunction and knowing the behaviour of processes and systems associated with the system being attacked. Even then, cyberwar operations neither directly harm individuals nor destroy equipment (albeit with some exceptions). At best, these operations can confuse and frustrate operators of military systems, and then only temporarily. Thus, cyberwar can only be a support function for other elements of warfare, for instance, in disarming the enemy‖ (Libicki, 2009: xiv — xv).”

#### No cyber-war—it’s all hype

**Gallagher 17**

Sean Gallagher (Ars Technica’s IT editor, former Navy officer, systems administrator, and network systems integrator with 20 years of IT journalism experience). “Who’s winning the cyber war? The squirrels, of course.” Ars Technica. January 16th, 2017. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/01/whos-winning-the-cyber-war-the-squirrels-of-course/

WASHINGTON, DC—For years, the government and security experts have warned of the looming threat of "cyberwar" against critical infrastructure in the US and elsewhere. Predictions of cyber attacks wreaking havoc on power grids, financial systems, and other fundamental parts of nations' fabric have been foretold repeatedly over the past two decades, and each round has become more dire. The US Department of Energy declared in its Quadrennial Energy Review, just released this month, that the electrical grid in the US "faces imminent danger from a cyber attack." So far, however, the damage done by cyber attacks, both real (Stuxnet's destruction of Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges and a few brief power outages alleged to have been caused by Russian hackers using BlackEnergy malware) and imagined or exaggerated (the Iranian "attack" on a broken flood control dam in Rye, New York), cannot begin to measure up to an even more significant cyber-threat—squirrels. That was the message delivered at the Shmoocon security conference on Friday by Cris "SpaceRogue" Thomas, former member of the L0pht Heavy Industries hacking collective and now a security researcher at Tenable. In his presentation—entitled, "35 Years of Cyberwar: The Squirrels Are Winning"—SpaceRogue revealed the scale of the squirrelly threat to worldwide critical infrastructure by presenting data gathered by CyberSquirrel 1, a project that gathers information on animal-induced infrastructure outages collected from sources on the Internet. Thomas sought to dispel what he called the "FUD" around cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, citing dire predictions from a number of sources, including "the pre-eminent infosec expert Ted Koppel" (whose recent book, Lights Out, focuses on the vulnerability of the power grid). And with government officials such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman Cheryl LaFleur declaring that "one [successful cyber attack] is too many," SpaceRogue likened the government's posture to the Cheney Doctrine, also known as the "One-Percent Doctrine." As Thomas explained, that doctrine is "if there's a one percent chance of something occurring, we must employ 100 percent of our resources to prevent it. This is essentially [what happened with] Iraq, and we're now applying it to cyber and equating cyber to nukes and [mutual assured destruction]. It really doesn't work that way." That sort of stance is made even more unnerving by the fact that many of the cases where "cyber" has been attributed to incidents with energy infrastructure turned out to be false alarms. Even in the few cases where a network intrusion resulted in disruption of the electrical grid—specifically in Ukraine, where two attacks caused power outages—the impact was relatively brief and was comparable to outages caused by other factors, Thomas noted. To "counteract the ludicrousness of cyberwar claims by people at high levels in government and industry," Thomas said, he launched CyberSquirrel1. Inspired by a presentation at Thotcon by Josh Corman (now the director for Cyber Statecraft at the Atlantic Council) and Jericho of Attrition.org, SpaceRogue started CyberSquirrel1 initially as a Twitter feed on March 19, 2013. The account simply "collected from a Google alert for news," he said. But it soon evolved into a much larger data gathering effort, collecting from search engines and other Web sources to populate a spreadsheet. Jericho joined in to enhance the data set the next year, adding more details and events—but even so, Thomas noted that he was only catching a fraction. Squirrels are not the only "actors" tracked by CyberSquirrel1—birds, snakes, raccoons, rats, and martens factor in among the top animal threats that have been captured by the project's spreadsheet. Jellyfish have even gotten into the act, shutting down a nuclear power plant in 2013. CyberSquirrel1's data so far has tracked "over 1,700 outages, affecting nearly 5 million people," Thomas noted. "If you consolidated them into one location, it would basically take out the power for the San Francisco metropolitan area for two months." Shockingly, there have even been eight deaths attributed since the tracking began to follow animal attacks on infrastructure—six caused by squirrels downing power lines that struck people on the ground. As of January 8, even if you count the Ukraine attacks still not firmly attributed to Russia, even frogs (with three outages) have more successful attacks on power grids than state actors. Squirrels worldwide, however, are the clear cyberwar leaders: 879 successful attacks against infrastructure. There's also that swan that performed the denial of service attack on a train in the UK on Friday, January 13—truly showing the breadth of the animal kingdom's toolbox.

#### No cyber threats

Healey 13 Jason, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, "No, Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War", 3/20, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us

America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite recent warnings. Our cybervulnerabilities are undoubtedly grave and the threats we face are severe but far from comparable to nuclear war. ¶ The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against advanced threats (in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems."¶ While it is true that cyber attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not only never happened but are far more difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking believes. The consequences from cyber threats may be similar in some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are incredibly dissimilar. ¶ Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and cause their populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality. A study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by the Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has shown a similar dynamic where the impact of disruptive cyberattacks has been consistently overestimated. ¶ Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused. No attacks, so far, have been both widespread and persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia, have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss. ¶ Moreover, as with conflict in ther domains, cyberattacks can take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined defenses has so far been out of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in a conflict with those nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers should be worrying about. Plutonium trumps bytes in a shooting war.¶ This is not all good news. Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little significant progress. Worse, the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily more worrying. Still, experts have been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of the 70 years since the actual Pearl Harbor. ¶ The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber espionage could someday accumulate into an existential threat. But it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only handwaving estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it doesn't add up to an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."

#### **Zero risk of cyberterror – no tech capability and no publicity motive – it’s media hype.**

Conway 11 [Maura Conway (Lecturer in International Security in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University, PhD in Political Science), “Against Cyberterrorism”, Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, Vol. 54 No. 2, February 2011]

Cyberterrorism is a concept that appears recurrently in contemporary media. It is not just reported upon in newspapers and on television, but is also the subject of movies (such as 1990’s Die Hard II and 2007’s Die Hard IV: Live Free or Die Hard) and popular fiction books (for example, Winn Schwartau’s 2002 novel Pearl Harbor Dot Com). This coverage is particularly interesting if one believes, as I do, that no act of cyberterrorism has ever yet occurred and is unlikely to at any time in the near future. Having said that, it is almost always portrayed in the press as either having already occurred or being just around the corner. As an academic, I’m not alone in arguing that no act of cyberterrorism has yet occurred and, indeed, some journalists agree; most, however, seem convinced as to the salience of this threat. Why? I can only surmise that, just as a large amount of social psychological research has shown, the uncertain and the unknown generally produce fear and anxiety. This is the psychological basis of an effective movie thriller: the fear is greatest when you suspect something, but you’re not certain what it is. The term “cyberterrorism” unites two significant modern fears: fear of technology and fear of terrorism. Fear of terrorism, though the likelihood of any one of us being the victim of terrorism is statistically insignificant, has become perhaps normalized; but fear of technology? In fact, for those unfamiliar with the workings of complex technologies, these are perceived as arcane, unknowable, abstract, and yet increasingly powerful and ubiquitous. Many people therefore fear that technology will become the master and humankind the servant. Couple this relatively new anxiety with age-old fears associated with apparently random violence and the result is a truly heightened state of alarm. Many journalists—although fewer technology journalists than others— have succumbed, like members of the general population, to these fears, to which the journalists have then added further fuel with their reporting. The Definition Issue The second stumbling block for journalists is that just as the definition of terrorism is fraught, so too is the definition of cyberterrorism. My preference is to distinguish between cyberterrorism and terrorist use of the Net. This is the distinction FBI Director Robert Mueller seemed implicitly to be drawing in a March 2010 speech in which he stated that “the Internet is not only used to plan and execute attacks; it is a target in and of itself…We in the FBI, with our partners in the intelligence community, believe the cyber terrorism threat is real, and it is rapidly expanding.” Where the FBI Director and I diverge is in the efficacy of the cyberterrorist threat as opposed to that of everyday terrorist use of the Net (that is, for radicalization, researching and planning, financing, and other purposes). Dorothy Denning’s definitions of cyberterrorism are probably the most well known and respected. Her most recent attempt at defining cyberterrorism is: “…[H]ighly damaging computer-based attacks or threats of attack by non-state actors against information systems when conducted to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political or social. It is the convergence of terrorism with cyberspace, where cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. Rather than committing acts of violence against persons or physical property, the cyberterrorist commits acts of destruction or disruption against digital property.”(2) Analyses of cyberterrorism can be divided into two broad categories on the basis of where the producers stand on the definition issue: those who agree broadly with Denning versus those who wish to incorporate not just use, but a host of other activities into the definition. The literature can also be divided on the basis of where the authors stand on the magnitude of the cyberterrorism threat. Dunn-Cavelty uses the term “Hypers” to describe those who believe a cyberterrorist attack is not just likely, but imminent, and the term “De-Hypers” to describe those who believe such an attack is unlikely.(1) Most journalists are hypers, on the other hand I’m emphatically a de-hyper. In this column, I lay out the three major reasons why. Three Arguments Against Cyberterrorism In my opinion, the three most compelling arguments against cyberterrorism are: • The argument of Technological Complexity; • The argument regarding 9/11 and the Image Factor; and • The argument regarding 9/11 and the Accident Issue. The first argument is treated in the academic literature; the second and third arguments are not, but ought to be. None of these are angles to which journalists appear to have devoted a lot of thought or given adequate consideration. In the speech mentioned earlier, FBI Director Mueller observed “Terrorists have shown a clear interest in pursuing hacking skills. And they will either train their own recruits or hire outsiders, with an eye toward combining physical attacks with cyber attacks.” That may very well be true, but the argument from Technological Complexity underlines that ‘wanting’ to do something is quite different from having the ability to do the same. Here’s why: Violent jihadis’ IT knowledge is not superior. For example, in research carried out in 2007, it was found that of a random sampling of 404 members of violent Islamist groups, 196 (48.5%) had a higher education, with information about subject areas available for 178 individuals. Of these 178, some 8 (4.5%) had trained in computing, which means that out of the entire sample, less than 2% of the jihadis came from a computing background.(3) And not even these few could be assumed to have mastery of the complex systems necessary to carry out a successful cyberterrorist attack. Real-world attacks are difficult enough. What are often viewed as relatively unsophisticated real-world attacks undertaken by highly educated individuals are routinely unsuccessful. One only has to consider the failed car bomb attacks planned and carried out by medical doctors in central London and at Glasgow airport in June 2007. Hiring hackers would compromise operational security. The only remaining option is to retain “outsiders” to undertake such an attack. This is very operationally risky. It would force the terrorists to operate outside their own circles and thus leave them ripe for infiltration. Even if they successfully got in contact with “real” hackers, they would be in no position to gauge their competency accurately; they would simply have to trust in same. This would be very risky. So on the basis of technical knowhow alone cyberterror attack is not imminent, but this is not the only factor one must take into account. The events of Sept. 11, 2001 underscore that for a true terrorist event spectacular moving images are crucial. The attacks on the World Trade Center were a fantastic piece of performance violence; look back on any recent roundup of the decade and mention of 9/11 will not just be prominent, but pictures will always be provided. The problem with respect to cyberterrorism is that many of the attack scenarios put forward, from shutting down the electric power grid to contaminating a major water supply, fail on this account: they are unlikely to have easily captured, spectacular (live, moving) images associated with them, something we—as an audience—have been primed for by the attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11. The only cyberterrorism scenario that would fall into this category is interfering with air traffic control systems to crash planes, but haven’t we seen that planes can much more easily be employed in spectacular “real-world” terrorism? And besides, aren’t all the infrastructures just mentioned much easier and more spectacular to simply blow up? It doesn’t end there, however. For me, the third argument against cyberterrorism is perhaps the most compelling; yet it is very rarely mentioned. In 2004, Howard Schmidt, former White House Cybersecurity Coordinator, remarked to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding Nimda and Code Red that “we to this day don’t know the source of that. It could have very easily been a terrorist.”(4) This observation betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and purposes of terrorism, particularly its attention-getting and communicative functions. A terrorist attack with the potential to be hidden, portrayed as an accident, or otherwise remain unknown is unlikely to be viewed positively by any terrorist group. In fact, one of the most important aspects of the 9/11 attacks in New York from the perpetrators viewpoint was surely the fact that while the first plane to crash into the World Trade Center could have been accidental, the appearance of the second plane confirmed the incident as a terrorist attack in real time. Moreover, the crash of the first plane ensured a large audience for the second plane as it hit the second tower. Alternatively, think about the massive electric failure that took place in the northeastern U.S. in August 2003: if it was a terrorist attack—and I’m not suggesting that it was—but if it was, it would have been a spectacular failure. Conclusion Given the high cost—not just in terms of money, but also time, commitment, and effort—and the high possibility of failure on the basis of manpower issues, timing, and complexity of a potential cyberterrorist attack, the costs appear to me to still very largely outweigh the potential publicity benefits. The publicity aspect is crucial for potential perpetrators of terrorism and so the possibility that an attack may be apprehended or portrayed as an accident, which would be highly likely with regard to cyberterrorism, is detrimental. Add the lack of spectacular moving images and it is my belief that cyberterrorism, regardless of what you may read in newspapers, see on television, or obtain via other media sources, is not in our near future. So why then the persistent treatment of cyberterrorism on the part of journalists? Well, in this instance, science fiction-type fears appear to trump rational calculation almost every time. And I haven’t even begun to discuss how the media discourse has clearly influenced the pronouncements of policymakers.

#### No impact – security solves.

Green, Editor of the Washington Monthly, ‘2 (Joshua, November, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism” http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html)

There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," says Dorothy Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown University and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts. "Not only does [cyberterrorism] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it is not anywhere near as serious as other potential physical threats like car bombs or suicide bombers." Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn't a serious problem--it's just not one that involves terrorists. Interviews with terrorism and computer security experts, and current and former government and military officials, yielded near unanimous agreement that the real danger is from the criminals and other hackers who did $15 billion in damage to the global economy last year using viruses, worms, and other readily available tools. That figure is sure to balloon if more isn't done to protect vulnerable computer systems, the vast majority of which are in the private sector. Yet when it comes to imposing the tough measures on business necessary to protect against the real cyberthreats, the Bush administration has balked. Crushing BlackBerrys When ordinary people imagine cyberterrorism, they tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons, airliners, or military computers from halfway around the world. Given the colorful history of federal boondoggles--billion-dollar weapons systems that misfire, $600 toilet seats--that's an understandable concern. But, with few exceptions, it's not one that applies to preparedness for a cyberattack. "The government is miles ahead of the private sector when it comes to cybersecurity," says Michael Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a Virginia-based computer security company with government and private-sector clients. "Particularly the most sensitive military systems."

#### Squirrels pose a bigger threat to critical infrastructure than hackers.

Rogue 16 (Space, also known as C. Thomas (most CS kids need cool pseudonyms) is a strategist at Tenable Network Security. “Opinion: Squirrels are bigger threat to US power grid than hackers” 1/6/16 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2016/0106/Opinion-Squirrels-are-bigger-threat-than-hackers-to-US-power-grid)

The cyberwar drumbeaters have been stoking fears for decades about the potential of cyberattacks causing devastating physical damage. A litany of anonymous government officials quoted in articles regularly warn about coming digital strikes on power plants, gas pipelines, or water treatment plants. The perpetrators, they say, will be rogue nation hackers executing malicious code to pull off some kind of "cyber armageddon." But until recently no such attacks have ever been confirmed and nothing approaching the kind of physical destruction the doomsayers foretell has taken place. And even though two recently reported incidents – one at [a small New York dam](http://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559) and another involving [a Ukrainian power plant](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-suspected-in-attack-that-blacked-out-parts-of-ukraine/2016/01/05/4056a4dc-b3de-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html) – may qualify as real cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, recent history suggests we should all be wary of pointing to these incidents as signs that cyberwar is somehow imminent. Every time stories in the media emerge about computer attacks that cause physical damage – usually supported by anonymous sources – eventually more reasonable people investigate those claims and disprove theories involving destructive cyberattacks. One of the most commonly cited – yet erroneous – cyberevents involves several blackouts that affected Brazil between 2005 and 2007. The story goes that blackouts were the work of hackers. Even "60 Minutes" repeated that claim. Brazil's National Agency for Electric Energy, however, concluded that sooty insulators [caused the power outages](http://www.wired.com/2009/11/brazil_blackout/). Then there was the [2008 explosion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline](http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/tuerkei-ermittler-schliessen-cyberangriff-bei-pipeline-explosion-aus-1.2529345) in Turkey. No less than four unnamed sources claimed it was a cyberattack despite the fact that the pipeline owner said the valves involved in the blast weren't attached to any network. Ever since [Stuxnet](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2014/0225/Exclusive-New-thesis-on-how-Stuxnet-infiltrated-Iran-nuclear-facility), the computer worm discovered in 2010 [that damaged the Iranian nuclear program](http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/), many experts have warned a that torrent of other computer attacks on critical infrastructure would follow. They had a smoking gun the following year when [Russian hackers broke into a small Illinois water facility](http://www.wired.com/2011/11/water-pump-hack-mystery-solved/). While the plant's control systems were accessed by someone in Russia, that someone was the contractor for the water facility who happened to be on vacation in Russia at the time. Even though Stuxnet is the only confirmed cyberattack leading to physical damage, a German incident is often lumped into the category of hacks that lead to property destruction. [Many news articles](https://www.rt.com/news/216379-germany-steel-plant-hack/) and German government reports suggested that cyberattackers caused ["massive damage"](http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30575104) at an unnamed steel plant by causing the blast furnace to malfunction. And, again, no one has gone on the record confirming this story and the steel plant remains unnamed. While this event has not been conclusively disproven, there are enough missing facts to raise considerable doubt. But over the Christmas and New Year's holiday, news stories about two more incidents are once again stirring up the cyberwar hawks. The first event occurred at the Bowman Avenue Dam near Rye, N.Y., which is about 20 miles north of Manhattan. It actually occurred in 2013 but unnamed officials (surprise) speaking to The Wall Street Journal attributed some kind of breach of the dam's computers to Iranian hackers. While the facts about what actually transpired at the dam are few, the incident did cause [the Department of Homeland Security to investigate](http://www.myrye.com/my_weblog/2015/12/rye-city-statement-on-bowman-avenue-dam.html). But exactly what DHS discovered, the extent of the so-called "attack," or how the incident was attributed to Iran remains unknown. What's more, the dam has no electrical generation capability and its only electronically controlled item is a flood control sluice gate, which dam officials say has never been fully operational. More facts are available surrounding the [Christmas Day attack in Ukraine](http://www.securitylab.ru/news/477942.php) in which the regional power company blamed malware for turning off substations. Normally, such claims would be met with deserved skepticism from cybersecurity pros. In this case, however, a sample of the malware has been found, which to people who research such things is considered [pretty damning evidence](https://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/01/potential-sample-of-malware-from-the-ukrainian-cyber-attack-uncovered). But there's still debate as whether the introduction of the malware into the power company's systems was the work of a nation state, cybercriminals, or simply a random infection that occurs in all kinds of systems daily. So despite all the hype, fear, uncertainty, and doubt, we still don't have confirmed, indisputable cases of someone causing a power outage, or other major infrastructure damage, as a result of a cyberattack. In fact, according to a former deputy director of the National Security Agency, the biggest threat to the US power grid isn't a cyberattack at all. [It's a squirrel.](https://twitter.com/CyberSquirrel1/status/679345894421086209) Yes, [squirrels](http://cybersquirrel1.com/) and other animals cause hundreds of power outages every year and yet the only confirmed infrastructure cyberattack that has resulted in physical damage that is publicly known is Stuxnet. Perhaps we should focus less on cyberattacks and more attention to these furry adversaries.

#### Their impact ev is hype from cybersecurity firms who want money – independently their rhetoric *creates* cyberweapons actually capable of destruction.

Lee 15 (Robert Lee is a US Cyber Warfare Operations Officer, and is studying for a PhD in Cyber Security at King's College London. “Robert Lee: Beware the Hype” may 6 2015 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32534923)

"A lot of my research debunks stories. I can't cite them because they're not true. There's a general narrative that horrible things are happening all the time: cyber-war, nation states are crumbling. That's not true. "If you hear, 'There's been some recent research around aviation and planes are going to be hacked and fall out of the sky,' or, 'People are going to cyber-attack trains and derail them,' that's not realistic. "Security companies are ramping up the threat. The military's relabelled a lot of things 'cyber-warfare' because they want to get the budget from Congress. Nato and the different alliances ramp up the threat to encourage other countries to invest in security. "One of the narratives that gets built around critical infrastructure is that we're going to have these cascading power failures; someone's going to break in and very easily take down the power grid. While it's true there's vulnerable infrastructure, you can't just take down the entirety of the power grid from a cyber-capability. "[And] we all have the same threat. If the US wants to be able to do that against Russia, or China wants to do that against the US, they have to accept their own vulnerability and do things that would impact themselves as well. "The head of Cyber Command and the head of the National Security Agency say, 'OK, we need to invest in offensive capabilities to be able to secure our critical infrastructure'. Those capabilities trickle down to fringe groups. "If you developed a cyber-capability that could take down the Chinese power grid, it would be nearly identical to the capability you would need to take down the US power grid. We use the same systems. The hype is forcing us to look into offence, which is exactly what we should not be doing. "We actually saw a very concerning case recently, where a company said, 'Iran, they're attacking the US hundreds of thousands of times a year'. But they redefined 'attack': they used ways of describing the events in a way that no-one else in the security world support. The way they framed it was very dangerous."

#### No threat – no incentive for disruption and we can disconnect from the internet.

Lindsay and Gartzke 16 (Jon Lindsay University of Toronto , Erik Gartzke University of California San Diego. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited” In Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter J. P. Krause, eds., The Power to Hurt: Coercion in Theory and in Practice (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming) august 25 2016 http://deterrence.ucsd.edu/\_files/LindsayGartzke\_CoercionThroughCyberspace\_DraftPublic1.pdf)

To paraphrase Clausewitz, cyberwar is politics by other means. Understanding the dynamics, magnitude, and likelihood of aggression online requires an assessment of the operational requirements for staging various types of cyber operations, the strategic benefits actors hope to gain through them, and the risks of unintended consequences. In this chapter we lay out a typology of cyber operations that combines the logic of technological possibility with the logic of strategic utility. We distinguish a number of myths that assume cyber attacks can provide high rewards at low cost from more realistic options that deliver variable rewards at variable costs. There is no free lunch in cyberspace. As a result of technical and political constraints on secret operations that depend on interconnections between adversaries, the coercive potential of cyberspace is more limited than generally appreciated. Because voluntary connections to the internet make cyber harms possible in the first place, aggressors must be careful not to provoke their victims to disconnect. The social and economic value of the internet both expands and constrains the scope for minor aggression like espionage, covert influence, and symbolic protest. Moreover, the availability of military instruments beyond the cyber domain creates potential for retaliation for unacceptable harms. There are diminishing incentives to “go big” with cyber warfare, even as an adjunct to battlefield operations, because victims have incentives to mount major investigations and shift domains to punish cyber aggression. Coercion still has an important role in cyberspace, nonetheless, especially when exploited in conjunction with other forms power such as military force. We thus delineate the ways in which the cyber domain can be used alone or in conjunction with other domains for deterrence or compellence. Strategic logic helps to explain the highly skewed distribution of cyber harms we observe historically. While information technology creates the possibility for harm, it is political and economic incentives that determine the probability of harm. Small-scale aggression online and computer crime is relatively appealing and thus more abundant; large-scale cyber attacks are more difficult and less desirable for initiators and thus far less likely to occur. This argument extends the logic of the “stability-instability paradox” pioneered in the 1960s. Mutually assured destruction may have restrained the superpowers from engaging in direct confrontations during the Cold War, but nuclear threats could not credibly prevent the exercise of proxy wars throughout the Third World. The mechanisms of restraint in the cyber domain are slightly different than in the nuclear world insofar as actors look to maintain connectivity and avoid military retaliation vs. mutual Armageddon, but the results are similar: we see little to none of the most dangerous behavior but a great deal of provocative friction. It turns out that cyber revolutionaries and cyber skeptics are both partially correct. We should expect to see a lot more creative exploitation of global information infrastructure, but threat actors have strong incentives to restrain the intensity of their exploitation. The Power to Hurt Online It is common to hear alarming claims that the U.S. Department of Defense is attacked ten million times per day.5 In reality most such “attacks” are routine automated port scans from cyber criminals trolling for low-hanging fruit. The majority of actual intrusions, including by sophisticated nation-state “advanced persistent threats” (APT), aim to steal data rather than disrupt systems. Cyber operations (also called “computer network operations”) are conventionally divided into three functions: attack, exploitation, and defense.6 Computer network exploitation (CNE) seeks to preserve the illusion of normal functioning in the target system while illicitly stealing data and using system resources. Attack (CNA), by contrast, may cause servers to shut down, alter important data, or create malfunctions in computer-controlled industrial equipment. CNE and CNA are so closely related that U.S. doctrine considers them together as offensive cyber operations (OCO). Both require the attacker to gain access to a target system through some combination of technical methods and malware (viruses, worms, Trojan horses, rootkits, etc.) that take advantage of design flaws or vulnerabilities, social engineering tricks to fool users into revealing sensitive data and passwords (phishing, baiting, water holing, candy drops, etc.), and a command and control network to coordinate the attack and obfuscate the attacker’s identity. Only the malware payload differentiates exploitation from attack, which creates a challenge for the defender trying to differentiate an intelligence penetration from something more sinister.7 Moreover, most disruptive attacks invariably require supporting exploitation for preparatory reconnaissance and performance feedback. Ambiguity about the purpose and severity of intrusions contributes to something of a siege mentality in popular accounts of cybersecurity.

### 2NC---Defense: Economy

#### No conflict from economic decline – recession proves

Barnett, 09 – Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions LLC, Contributing Editor and Online Columnist for Esquire (Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, 8/25/09 <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

### 2NC---Turn: Crowdout

#### H-1Bs don’t bring unique skills and trade off directly with other workers – crowdout means no positive effect on business.

Doran et al 16 [Kirk Doran, University of Notre Dame, Alexander Gelber, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, and NBER, Adam Isen, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries”, February 2016, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/h1b.pdf]

Overall, our results are more supportive of the narrative about the effects of H1Bs on firms in which H-1Bs crowd out alternative workers, are paid less than the alternative workers whom they crowd out, and thus increase the firm’s profits despite no measurable effect on innovation. Prima facie, these results appear at odds with a chief goal of the program, as articulated by policy-makers in legislation, of providing firms with skilled workers who have unique, innovative skills that the firms cannot otherwise obtain. Even though firms attest that hiring the H-1B does not adversely affect similarly employed workers, our results raise the possibility that in many cases firms could be employing H-1Bs instead of employing other workers.40 Although we find little impact on measures of firms’ quantity of innovation, further assessing impacts on measures related to productivity should be a priority for further research. Our results are consistent with the possibility that new H-1B workers and other workers are perfect substitutes, as H-1Bs appear to crowd out similar workers. This is relevant in light of frequent claims that H-1Bs have unique skills that cannot easily be obtained elsewhere.41 If the firm faces frictions in finding a new employee that limit the degree of crowdout of other workers, it would be all the more notable that we find that a new H-1B worker does partially crowd out other workers, and that we cannot rule out that a new H-1B worker has no effect on total employment.

### 2NC---Turn: Employment

#### H1Bs don’t increase employment – causes crowd-out.

Doran et al 16 [Kirk Doran, University of Notre Dame, Alexander Gelber, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, and NBER, Adam Isen, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries”, February 2016, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/h1b.pdf]

Our paper estimates the causal impact of extra H-1B visas on the receiving firm, examining outcomes relevant to assessing these narratives. We use randomized variation from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and FY2007 H-1B visa lotteries. In each of these years, on the date when the cumulative number of H-1B visa applications first exceeded the maximum allowed for a given visa type, the applications submitted on this day were subject to a lottery. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) randomly chose some of these visa applications to win the lottery, and the remaining applications lost the lottery. Across both years and across visa lotteries for those with and without advanced degrees, 3,050 firms applied for 7,243 visas, of which 4,180 visa applications won the lottery. We use administrative data from USCIS on the entrants in these lotteries, matched to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data on the universe of patents at U.S. firms, and matched to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) microdata on the universe of U.S. firms. The Senate Judiciary Committee reports that accompanied legislation to expand the H-1B program in 1998 and 2000 exemplify the narrative in which H-1Bs help firms address “shortages” of special skills. These reports noted that: “Companies across America are faced with severe high-skill labor shortages that threaten their competitiveness” (Senate Judiciary Committee 1998). “America faces a serious dilemma when employers find that they cannot grow, innovate, and compete in global markets without increased access to skilled personnel. Even apart from shortages in particular fields, in our increasingly global economy, highly skilled foreign workers are certain to be in a position to make unique contributions to the U.S. economy. A person from another country may simply be a uniquely talented individual with unique knowledge and skills. The country needs to increase its access to skilled personnel immediately in order to prevent current needs from going unfilled” (Senate Judiciary Committee 2000). Indeed, firms have a legal obligation to ensure that the employment of H-1Bs “will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed.” 3 If H-1Bs have special skills that cannot otherwise easily be obtained, they generally would not be employed in place of others who would have worked at the firm. In fact, many firms, policy-makers, and think-tanks have argued that extra H-1Bs lead firms to increase their employment of other workers (Gates 2008, National Foundation for American Policy 2008). If by contrast H-1Bs do not typically have special skills, then H-1Bs may be employed rather than other workers who would have helped the firm grow and innovate as much as the H-1Bs themselves. In this case, we would not expect employment or innovation to increase at firms that randomly received H-1Bs. Moreover, many H-1Bs are not in scientific industries, and many H-1B workers perform jobs (e.g. technical support) that might be expected not to lead to innovations in the great majority of cases. Economic theory predicts that firms will apply to hire an H-1B worker as long as this increases the firm’s profit in expectation. H-1Bs could increase the firm’s profit even if they crowd out other workers and/or have no effect on the firm’s innovation, as in the case studies in Matloff (2003) or Hira (2010)—for example, if the H-1B is substitutable with other workers and the firm pays the H-1B less than the worker whose employment is crowded out.4 Firms submit legal attestations that they will pay the H-1B a “prevailing wage” comparable to other similar workers, but it is possible that these regulations are ineffective in some cases. Indeed, profit-maximizing firms apply for H-1Bs even though they must pay a fee to the U.S. government to apply, suggesting that H-1Bs are paid less than alternative workers with the same marginal product of labor. We find that new H-1Bs cause no significant increase in firm employment. Our primary finding is that we can robustly rule out more than a moderate increase in overall firm employment (including employment of H-1Bs). Therefore, new H-1Bs substantially crowd out employment of other workers at the firm. This evidence is particularly strong in small and medium-sized firms, where we have the most statistical power to detect an effect on employment of an additional H-1B. The available data suggest that new H-1Bs at least partly crowd out employment of other foreigners, although we cannot rule out that new H-1Bs crowd out non-foreigners as well.

#### It's statistically robust – there’s zero effect on employment.

Doran et al 16 [Kirk Doran, University of Notre Dame, Alexander Gelber, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, and NBER, Adam Isen, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries”, February 2016, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/h1b.pdf]

Our main finding is that we bound any increase in employment below a moderate level. In the baseline median regressions, the top end of the 95 percent confidence interval in firms with 10 or fewer employees is 0.11, indicating that an extra chance H-1B visa leads to an increase in total employment of at most 0.11 workers. Although the point estimate is below zero, it is insignificant. Similarly, in this specification in firms with 30 or fewer employees, the top end of the confidence interval is 0.37. In the full sample of firms, we can rule out an increase greater than 0.57. All of these estimates are significantly different from 1, suggesting crowdout of other employment. In the 2SLS (i.e. mean regression) specification among firms with 10 or fewer employees, the top end of the confidence interval when controlling for expected wins is 0.68, again significantly different from 1, but compatible with a moderate positive effect. With 30 or fewer employees, we can rule out a coefficient of 0.71 or greater (p<0.05. In the full sample of firms, the 2SLS results are extremely imprecise. There is no clear break in these results from those shown in Years -1 or -2 (Table 3 and Appendix Table 7), again consistent with crowdout. Although the point estimates of the employment effect are negative—consistent with several hypotheses, e.g. that H-1Bs work harder than alternative employees—we do not conclude from the point estimate that chance H-1B visas decrease employment, because our confidence interval is compatible with an increase in employment. Of course, this is why confidence intervals are useful in determining what we can rule out with a standard degree of statistical certainty. Our choices of the number of employees in our size thresholds (e.g. 10 or fewer) could be varied. Figure 1 plots the coefficient and confidence interval on chance lottery wins from the baseline median employment specification, as a function of the employer size threshold, from under 10 employees to under 500, in increments of 10.29 We focus on the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval; across all 50 choices of the employer size threshold, in the most positive case we are able to rule out an increase in employment of more than 0.6. In all cases, the estimate is significantly less than 1 at the 1 percent level. The point estimates are always negative and insignificantly different from zero. We also find no significant effect in firms with over 500 employees. We perform a number of variations on our basic specifications. An important issue is whether our results generalize to H-1B applications submitted on other days. We cannot directly address this question, but we can re-weight observations so that the weighted distribution of key firm and worker characteristics from the day of the lottery matches that among applicants for capped H-1B visas over all days that applications were submitted. Appendix Table 8 shows that these results are very similar to the baseline. Throughout the paper, the results are also similar when weighting by firms’ number of H1B applications, or by the expected number of lottery wins. Appendix Table 9 shows that several other specifications yield comparable results: winsorizing instead at the 99th percentile; letting the dependent variable be the IHS of the first difference in employment (as in the IHS patenting specifications); winsorizing the IHS of the first difference in employment at the 99th percentile (to address the long right tail further); winsorizing the IHS of the level of employment at the 99th percentile; and running median regressions when the dependent variable is the first difference of employment (rather than controlling for the lag of employment). We find similar results when we control for fixed effects for each of the four lotteries (Appendix Table 10), or for a firm’s number of applications in each lottery interacted with dummies for each of the lotteries (i.e. conditioning on the “risk set” to which each firm was exposed, Appendix Table 11). Since outliers are particularly notable in the employment context, Appendix Table 12 shows that when we remove only the largest observation in each set of regressions, the 2SLS results for firms with 10 or fewer employees are still comparable to Table 4, ruling out a coefficient of one at the 1 percent level. Appendix Table 13 shows that in each individual quarter from Q1 to Q4, we typically rule out a coefficient of 1, particularly in smaller firms. Appendix Tables 14 and 15 verify that chance lottery wins are also unrelated to whether the firm is in business.30 Appendix Table 16 shows that chance lottery wins have a precise zero effect on a dummy for being above the 99th percentile of employment—as well as the 95th percentile at which we winsorize—demonstrating no effect on being a “star” employer. Quantiles other than the median also show no evidence of increases in employment.

### 2NC---Turn: Wages

#### **H-1Bs drive down domestic wages and displace American tech workers.**

Bukhari 17 [Jeff Bukhari, 2-15-2017, "Why H1-B Visas Aren't So Great for Silicon Valley Workers," Fortune, http://fortune.com/2017/02/15/h1-b-silicon-valley-wages/]

Bringing in computer scientists from abroad has been good for the U.S. overall, raising wages nationwide and bringing down costs for computer products. But the practice hasn’t necessarily been great for native-born workers in the country’s IT sector. Those are the mixed-bag conclusions of a study released recently by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The study ran two comparison models that looked at data from 1994 to 2001, the period during which the use of H-1B visas skyrocketed. H-1B visas allow companies to temporarily employ foreign workers in specialized occupations, which was a practice that was of particular use to tech companies as the digital boom began to take off. Some political leaders, including President Donald Trump, have criticized the visa program in its current form, saying that it displaces American workers and drives down compensation. In 1990, 11% of U.S. computer scientists were immigrants. By 2001, more than 21% of workers in the sector were foreign-born. The study found that immigration in the computer science sector led to an increase in wages across the broader economy of 0.04% to 0.28%. There was a more pronounced effect for non-college educated workers, whose paychecks saw a 0.43% to 0.52% bump. The study also concluded that the inclusion of immigrant labor meant prices for computer products were 1.9% to 2.4% lower. The authors concluded that that decrease boosted the adoption of technology by the general public, by making it more affordable. There is a caveat, though, that could give ammunition to opponents of the H-1B visa program. Without the added foreign labor, the study concluded that domestic employment in the computer science sector would have been between 6.1% and 10.8% higher in 2001. Put simply, for every 100 foreign computer scientists working in the U.S., between 33 and 61 domestic workers were displaced. The influx of foreign workers also held down wages, the authors concluded, with compensation being 2.6% to 5.1% lower than if foreign workers were not allowed. Despite that impact, tech-sector jobs remain among the best-paid jobs in the country. Industry trade group CompTIA estimates that the average U.S tech worker earned $105,400 in 2016, more than twice the national average. The group estimates that the tech sector employed 6.7 million people in the U.S. in 2016, or about 6% of private-sector workers.

### 2NC---AT: Innovation

#### Patenting increases are statistically insignificant.

Doran et al 16 [Kirk Doran, University of Notre Dame, Alexander Gelber, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, and NBER, Adam Isen, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Effects of High-Skilled Immigration Policy on Firms: Evidence from Visa Lotteries”, February 2016, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/h1b.pdf]

In Table 6, we estimate a precise zero effect of chance visas on patenting. The point estimates are generally very close to zero. As the estimates are insignificant, we focus on the confidence intervals to determine what we can rule out with statistical confidence. When the dependent variable is the IHS of the number of patents from Years 0 to 8 in firms with 10 or fewer employees, the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval in the baseline rules out an increase greater than just 0.47 percent, relative to a “base” mean number of patents of only 0.023 per year. For firms with 30 or fewer employees, in the baseline we bound the increase in patents below 1.3 percent, and in the full sample, below 1.9 percent. When the dependent variable is the level of patents, the confidence interval also indicates at most a small impact, e.g. at most an increase of only 0.0021 patents per year from years 0 to 8 in firms with 10 or fewer employees. The results for Years 0 to 3 verify that there is no significant effect on patenting in earlier years, suggesting no apparent break from the results in Years -1 or -2 shown in Table 3 and Appendix Table 7.34 We also find no evidence that H-1Bs increase high quantiles of patenting, and we can bound any increase below a similarly small level. Figure 2 plots the coefficient and confidence interval on chance H-1B visas when the dependent variable is the IHS of number of patents over Years 0 to 8, as a function of the employer’s size. The upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from near 0 to just above 0.01; across all 50 choices of the employer size threshold shown, in the most positive case we are able to rule out an increase in patents greater than around 1.5 percent (and usually the upper bound is substantially smaller). The point estimate is positive in only three of 50 cases—notably, for size thresholds of 10, 20, and 30—though it is insignificant and very small in all of these cases. We also find no significant effects in the largest firms (over 500 employees). Overall, we find no evidence of a notable increase in patenting and robustly rule out more than a small percentage increase.

### 2NC---AT: China Rise

#### Chinese innovation capacity far behind the US

**Norris 10** (President of Americans for Energy Leadership, ’10 Teryn, Summer/Fall, “Dynamic Balances: American Power in the Age of Innovation” SAIS Review, Vol 30 No 2, p 149-164, ProjectMuse)

Any state’s capacity for technological innovation depends on a number of complex factors, including their macroeconomic environment, individual and firm-level microeconomic incentives, and institutional and cultural predispositions. Many of these factors, such as culture, are difficult to measure and lie beyond the scope of this article. This paper uses three measures of national innovation capacity: research and development (R&D), science and engineering education, and technology scaling. R&D is measured by the total and relative expenditure of each state on dedicated research and development. Science and engineering education is measured by numbers of graduates from institutions of higher education. And technology scaling refers to conditions that help diffuse new technologies throughout the marketplace and establish knowledge-intensive industries, ranging from enabling infrastructure and market creation to intellectual property and the ease of doing business. Along with R&D and education, this a key measure of innovation capacity, since realizing the productivity gains of new technologies requires their diffusion throughout the economy. In short, by these three metrics, China is improving its national innovation system but still lags significantly behind the United States. In terms of R&D, total U.S. investment as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively constant since the mid-1980s, hovering around 2.7 percent, with the federal share of total R&D consistently declining. The National Science Foundation (NSF), which publishes one of the most comprehensive reports on international innovation capacity, recently found that China’s investments in R&D grew by over 20 percent annually between 1996 and 2007, compared to less than 6 percent annual growth in the United States. These high growth rates ignore the low starting point of China’s R&D expenditures; China’s R&D intensity in 2007 was still 1.5 percent, just over half the U.S. level. Moreover, this measure ignores the large difference in total GDP between the countries as well. By total expenditure, the United States dwarfs China by an approximate ratio of fifteen to one. 21 In terms of education and workforce in science and engineering, China is rapidly developing its capacity. Whereas the United States experienced moderate annual growth in researchers of about 3 percent between 1995 and 2006, China averaged nearly 9 percent annual growth over this period. The NSF report found that the total number of Chinese researchers nearly tripled, from just over half a million to more than 1.4 million, on par with the U.S. total of around 1.4 million. This measure ignores quality differences between U.S.—educated scholar researchers and their Chinese counterparts, but serves as a useful starting point in showing that in terms of sheer manpower, China is approaching the United States.

#### No China Rise — US maintains technological dominance despite economic slowdown

Brooks and Wohlforth 16 — Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, former Fellow in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, 2016 (“The Once and Future Superpower; Why China Won't Overtake the United States” *Foreign Affairs*, April 21st, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis, Accessed 7-9-16)

After two and a half decades, is the United States' run as the world's sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising Chinaready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, China's economy is on track to become the world's biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon.

But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and established ones to fall. And China-the only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States-also faces a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States' economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the country's military superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come.

Lasting preeminence will help the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger, war between the world's major powers. And it will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked.

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

In forecasts of China's future power position, much has been made of the country's pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But as harmful as these problems are, China's true Achilles' heel on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States'. Relative to past rising powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn't reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call "processing trade," meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed countries.

When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, China's true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013-more than four times as much as the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential articles in science and engineering-those in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation-tells the same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times China's share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two.

Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP, greatly underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledge-based and global­ized a country's production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economy's true size.

A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates China's relative power. Called "inclusive wealth," this measure represents economists' most systematic effort to date to calculate a state's wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a country's stock of assets in three areas: "(i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere)." Added up, the United States' inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion-4.5 times China's $32 trillion.

The true size of China's economy relative to the United States' may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it, "Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet." Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition.

But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didn't lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. China's relative technological backwardness today, however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood.

#### China’s military is too far behind to catch up — China rise would require decades of military innovation

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BARRIERS TO ENTRY

The technological and economic differences between China and the United States wouldn't matter much if all it took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called "command of the commons"-that is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them.

For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in China's way-such as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating capital-that will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R & D, more than 13 times as much as China's estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap.

Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge.

Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the military-industrial complex and the "waste, fraud, and abuse" in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This kind of "learning by doing" experience resides in organizations, not in individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an effective shortcut for acquiring it.

China's defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, "Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems." For example, China still cannot mass-produce high-performance aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In other areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea warfare. China is poorly equipped for antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s. Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars and six decades of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels of silencing.

Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to actually use all these weapons. Employing them is difficult not just because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also because they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an incredibly complicated endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together in real time. Even systems that may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather, process, and act on information collected from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the commons would take any military a very long time. And since the task places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, China's centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it.

#### No capability or incentive for China to challenge the US militarily

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THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT

In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the United States' own sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today, few seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries can become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies.

But what is taking place now is not your grandfather's power transition. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy alone won't make China the world's second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it "an emerging potential superpower": thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superpower.

China's quest for superpower status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War.

Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who's who of the world's most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United States' superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China's only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it is worth.

#### Lacks hegemonic ambition and technological capability – interdependence ensures co-operation – pursuit of hegemony collapses itself

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Needless to say, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet complicated bilateral relationships in the world today. This explains why Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang’s recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online (here and here). Wang Yang stated that China “[has] neither the ability nor the intent to challenge the United States.” Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such soft remarks with regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because Wang’s remarks are seemingly inconsistent with China’s recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true meaning of Wang’s remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward Wang’s conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that China’s ultimate aim is to establish a China-centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia. In other words, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon.¶ The reactions from the U.S. side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with regard to China’s long term goals. But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asia’s peace and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere when he said that China does not have the capabilities and desires to challenge the United States. The evidence of his sincerity is apparent.¶ First let us look at China’s capabilities, which need to be especially formidable if China wants to challenge the United States. Although China’s comprehensive capabilities have been growing rapidly for the past three decades, almost all analysts inside and outside of China agree that there is still a huge gap between China and the U.S. in terms of comprehensive capabilities, particularly when the U.S. is far ahead of China in military and technological realms. China’s economy might have already passed the U.S. economy as the largest one in 2014, but the quality of China’s economy still remains a major weakness for Beijing. Thus, it would be a serious mistake for China to challenge the U.S. directly given the wide gap of capabilities between the two. Even if one day China’s comprehensive capabilities catch up with the United States, it would still be a huge mistake for China to challenge the U.S. because by then the two economies would be much more closely interconnected, creating a situation of mutual dependence benefiting both countries.¶ Besides limited capabilities, China also has limited ambitions which have not been properly understood by many U.S. analysts. It is true that China’s grand strategy is to realize the “China dream” — a dream that will bring wealth, glory, and power to China again — but this, by no means, suggests that China wants to become a hegemon in Asia, or to create a Sino-centric tributary system around which all smaller states must obey China’s orders. Perhaps these perceptions exist in the United States because many U.S. analysts have unconsciously let ultra-realist thinking slip into their minds, thereby believing that states are constantly engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power and influence. But the structure of international politics has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War, thus rendering any serious possibility of world hegemony ineffective or even impossible. In essence, the costs of hegemony outweigh the benefits of hegemony in this new era of international politics, thanks to rising nationalism, nuclear weapons, and increasing economic interdependence between major powers. The Chinese leaders understand this new and changed structure of international politics and based on their assessments, they have decided not to seek hegemony, which is a losing business in this new era.¶Unfortunately, the U.S. is still obsessed with the concept (or illusion) of hegemony, as Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow have pointed out recently. The hegemony mentality is precisely the reason why the United States has declined (slowly) in the post-Cold War era. Wrongly believing that a stable global order needs U.S. hegemony, American leaders have adopted a grand strategy of liberal interventionism, which has only caused self-inflicted wounds for the U.S. economy and its global status. The tragedy, however, is that within U.S. elite circles, this misperception about U.S. hegemony (here and here) sticks and is unlikely to go away for a long time barring a major failure or crisis.¶ At the end of the day, our world can survive and prosper without a hegemon, regardless of whether the hegemon is American or Chinese. The sooner American leaders understand this point and believe Chinese leaders’ words, the higher the chances of peace and stability worldwide.

#### Chinese economic growth doesn’t threaten primacy – several warrants

Beauchamp 14— Zack, World Correspondent at Vox.com, 2014 (“China has not replaced America — and it never will,” The Week, February 13, Available Online at http://theweek.com/articles/450975/china-not-replaced-america--never, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

Many people seem to think it's simply a matter of when, not if, China takes the reins of world leadership. How, they think, can America's 314 million people permanently outproduce a population that outnumbers the U.S. by over a billion people?¶ This facile assumption is wrong. China is not replacing the United States as the global hegemon. And it never will.¶ China faces too many internal problems and regional rivals to ever make a real play for global leadership. And even if Beijing could take the global leadership mantle soon, it wouldn't. China wants to play inside the existing global order's rules, not change them.¶ Start with the obvious military point: The Chinese military has nothing like the global reach of its American rival's. China only has one aircraft carrier, a refitted Russian vessel. The U.S. has 10, plus nine marine mini-carriers. China's first homemade carrier is slated for completion in 2018, by which time the U.S. will have yet another modern carrier, and be well on its way to finishing another. The idea that China will be able to compete on a global scale in the short to medium term is absurd.¶ Even in East Asia, it's not so easy for China. In 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies experts Anthony Cordesman and Nicholas Yarosh looked at the data on Chinese and Taiwanese military strength. They found that while China's relative naval strength was growing, Taiwan had actually improved the balance of air power in its favor between 2005 and 2012 — just as China's economic growth rate, and hence influx of new resources to spend on its military, was peaking.¶ China's equipment is often outdated, and its training regimes can be comically bad. A major part of its strategic missile force patrols on horseback because it doesn't have helicopters.¶ This isn't to deny China's military is getting stronger. It is. And one day, this might require the United States to rethink its strategic posture in East Asia. But Chinese hard power is nowhere close to replacing, or even thinking about challenging, American military hegemony.¶ And look at China's geopolitical neighborhood. As a result of historical enmity and massive power disparities, Beijing would have a tough time convincing Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that its military buildup is anything but threatening. Consequently, the smaller East Asian states are likely to get over their mutual disagreements and stick it out together in the American-led alliance system for the foreseeable future.¶ To the north and west, China is bordered by Russia and India. China fought each of them as recently as the 1960s, and both are likely to be threatened by any serious Chinese military buildup. Unlike the United States, bordered by oceans and two friendly states, China is surrounded by enemies and rivals. Projecting power globally is hard when you've got to worry about defending your own turf.¶ But what happens when China's GDP passes America's? Well, for one thing, we're not really sure when that will be. Realizing that current growth rates were economically and ecologically unsustainable, the Chinese government cut off the investment spigot that fueled its extraordinary 10 percent average annual growth. Today, China's growth rate is about half of what it was in 2007. One analysis suggests China's GDP may not surpass America's until the 2100s.¶ Moreover, China's GDP per capita is a long way off from matching Western standards. In 2012, the World Bank assessed China's at $6,009; the United States' was $57,749. The per-person measure of wealth matters in that it reflects the government's capacity to pay for things that make its citizens happy and healthy.¶ That's where China's internal headaches begin. The Chinese government has staked its domestic political legitimacy on delivering rapid, massive improvements in quality of life for its citizens. As growth slows, domestic political dissent may rise. Moreover, growth's worst side effect to date — an unprecedented ecological crisis — is also a source of massive discontent. China has 20 of the world's 30 most polluted cities; environmental cleanup costs may hoover up 3 percent of China's GDP. That's throwing 30 percent of its yearly average growth (during the pre-2013 boom years!) down the drain.¶ The mass death and poisoning that follow as severe pollution's handmaidens threaten the very foundations of the Communist Party's power. American University China scholar Judith Shapiro writes that environmental protests — which sometimes "shut down" huge cities — are "so severe and so central to the manner in which China will 'rise' that it is no exaggeration to say that they cannot be separated from its national identity and the government's ability to provide for the Chinese people."¶ That's hardly the only threat to the Chinese economy. China's financial system bears a disturbing resemblance to pre-crisis Wall Street. Its much-vaunted attempt to move away from an unsustainable export-based economy, according to Minxin Pei, may break on the rocks of massive corruption and other economic problems. After listing a slew of related problems, Pei suggests we need to start envisioning a world of "declining Chinese strength and rising probability of an unexpected democratic transition in the coming two decades."¶ But even if this economic gloom and doom is wrong, and China really is destined for a prosperous future, there's one simple reason China will never displace America as global leader: It doesn't want to.¶ Chinese foreign policy, to date, has been characterized by a sort of realist incrementalism. China has displayed no interest in taking over America's role as protector of the global commons; that's altogether too altruistic a task. Instead, China is content to let the United States and its allies keep the sea lanes open and free ride off of their efforts. A powerful China, in other words, would most likely to be happy to pursue its own interests inside the existing global order rather than supplanting it.

#### China is all talk and no action – makes rise unlikely

Wong, Barnes, and Page 14— Chun Han, writes about politics, labor and urbanization issues in China from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, previously covered politics and business in Singapore, Cambodia and the broader Southeast Asian region, graduated from the London School of Economics; Julian E, covers the Department of Defense and national security issues from The Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, writes regularly on Pentagon policy, military strategy and other defense issues, has covered the Pentagon for more than a decade, reported on the military for the Los Angeles Times and U.S. News and World Report, graduate of Harvard University, has also worked for the New York Times and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette; Jeremy, a reporter in the Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, covering domestic politics, international relations and security, joined the Journal in Beijing in 2010, prior to which he worked for The Times of London for eight years, first in Russia, then in India; 2014 (“China Military Official Blasts U.S. 'Hegemony' at Shangri-La Conference,” The Wall Street Journal, June 1, Available Online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-military-official-blasts-u-s-hegemony-at-shangri-la-security-conference-1401648136, Accessed 07-12-2016, AV)

But China also risks overplaying its hand by speaking out so forcefully against the U.S. and its allies.¶ "China's position is not as strong as it thinks it is," said Rory Medcalf, director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia. Not only do China's more-aggressive actions encourage other countries to band together to counter China's rise, they also make it easier for the U.S. to justify its continued military role in the region, he said.¶ Some U.S. officials have said privately they hope that China's actions in the South China Sea and its tough language will push America's allies to strengthen ties with one another, and smaller nations to seek stronger ties with the U.S.¶ But the strategic equation is changing rapidly as China's economic and military power grows. Deepening trade and economic ties between China and its neighbors mean that many Asian countries can't afford to challenge China.¶ Several weeks ago, a Chinese state-run oil company moved a drilling rig into waters also claimed by Vietnam, sparking riots against Chinese and other businesses in Vietnam, and triggering criticism from Washington and Tokyo about what they see as Beijing's growing disregard for international law.¶ China defended its actions as normal activities in its own sovereign territory.¶ Other actions by China that have angered the region include the seizure of the Scarborough Shoal, a disputed area in the South China Sea that is also claimed by the Philippines, in 2012, and a construction project in the disputed Spratly Islands. China has also repeatedly sparred with Japan over rights to disputed East China Sea islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China.¶ Despite region-wide concern over these perceived incursions, few nations in the region have the military or economic wherewithal to risk angering Beijing.¶ The tit-for-tat at the Shangri-La Dialogue was unusual in its frankness. It kicked off on Friday night, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe used his speech to denounce unilateral efforts to alter the strategic status quo in Asia, in remarks clearly aimed at China.¶ Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that the Pacific region was becoming less stable because of "coercion and provocation" by China.¶ China's Gen. Zhu said charges of destabilizing actions by China were groundless. Gen. Zhu accused Mr. Hagel of hypocrisy in his assessment of the region's security landscape, suggesting that in his view "whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right."¶ The "Chinese are not so stupid" as to believe that Washington wants to work with China, or that the U.S. government is truly neutral when it comes to territorial disputes between China and American allies, he said.¶ China's military remains far less powerful than that of the U.S., but its investments in enhanced surveillance and missile-weapons systems means it would be more capable of deterring U.S. advances in the region in the event of a military conflict.¶ China's military strategists have long seen their country as being hemmed in militarily by a network of U.S. bases and alliances in Asia that are mostly legacies from World War II and the Cold War.¶ Since the global financial crisis in 2008, many Chinese military officers have perceived an opportunity to use the country's economic strength to change that dynamic. Those officers, and many civilian analysts, also expect that the U.S. would be reluctant to become embroiled in another conflict after extricating itself from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ In his speech on Sunday, Lt. Gen. Wang, China's top military delegate at the meeting, said Mr. Hagel's speech was designed to "create trouble and make provocations."¶ Nevertheless, he said, China is committed to peaceful development and observes proper processes in handling territorial disputes.¶ "China has never taken the first step to provoke troubles," the general said in comments that he said were deviations from his prepared remarks. "China has only been forced to respond to the provocative actions by other parties."

#### Technology means China won’t rise to U.S. levels

Rogoff 4/4 (2018, Kenneth, Business Standard Author, “Will China supplant US hegemony?”, Business Standard, https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/will-china-supplant-us-hegemony-118040301365\_1.html)

Which is it? Over the next 100 years, who takes over, Chinese workers or the robots? If robots and AI are the dominant drivers of production in the coming century, perhaps having too large a population to care for — especially one that needs to be controlled through limits on Internet and information access — will turn out to be more of a hindrance for China. The rapid aging of China’s population exacerbates the challenge. As the rising importance of robotics and AI blunts China’s manufacturing edge, the ability to lead in technology will become more important. Here, the current trend toward higher concentration of power and control in the central government, as opposed to the private sector, could hamstring China as the global economy reaches higher stages of development. The possibility that China might never supplant the US as the world’s economic hegemon is the flip side of the technology and inequality problem. Everyone in the West is worrying about the future of work, but in many ways it is a bigger problem for the Chinese development model than for the American one. The US needs to struggle with the problem of how to redistribute income internally, especially given highly concentrated ownership of new ideas and technology. But for China, there is the additional problem of how to extend its franchise as export superpower into the machine age. True, it is highly unlikely that President Donald Trump’s huffing and puffing and bluffing will bring about a large-scale return of manufacturing jobs to the US. But the US has the potential to expand the size of its manufacturing base anyway, in terms of output if not jobs. After all, today’s high-tech factory floors produce far more with far fewer workers. And the robots and AI are coming not just in manufacturing and driverless cars. Robo-doctors, robo-financial advisors, and robo-lawyers are just the tip of the iceberg in machine disruption of service-sector jobs. To be sure, China’s rise is hardly a mirage, and its heady success is not built on population size alone. India has a similar population (both around 1.3 billion people), but for now, at least, it trails far behind. Chinese leadership must be credited with doing a miraculous job of lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and into the middle class. But China’s rapid growth has been driven mostly by technology catch-up and investment. And while China, unlike the Soviet Union, has shown vastly more competence in homegrown innovation — Chinese companies are already leading the way in the next generation of 5G mobile networks — and its cyber-warfare capacity is fully on par with the US, keeping close to the cutting edge is not the same thing as defining it. China’s gains still come largely from adoption of Western technology, and in some cases, appropriation of intellectual property. Mr Trump is hardly the first American president to complain on this score, and he is right to do so (though starting a trade war cannot be the solution). In the economy of the 21st century, other factors, including rule of law, as well as access to energy, arable land, and clean water may also become increasingly important. China is following its own path and may yet prove that centralised systems can push development further and faster than anyone had imagined, far beyond simply being a growing middle-income country. But China’s global dominance is hardly the predetermined certainty that so many experts seem to assume.

#### Chinese economic growth doesn’t challenge the US — insufficient growth and Japan proves economy not key

de Jonquieres 12 — Guy de Jonquieres, Senior Fellow at the European Centre for International Political Economy, former Asia columnist and commentator for the Financial Times, 2012 (“What Power Shift to China?” *China’s Geoeconomic Strategy*, June, Available Online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR012/LSE%20IDEAS%20China%20Geeconomic%20Strategy.pdf, Accessed 7-11-16)

Exactly what China’s power consists of, how it might be exercised and for what purposes are left tantalisingly unexplained. It seems simply to be assumed that such a populous country, whose economy has grown so big so fast, must have both the will and the capacity to impose its writ on the rest of the world. But that assumption, and the premises that underlie it, are highly questionable.

Undeniably, three decades of double-digit growth have given China impressive economic scale. It is the world’s second biggest economy, creditor nation and importer, its largest exporter and, by some measures, its most important manufacturing centre. It has the biggest current account surplus and foreign exchange reserves – at more than $3,000 billion, roughly one third of the global total. And it is the world’s biggest consumer of such commodities as aluminium, iron ore and copper.

However, those achievements need to be set in perspective. A hundred years ago, well before it became a global superpower, the US had already been the world’s biggest economy for a decade and accounted for a fifth of world GDP, considerably more than twice as much as Germany and Britain, the next largest economies, combined. On the most generous purchasing power parity (PPP) measure, China’s GDP today is only two thirds that of the US – and less than half at nominal exchange rates – and its growth rate is set to slow in the coming years.

Furthermore US incomes a century ago were the highest in the world, almost 10 percent more than those of Britain, its closest rival. Chinese incomes today are barely one-sixth of the US level on a PPP basis, and only one tenth at nominal exchange rates, and ranks about 90th in the world league table. Relative to other countries, China now is a vastly poorer country than the US was then.

In any case, economic size does not, of itself, confer international influence. Japan, at its economic apogee in the 1980s, had the world’s second largest GDP, a huge current account surplus, bulging foreign exchange reserves and a world-beating manufacturing sector. Yet, despite widespread predictions that it was set to become a dominant power, it never translated those strengths into matching political or diplomatic influence, let alone leadership. And two centuries ago, when China was the world’s biggest economy, with a GDP larger than the whole of Western Europe, it was largely closed off from the world.

#### China rise is highly unlikely – too much structural disadvantages stagnate leadership

Hale 12— Lyric Hughes, Editor of Econvue, a forum for independent voices and expert opinions on the global economy, a writer and contributor to a range of publications, including the Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, Current History, and Institutional Investor, studied Japanese at Northwestern University and graduated from the University of Chicago with a degree in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, her scholarly interests include Chinese monetary policy during the 1930s, Iranian affairs, and the role of the media in developing countries, especially China, member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue, and is a long-time director of the Japan America Society of Chicago, 2012 (“China’s 99% — Why China Will Not Surpass the U.S.,” The World Post, Jan 3, Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyric-hughes-hale/why-china-will-not-surpas\_b\_1069623.html, Accessed 07-05-2016, AV)

The received wisdom these days is that the West is in rapid decline, and China is on an upward trajectory that cannot be stopped. Sooner or later the pundits say, the two lines will cross— perhaps explosively— and China will rule the world. The latest evidence? Klaus Regling heading to Beijing on Friday to beg for Chinese financial aid to rescue Europe. It is certainly a long way from the foreign treaty ports and other indignities that China suffered at European hands in the last century... I wonder if there is a Chinese word for schadenfreude?¶ I might have contributed modestly to the momentum theory of China’s ascendancy myself with the 2003 article that David Hale and I wrote for Foreign Affairs, China Takes Off. To say that China is rising is one thing however, because that is undoubtedly true. To say that China will rule the world is quite another.¶ An amazing number of Americans who were polled recently incorrectly believe that China’s economy is already bigger than the US. The view from inside China is somewhat different. As any thoughtful person there will attest, China faces a slew of obstacles at this stage of its development. China might be a rich state, but its people remain poor. China may become the world’s largest economy in 2016 according to optimistic estimates by the IMF, but that simply means that total output will be larger than in the US. A country with 1.3 billion people should have an economy larger than one with .3 billion in absolute numbers: China’s population is more than four times larger. If both economies were exactly the same size, China’s GDP per capita would be just 25% compared to the US.¶ What this means is that in spite of the overall size of its economy, the standard of living in China is correspondingly lower. Just one example to put this into perspective: only 20% of Chinese people have flush toilets. The inescapable fact is that a world in which Chinese consume at the same rate as Americans is a world that cannot exist, based upon available resources of food, water, energy, and other commodities and products such as cars. It would require by some estimates four plant Earths. There is a natural limit to Chinese consumption simply because there are so many Chinese people. This might be unfair, but it means that the great majority of Chinese will not be able to enjoy the kind of life we live here in the US absent exponential and unforeseen technological progress.¶ Demographics play a crucial role in terms of limiting Chinese growth and economic prosperity. China’s population, similarly to Japan, is getting older. The difference is that the Chinese are not going to be as rich as the Japanese by the time that much of their population is over the age of 65. By 2040, assuming current demographic trends continue, there will be about 400 million Chinese elderly with fewer descendants to take care of them than in previous generations. According to a report by CSIS, The Graying of the Middle Kingdom instead of the current ratio of 6:1 working adults to elder dependents, by the middle of this century there will only be about 1.6 working adults for each elder. Due to the lack of job-related and government pension funding the end result will be that China’s savings, upon which her wealth has been built, will erode. China faces a steady decline in its workforce beginning mid this decade, thanks to the One Child Policy.¶ The elderly are also major consumers of health care services. The United States is the richest nation on earth, and has positive population growth, but we are still worried about being able to take care of our baby boomers in the future. In today’s China, healthcare is at a premium, and many people in the countryside cannot afford any medical treatment— full stop.¶ According to a recent article in Foreign Affairs by Yanzhong Huang, The Sick Man of Asia, China’s Health Crisis in 2006 80% of China’s health care expenditures were funneled into the treatment of only 8.5 million government officials. Another amazing statistic Huang cites: more than 73% of Chinese hospitals have reported violent incidents between patients and healthcare professionals. Why? Because feelings run high when you are told that your child, your parent or your spouse cannot be given treatment because you cannot pay for it. China is worried about getting both old and sick: by 2040, more Chinese will be suffering from Alzheimer’s than the total populations of all the developed nations combined.¶ Health care is not the only area of concern. The Chinese government is aware that there is growing resentment of income inequality, the result of the introduction of capitalism and the wholesale abandonment of its social safety net. When I first went to China in 1979, the so-called Gini coefficient, the measurement of income inequality, was low. China was a truly socialist country and all services including housing were provided by the state. China in 2011, nominally and in fact politically still a communist country, has greater income inequality than the US.¶ Someday China’s 99% could be a truly potent force. China’s leaders are worried about organized protests. There is no Twitter in China, as I recently confirmed with the co-founder of Twitter, Biz Stone. Facebook does not function, and the Internet and all online news is censored. Chinese citizens will increasingly face an asymmetric information gap as they struggle to compete with other large developing countries such as India, which allow the free flow of information. This is not an environment in which innovation can flourish. Try to imagine a Chinese Steve Jobs—almost all of the new companies in China today are derivative of US products, services, and business models.¶ Examples of the limits of technological progress in the face of suppression of information can be seen in recent accidents involving China’s showcase technology. The bullet train tragedy, the grounding of the new Airbus made in China, and similar events add up to an enormous glitch factor as China attempts to step up the technology ladder to more complex systems. Overheard comment—an inspector on the Shanghai’s vaunted subway system will not allow his family to use their trains. Whenever there is an atmosphere of fear, bad news does not get reported up the command chain.¶ Other countries are increasingly less willing to share their technology with China for a variety of reasons. Some businesspeople have had bad experiences, either in terms of political pressure (Google) or more commonly, theft of intellectual property. Lack of protection by China’s legal system is cited as the number one structural impediment to foreign companies doing business in China. This all goes back to the ideal of creating an atmosphere in which ideas can flourish and R&D spending is rewarded through the stock market and other vehicles, a process that is not taking place in China today.¶ Small business, the cradle of job creation everywhere, is at a lending standstill in China. Most small and medium size businesses are forced to go to the black or “informal” lending markets for funding, with interest rates of 20, 30 and 40%. Chinese banks are equipped to funnel loans to the large state-owned businesses, but they do not have credit analysts who can determine whether or not a business should be given a loan on its own merits. The languishing stock market is still dominated by behemoth state-owned enterprises, so when startups need capital, they often turn to foreign investors. In spite of the glut of savings within China’s banking system, all of China’s major Internet firms raised funds in US stock markets—Sina, Sohu, Alibaba. Lack of access to capital has also resulted in the loss of thousands of Chinese engineers and entrepreneurs who decided to come to the US to start their businesses, to the inestimable gain of Silicon Valley.¶ Another common misperception is that China will overcome the US militarily. First of all, China has no major allies, with the possible exception of Russia, which clearly seeks to protect its own interests first and foremost. The US on the other hand has firm global allies, military bases worldwide, and a navy that girdles the earth. Secondly, in today’s world, warfare is all about technology, and in spite of its successes with rockets and satellites, China is still handicapped in this area. Finally, there is the question of political will. China will fight to protect its interests in Taiwan and in Tibet. But other than that, North Korea has proved to be a major albatross, and there is another strong power in the region, Japan, which will do everything it can to check China’s military ascendency.¶ All of this is not to say that China isn’t the greatest success story of our generation. It is a land and a people I love dearly, a civilization whose history and art are unparalleled in many respects. But there is no predetermined place for China to regain on the world stage—history is that simple. When you next read about the “end of America” or China’s “inevitable” domination, put on your skeptical spectacles. In spite of the visible, flashy wealth of its modern coastal cities, China is still very much a developing economy on the brink of major changes. Its current system of centralized non-democratic government might be perfect for implementing unpopular choices such as joining the WTO, a decision that was estimated to cost 50 million jobs at the time. The question is whether China has been able to use its wealth it has gained since joining the WTO to create institutions that can bring longer-term stability.

#### Lack of intentions and required time to grow stagnate China’s rise – cooperation in Asia-Pacific more likely

Mizokami 14 — Kyle, writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan, the founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch and Asia Security Watch, contributor at The Daily Beast, The Atlantic.com, Salon, The Japan Times and The Diplomat, 2014 (“The Chinese Military Is a Paper Dragon,” War is Boring, Apr 29, Available Online at https://warisboring.com/the-chinese-military-is-a-paper-dragon-8a12e8ef7edc#.dvwvvul50, Accessed 07-12-2016, AV)

China’s military buildup, along with an aggressive foreign policy, has inspired a fair amount of alarm in the West. Some American policymakers consider Beijing to be Washington’s only “near-peer competitor”—in other words, the only country with the military might to actually beat the U.S. military in certain circumstances.¶ But they’re wrong. Even after decades of expensive rearmament, China is a paper dragon—a version of what Mao Zedong wrongly claimed the United States was … in 1956.¶ China’s military budget has grown by double-digits year after year, but inflation has eaten away at the increases. China’s army, navy, air force and missile command are wracked by corruption—and their weapons are, by and large, still greatly inferior to Western equivalents.¶ Yes, the People’s Liberation Army is slowly becoming more technologically advanced. But that doesn’t mean Beijing can mobilize its armed forces for global missions. Unlike the world’s main expeditionary powers—the United States and the U.K., to name two—China is surrounded by potential enemies.¶ Russia, Japan and India are all neighbors … and historic adversaries. China’s aggressive foreign policy targeting smaller states isn’t encouraging submission but resistance, as countries such as The Philippines and Vietnam ally with the United States, Japan and India.¶ China’s other neighbors are weak or failed states, such as Pakistan and North Korea. Their instability—or their outright collapse—could have serious security repercussions for China, and help explain why Beijing lavishes funds on its armed forces.

#### Lack of intentions and required time to grow stagnate China’s rise – cooperation in Asia-Pacific more likely

Sutter 05— Robert G., Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington, 2005 (“China’s Rise in Asia – Promises, Prospects, and Implications for the United States,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Feb, Available Online at http://apcss.org/Publications/Ocasional%20Papers/OPChinasRise.pdf, Accessed 07-11-2016, AV)

One key issue needing clarification relates to how much actual power and influence China exerts as a result of¶ its salient trading role and adroit diplomacy. In the past, China exerted important influence in nearby Asia¶ through military force and pressure, such as support for insurgencies and communist parties. The current¶ Chinese approach eschews military force and pressure in most cases (Taiwan is an obvious exception, and¶ there are arguably others, e.g. Japan, India, and Vietnam). China exerts influence in positive ways through¶ mutually beneficial economic and political arrangements, featuring growing China-Asia interdependence.¶ Most assessments correctly conclude that the new approach gives China more influence in Asia, but how much¶ more?¶ As Chinese leaders focus on seeking common ground with neighbors, with a few exceptions they do not seek¶ to have neighboring governments do things they would not otherwise be inclined to do. This is consistent with¶ their current “win-win” emphasis in developing relationships with neighboring countries. As noted earlier, the¶ exceptions include strong Chinese pressure against contacts with Taiwan, the Dalai Lama and the Chinese-outlawed¶ Falun Gong. The overall benign Chinese approach eases regional concerns about possible Chinese dominance¶ and wins support among elite and public opinion in many Asian states. However, many seasoned foreign¶ policy practitioners argue that such soft power doesn’t amount to much unless the Chinese can show that¶ they can make these governments make hard decisions they would otherwise seek to avoid in directions favorable¶ to China. China has yet to show its power in such circumstances.¶ China’s geo-economic strategy in Asia also has practical limitations. China is still a poor country. It remains a¶ significant net recipient of foreign aid; its annual dues to the United Nations are small. China’s ability to invest¶ and give aid to Asian neighbors is undercut by strong Chinese domestic development priorities. China’s strategic¶ reach and influence in Asia are overshadowed by those of the United States. The United States also¶ remains the most important recipient of finished products exported by China and other Asian manufacturers,¶ and an economic partner of choice and an accepted security guarantor in Asia for most Asian governments.¶ The United States is not a threat to many manufacturers in Asia, whereas rising China is.¶ These obstacles can be overcome with time and given continued prosperity and stability in China, but that will¶ not happen fast. Chinese limitations seemed on display in the international relief efforts following the Tsunami¶ disaster in southern Asia in December 2004. Chinese government leaders went to extraordinary efforts to provide¶ aid and other support, but the Chinese contributions were overshadowed by fast and efficient responses¶ by thousands of US forces with needed equipment along with relief teams from Asian Pacific states close to¶ the United States, and by large aid contributions from the U.S., Australia, Germany and Japan that placed¶ China in a secondary category of donors.¶ Meanwhile, in trying to measure Chinese power and influence in Asia, it appears important to differentiate¶ Asian elite and public opinion, which sometimes gets caught up in a pro-China “fever,” from the private calculus¶ of Asian government leaders. Governments remain the key actors in Asian affairs and in the foreign relations¶ of the region. In dealing with rising China, most Asian government officials carefully calculate their¶ nations’ interests as they endeavor to channel Chinese behavior in constructive ways while seeking offsetting¶ linkages with the United States, Japan, India, and others. Japan is particularly wary of China’s rise, while¶ India, Russia, and others maneuver with the United States and other powers to avoid an Asian order dominated¶ by China. ASEAN leaders in recent years have engaged in a transparent effort to get China, Japan, India, the¶ United States, and other powers to compete for better relations with ASEAN through free trade and other¶ arrangements. One conclusion that comes from this is that few Asian leaders appear ready to adhere to a¶ Chinese-led order in Asia.

#### China’s economic growth doesn’t threaten US – three reasons

Thompson 14— Loren, focuses on the strategic, economic and business implications of defense spending as the Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, 2014 (“Five Reasons China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global Power,” Forbes, June 6, Available Online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-be-a-big-threat-to-americas-global-power/#3a43984b1b5c, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

China’s rapid economic rise and growing assertiveness in relations with other nations has provoked concern in Washington that America is facing a new rival for global dominance. World Bank estimates suggest China may surpass the purchasing power of the U.S. economy as early as this year, meaning that America will cease being the world’s biggest producer of wealth for the first time since it overtook Britain on the eve of the 1876 centennial. U.S. critics of Beijing frequently ascribe China’s success to mercantilist trade policies, and point to other irritants such as growing military investment and state-directed cyber attacks to depict the Middle Kingdom as a menace on the march.¶ It certainly doesn’t help matters when Chinese military leaders attending international forums describe America as a nation in decline, and attribute the Obama Administration’s restrained response in Ukraine to “erectile dysfunction.” However, there is no need to make the administration’s Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War, because for all its dynamism China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were. This is partly due to intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on China’s ability to continue advancing. Those limits don’t get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining China’s power potential.¶ 1. Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, China’s potential for territorial growth is severely limited by geography. To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the north vast and largely empty grasslands known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia. And to the east stretches the world’s largest ocean (there are over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share the southern coastal plain and China’s historical claim to Taiwan, there isn’t much opportunity for wars of conquest on China’s periphery. Ironically, China’s disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its territory the way other powers have.¶ 2. Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the largest population of any country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in 1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations. What this means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that “within a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin a sharp decline.” The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled China’s economic miracle has already begun disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out. In the years ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending.¶ 3. Economic dependency. China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a springboard to economic development. According to the CIA’s 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services comprise over a quarter of China’s gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible wasn’t drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes China’s prosperity — per capita GDP is below $10,000 – much more vulnerable than America’s. China has sold over $100 billion more in goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy won’t persist if the labor cost differential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a real danger to its interests. China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and investors to keep its economy growing that it can’t run the risk of really scaring its trading partners.

#### Growth doesn’t threaten primacy – overinflated growth rates and American resiliency check

Lind 09— Michael, the author of Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States and co-founder of the New America Foundation, 2009 (“Shocking news: The world is stable!,” Salon, Dec 7, Available Online at http://www.salon.com/2009/12/08/stable/, Accessed 07-01-2016, AV)

The lesson I take from all of this is that the distribution of power and wealth in the world is far more stable than you would think if you listened to our manic-depressive public discourse, where America is always either on the brink of catastrophic decline or unchallengeable global supremacy. The U.S. share of global GDP — a good proxy for power — has fluctuated around a quarter or a fifth since the early 1900s, with the exception of a temporary spike after World War II before the other industrial great powers recovered from it. The Soviet Union never came anywhere near challenging American primacy, and neither did Japan.¶ But now we are told that China will catch up with the U.S. in a couple of decades and dominate the world in the “Asian century.” Maybe, and then again, maybe not. Those projections depend on straight-line extrapolations of the incredibly high Chinese growth rates of the last decade. But there are a lot of problems with those projections that you seldom hear in awed discussions of the rise of China.¶ For one thing, as developing countries become developed countries, their initial high rates of growth slow down. Taking this into account pushes China’s parity with the U.S. further into the future. And this assumes that China’s high growth rates have been real. More and more experts are wondering whether those official growth rates can be trusted. It would not be the first time that a corrupt, authoritarian regime cooked the books. If China’s growth figures have been inflated for a decade or two, then the Chinese economy may be smaller than many believe and the distance it has to travel to catch up with the U.S. is much greater.¶ And even optimistic projections only have China catching up with the U.S. in overall GDP, mainly because it will have a larger, but much poorer, population. Nobody expects China, even under the most favorable circumstances, to catch up with the U.S. and other developed countries in per capita income until the 22nd century, if then. And each of the rest of the “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is dwarfed by the U.S. in GDP.

#### China can’t create lasting institutions in Asia

Menon 16 ― Shivshankar Menon, distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, former national security advisor to the Indian Prime Minister, chairman of the advisory board of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi, 2016. (“What China’s Rise Means for the World”, *The Wire*, Feburary 1st, 2016, Available Online at: <http://thewire.in/18441/what-chinas-rise-means-for-the-world/> Accessed 7-11-16)

\*We do not endorse the gendered language in this card

Unlike the US, which is protected by two of the worlds largest oceans, China is in a crowded neighbourhood, has land boundaries with 13 countries, has only two allies — Pakistan and North Korea – and some of her neighbours with whom she has difficult relations have also been accumulating hard and soft power and working with each other, such as Japan, India and Vietnam.

Despite the considerable strides that China has made in acquiring power, she still lacks the capability to manage, devise or impose a political or security order in her immediate neighbourhood, the Asia-Pacific.

This is a function not just of the balance of power and the presence of the United States, but also of her inability to offer a normative framework, and, because of the nature of China’s relations with significant countries like India, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Russia and others. If China cannot, and the US will not continue to, provide security in the commons through alliances and bases, we should expect continued instability in the Asia-Pacific. Optimists – and those who want to change the status quo, like China – call this outcome multipolarity and welcome it, since instability offers space to pursue one’s interests and opens up the possibility of improving one’s position.

Can the world economy recover and prosper amidst such political and security instability, and in the economic fragmentation that the TPP, RCEP and other regional free trade agreements represent? My own sense is that it cannot. Also, the natural reaction to prolonged insecurity and strategic competition between states in the region would be to form coalitions and alliances, formal or informal.

### 2NC---AT: Labor Shortage

#### No shortage – incoming graduates fill the gap

Lohr 11/1 (2017, Steve, NY Times tech, business, and economics reporter, “Where the STEM Jobs Are (and Where They Aren’t)”, NY Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/education/edlife/stem-jobs-industry-careers.html)

Life Sciences\* 183k 12k Engineering 169k 51k Physical Sciences So Many Degrees, So Little Demand 43k The number of graduates with technical majors (shown: bachelor, master and Ph.D. degrees awarded in 2015-16) tends to outpace job openings (shown: 2014-24 projections, annualized). Computer science is the exception. 9k Mathematical Sciences 33k 7k Computer Science 107k 108k \*Does not include health care occupations. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Center for Education Statistics The national priority in education can be summed up in a four-letter acronym: STEM. And that’s understandable. A country’s proficiency in science, technology, engineering and mathematics is vital in generating economic growth, advancing scientific innovation and creating good jobs. The STEM campaign has been underway for years, championed by policymakers across the ideological spectrum, embraced in schools everywhere and by organizations ranging from the YWCA to the Boy Scouts. By now, the term — first popularized and promoted by the National Science Foundation — is used as a descriptive identifier. “She’s a STEM,” usually meant as a compliment, suggests someone who has a leg up in the college admissions sweepstakes. Much of the public enthusiasm for STEM education rests on the assumption that these fields are rich in job opportunity. Some are, some aren’t. STEM is an expansive category, spanning many disciplines and occupations, from software engineers and data scientists to geologists, astronomers and physicists. What recent studies have made increasingly apparent is that the greatest number of high-paying STEM jobs are in the “T” (specifically, computing). Earlier this year, Glassdoor, a jobs listing website, ranked the median base salary of workers in their first five years of employment by undergraduate major. Computer science topped the list ($70,000), followed by electrical engineering ($68,438). Biochemistry ($46,406) and biotechnology ($48,442) were among the lowest paying majors in the study, which also confirmed that women are generally underrepresented in STEM majors. “There is a huge divide between the computing technology roles and the traditional sciences,” said Andrew Chamberlain, Glassdoor’s chief economist. At LinkedIn, researchers identified the skills most in demand. The top 10 last year were all computer skills, including expertise in cloud computing, data mining and statistical analysis, and writing smartphone applications. In a recent analysis, Edward Lazowska, a professor of computer science at the University of Washington, focused on the Bureau of Labor Statistics employment forecasts in STEM categories. In the decade ending in 2024, 73 percent of STEM job growth will be in computer occupations, but only 3 percent will be in the physical sciences and 3 percent in the life sciences. A working grasp of the principles of science and math should be essential knowledge for all Americans, said Michael S. Teitelbaum, an expert on science education and policy. But he believes that STEM advocates, often executives and lobbyists for technology companies, do a disservice when they raise the alarm that America is facing a worrying shortfall of STEM workers, based on shortages in a relative handful of fast-growing fields like data analytics, artificial intelligence, cloud computing and computer security. “When it gets generalized to all of STEM, it’s misleading,” said Mr. Teitelbaum, a senior research associate in the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School. “We’re misleading a lot of young people.”

#### STEM fails and increasing it isn’t necessary

Billimoria 17 (Jeroo Billimoria - founder of several award-winning international NGOs. Her innovative approach to managing social ventures and bringing them to global scale has earned her fellowships with Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, the Skoll Foundation and the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship. Billimoria founded Child and Youth Finance International in 2011 – “Is STEM education all it’s cracked up to be?” – 5/4/17 - https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/is-stem-education-all-it-s-cracked-up-to-be/)

STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) is a buzzword for economic development and growth, frequently touted as a many-fold solution to prepare young people for employment, support the national workforce, and promote innovation and explore methods for accelerating future development.¶ But is STEM education really the silver bullet? Does it truly boost economic growth and support the nation’s workforce? And is STEM the best way to equip young people with the skills, knowledge and opportunities to ensure they can be capable and responsible citizens?¶ I believe that focusing solely on STEM presents a one-dimensional “fix” which fails to consider the many other factors that influence economic growth and development from context to context.¶ Instead, a holistic approach is needed to equip the future workforce and secure economic development for emerging and modern economies alike. To adequately invest in the future, the creation of a generation of economic citizens is key to boosting economic growth and breaking ongoing cycles of poverty.¶ Putting all our egg(head)s in one basket¶ Although there are many opportunities and benefits linked to a solid STEM infrastructure and development of skills within a country, the current emphasis placed on investment in this sector pays little regard to the limitations resulting from a reliance on this subject area.¶ Regarding inclusivity and reach, across STEM subjects workers are predominantly male, from higher socio-economic backgrounds, while minority groups, women and low-income youth are often not adequately represented in STEM subjects. Known for being an elitist and exclusive subject area, it is surprising that the onus is being placed on STEM to fill gaps across national workforces – female students are 50% more likely to leave their STEM course than male counterparts and STEM students from Black, Asian and other minority ethnic groups are more likely to be in non-engineering jobs or unemployed six months after graduation.¶ In addition, STEM offers only a one-dimensional solution, which is inadequate for the multi-dimensional reality of economic development and growth. Rapidly changing technologies and global competition make it very difficult to predict occupational needs. While there is a need for scientific and technological knowledge in all countries, it has been suggested that there is not as big a shortage of STEM-related workers as previously thought. In addition, too much focus on STEM alone runs the risk of over-saturating certain sectors rather than producing a well-rounded workforce.¶ There continues to be heavy emphasis on supporting STEM education as an answer to contributing to educational opportunities, strengthening the national workforce and supporting the economy for both emerging and developed economies. However, focusing on STEM is not enough. Educating young people in these subject areas may ensure they are experts on specific topics, but it does not necessarily create conscientious citizens who are capable of making responsible social and financial decisions.

#### No shortage of STEM workers—tech labor stats and census prove.

Curt Woodward 17, Boston Globe reporter, 4-3-2017, “In Trump era, tech visas get a hard look,” https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/02/tech-industry-talent-shortage-claims-under-new-scrutiny/EsxYnPpoKBNv1iTjRl6lLL/story.html

“The notion that there just aren’t enough decently qualified people in the US, and that’s why you have to go overseas, I think is hype,” said John Bound, a University of Michigan economist. On Monday, employers begin their annual scramble for H-1B visas, submitting applications for the upcoming federal fiscal year, which begins Oct. 1. Companies typically submit so many applications that officials must hold a lottery to determine which ones get the visas. The process is under heightened political pressure this year as the Trump administration seeks to implement immigration and economic policies that create or protect American jobs. And that’s putting a new spotlight on the tech industry’s claims of a talent crunch. Critics of the program have pushed for more regulations, including higher pay requirements, arguing that could keep H-1B workers from weighing down overall wages. President Trump has seemed sympathetic to that argument, saying during the campaign that he would “end forever the use of the H-1B as a cheap labor program.” Many economists who are skeptical of the tech industry’s assertions still say the H-1B program is a net positive for the economy, allowing companies to grow quickly, keep prices lower, and produce software and gadgets that make other fields more productive. But they also say there’s evidence of a large, underused pool of domestic workers who could be tapped instead of guest workers. Census figures, for example, show that half of the nearly 2 million college graduates with degrees in computers, math, or statistics do not work in STEM, the sector that encompasses science, tech, engineering, and mathematics jobs. Wages in some key tech jobs haven’t grown dramatically in years, indicating the industry isn’t holding on to pricey, experienced workers or jacking up pay across the board to woo employees from other fields, experts said. Moreover, tech companies routinely lay off thousands of workers each year, creating a large potential surplus of workers who could be retrained. And the industry has made little progress in diversifying its mostly white, male employee base.

#### **STEM shortage is hype to drive wages down**

Murawski 16 (4/22, John, New Observer contributor, quoting, Andrew Hacker, Queens College professor and author, “An argument against emphasis on STEM education”, Charlotte Observer, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/entertainment/books/article73350382.html)

The report, which laid the philosophical groundwork for the Common Core curriculum, called for an overhaul of the U.S. educational system to prepare students to master essential skills needed to succeed in the emerging technology economy – such basic competencies as binomial coefficients and quadratic polynomials. But Hacker says the numbers tell a different story. For example, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the United States economy will add only about 130,400 engineering jobs by 2022. Meanwhile our education system is on track to mint 860,000 new engineering graduates over that time. So what’s really going on here? Hacker is among the skeptics who suspect the high-tech industry is promoting STEM-focused training for its own ends: to glut the job market with an oversupply of technology workers in a ploy to drive down the cost of labor. How else to explain the H-1B visas used by Microsoft, Intel, IBM and a host of other corporations to hire, at last count, more than a quarter-million foreign technology workers in this country? Notes Hacker: These temporary workers are paid about 57 percent of an equivalent American’s wage.

## India Advantage

### 1NC---Defense: Indo-Pak

#### No Indo-Pak war

**Mutti 9**— Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington. BA in History, Knox College. over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editor to Demockracy journal (James, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent, http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/)

Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed **fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.”** As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war **seems the result of** the **media** being **superficial**ly **knowledge**able **about the history of** Indian-Pakistani **relations**, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war. Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war: 1. **For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been** successfully **building stronger relations with the rest of the world** over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but **it has** much more **aggressively promoted itself as an** emerging **economic** powerhouse and a **moral, democratic alternative** to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes. The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. **Pakistan**, on the other hand, **couldn’t possibly win a war** against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. **Pakistani president** Asif Ali **Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants** his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so. 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, **both countries have made concrete efforts** to create people-to-people connections and **to improve economic relations**. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along **with** an easing of the issuing of **visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan** **cricket matches have resumed**, and **India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status**. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. **There are** also **growing** efforts to recognize and build upon the many **cultural ties** between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries. 3. **Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat** to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not. Groups based in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. **The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not** against its traditional enemy **India, but against militants** bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic, inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicide bombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindu fundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of India as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pakistan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally, Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflaming public opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out with no resolution, as many other such inquiries have. 4. The international attention to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terrorist attacks in places like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope in terms of how they respond to the terrible events, it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without resorting to war. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, and others not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan’s closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US has been in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

### 1NC---Defense: Climate Change

#### No warming – historical data disproves the climate change hypothesis and statistical analysis disproves the predictive capability of climate models

Fyfe, Research Scientist with the Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling, et al, 13 [John, with Nathan Gillett, Research Scientist with the Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling, and Francis Zwiers, Director of the Pacific Climate Impacts Consortium and Adjunct Professor in the Dept. of Mathematics and Statistics of the University of Victoria, September, “Overestimated Global Warming Over the Past 20 Years,” *Nature*, Vol. 3, p. 767-769]

Global mean surface temperature over the past 20 years (1993–2012) rose at a rate of 0.14 ± 0.06 °C per decade (95% confidence interval)1. This rate of warming is significantly slower than that simulated by the climate models participating in Phase 5 of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5). To illustrate this, we considered trends in global mean surface temperature computed from 117 simulations of the climate by 37 CMIP5 models (see Supplementary Information). These models generally simulate natural variability — including that associated with the El Niño–Southern Oscillation and explosive volcanic eruptions — as well as estimate the combined response of climate to changes in greenhouse gas concentrations, aerosol abundance (of sulphate, black carbon and organic carbon, for example), ozone concentrations (tropospheric and stratospheric), land use (for example, deforestation) and solar variability. By averaging simulated temperatures only at locations where corresponding observations exist, we find an average simulated rise in global mean surface temperature of 0.30 ± 0.02 °C per decade (using 95% confidence intervals on the model average). The observed rate of warming given above is less than half of this simulated rate, and only a few simulations provide warming trends within the range of observational uncertainty (Fig. 1a). The inconsistency between observed and simulated global warming is even more striking for temperature trends computed over the past fifteen years (1998–2012). For this period, the observed trend of 0.05 ± 0.08 °C per decade is more than four times smaller than the average simulated trend of 0.21 ± 0.03 °C per decade (Fig. 1b). It is worth noting that the observed trend over this period — not significantly different from zero — suggests a temporary ‘hiatus’ in global warming 2–4. The divergence between observed and CMIP5- simulated global warming begins in the early 1990s, as can be seen when comparing observed and simulated running trends from 1970–2012 (Fig. 2a and 2b for 20-year and 15-year running trends, respectively). The evidence, therefore, indicates that the current generation of climate models (when run as a group, with the CMIP5 prescribed forcings) do not reproduce the observed global warming over the past 20 years, or the slowdown in global warming over the past fifteen years. This interpretation is supported by statistical tests of the null hypothesis that the observed and model mean trends are equal, assuming that either: (1) the models are exchangeable with each other (that is, the ‘truth plus error’ view); or (2) the models are exchangeable with each other and with the observations (see Supplementary Information). Differences between observed and simulated 20-year trends have p values (Supplementary Information) that drop to close to zero by 1993–2012 under assumption (1) and to 0.04 under assumption (2) (Fig. 2c). Here we note that the smaller the p value is, the stronger the evidence against the null hypothesis. On this basis, the rarity of the 1993–2012 trend difference under assumption (1) is obvious. Under assumption (2), this implies that such an inconsistency is only expected to occur by chance once in 500 years, if 20-year periods are considered statistically independent. Similar results apply to trends for 1998–2012 (Fig. 2d). In conclusion, we reject the null hypothesis that the observed and model mean trends are equal at the 10% level. One possible explanation for the discrepancy is that forced and internal variation might combine differently in observations than in models. For example, the forced trends in models are modulated up and down by simulated sequences of ENSO events, which are not expected to coincide with the observed sequence of such events. For this reason the moderating influence on global warming that arises from the decay of the 1998 El Niño event does not occur in the models at that time. Thus we employ here an established technique to estimate the impact of ENSO on global mean temperature, and to incorporate the effects of dynamically induced atmospheric variability and major explosive volcanic eruptions 5,6. Although these three natural variations account for some differences between simulated and observed global warming, these differences do not substantively change our conclusion that observed and simulated global warming are not in agreement over the past two decades (Fig. 3). Another source of internal climate variability that may contribute to the inconsistency is the Atlantic multidecadal oscillation7 (AMO). However, this is difficult to assess as the observed and simulated variations in global temperature that are associated with the AMO seem to be dominated by a large and concurrent signal of presumed anthropogenic origin (Supplementary Fig. S1). It is worth noting that in any case the AMO has not driven cooling over the past 20 years. Another possible driver of the difference between observed and simulated global warming is increasing stratospheric aerosol concentrations. Results from several independent datasets show that stratospheric aerosol abundance has increased since the late 1990s, owing to a series of comparatively small tropical volcanic eruptions8 . Although none of the CMIP5 simulations take this into account, two independent sets of model simulations estimate that increasing stratospheric aerosols have had a surface cooling impact of about 0.07 °C per decade since 1998,9. If the CMIP5 models had accounted for increasing stratospheric aerosol, and had responded with the same surface cooling impact, the simulations and observations would be in closer agreement. Other factors that contribute to the discrepancy could include a missing decrease in stratospheric water vapour10 (whose processes are not well represented in current climate models), errors in aerosol forcing in the CMIP5 models, a bias in the prescribed solar irradiance trend, the possibility that the transient climate sensitivity of the CMIP5 models could be on average too high 11,12 or a possible unusual episode of internal climate variability not considered above 13,14. Ultimately the causes of this inconsistency will only be understood after careful comparison of simulated internal climate variability and climate model forcings with observations from the past two decades, and by waiting to see how global temperature responds over the coming decades.

#### Even if warming is real it doesn’t cause extinction – the newest IPCC report concludes with other independent studies that catastrophe is impossible – slowing population growth, energy efficiency, and innovation

Ridley 14 [Matt, 6/19/14, The Financial Post, “Junk Science Week: IPCC commissioned models to see if global warming would reach dangerous levels this century. Consensus is ‘no’,” <http://business.financialpost.com/2014/06/19/ipcc-climate-change-warming/>, accessed 7/1/14]

The debate over climate change is horribly polarized. From the way it is conducted, you would think that only two positions are possible: that the whole thing is a hoax or that catastrophe is inevitable. In fact there is room for lots of intermediate positions, including the view I hold, which is that man-made climate change is real but not likely to do much harm, let alone prove to be the greatest crisis facing humankind this century.After more than 25 years reporting and commenting on this topic for various media organizations, and having started out alarmed, that’s where I have ended up. But it is not just I that hold this view. I share it with a very large international organization, sponsored by the United Nations and supported by virtually all the world’s governments: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) itself. The IPCC commissioned four different models of what might happen to the world economy, society and technology in the 21st century and what each would mean for the climate, given a certain assumption about the atmosphere’s “sensitivity” to carbon dioxide. Three of the models show a moderate, slow and mild warming, the hottest of which leaves the planet just 2 degrees Centigrade warmer than today in 2081-2100. The coolest comes out just 0.8 degrees warmer.Now two degrees is the threshold at which warming starts to turn dangerous, according to the scientific consensus. That is to say, in three of the four scenarios considered by the IPCC, by the time my children’s children are elderly, the earth will still not have experienced any harmful warming, let alone catastrophe. But what about the fourth scenario? This is known as RCP8.5, and it produces 3.5 degrees of warming in 2081-2100. Curious to know what assumptions lay behind this model, I decided to look up the original papers describing the creation of this scenario. Frankly, I was gobsmacked. It is a world that is very, very implausible.For a start, this is a world of “continuously increasing global population” so that there are 12 billion on the planet. This is more than a billion more than the United Nations expects, and flies in the face of the fact that the world population growth rate has been falling for 50 years and is on course to reach zero – i.e., stable population – in around 2070. More people mean more emissions.Second, the world is assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario to be burning an astonishing 10 times as much coal as today, producing 50% of its primary energy from coal, compared with about 30% today. Indeed, because oil is assumed to have become scarce, a lot of liquid fuel would then be derived from coal. Nuclear and renewable technologies contribute little, because of a “slow pace of innovation” and hence “fossil fuel technologies continue to dominate the primary energy portfolio over the entire time horizon of the RCP8.5 scenario.” Energy efficiency has improved very little. These are highly unlikely assumptions. With abundant natural gas displacing coal on a huge scale in the United States today, with the price of solar power plummeting, with nuclear power experiencing a revival, with gigantic methane-hydrate gas resources being discovered on the seabed, with energy efficiency rocketing upwards, and with population growth rates continuing to fall fast in virtually every country in the world, the one thing we can say about RCP8.5 is that it is very, very implausible.Notice, however, that even so, it is not a world of catastrophic pain. The per capita income of the average human being in 2100 is three times what it is now. Poverty would be history. So it’s hardly Armageddon. But there’s an even more startling fact. We now have many different studies of climate sensitivity based on observational data and they all converge on the conclusion that it is much lower than assumed by the IPCC in these models. It has to be, otherwise global temperatures would have risen much faster than they have over the past 50 years. As Ross McKitrick noted on this page earlier this week, temperatures have not risen at all now for more than 17 years. With these much more realistic estimates of sensitivity (known as “transient climate response”), even RCP8.5 cannot produce dangerous warming. It manages just 2.1C of warming by 2081-2100. That is to say, even if you pile crazy assumption upon crazy assumption till you have an edifice of vanishingly small probability, you cannot even manage to make climate change cause minor damage in the time of our grandchildren, let alone catastrophe. That’s not me saying this – it’s the IPCC itself.

### 2NC---Defense: Indo-Pak

#### No Indo-Pak War – International pressures

Dhanda 11 [Suresh Dhanda, Department of Political Science, S.A.Jain College,, Haryana, India, International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol 2, 2011, “Dangers of Missile Race in South Asia: an India-Pakistan Perspective” http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/IAGS/article/view/1065/985]

Fourthly, India and Pakistan will face international opprobrium if they opt to deploy nuclear weapons. **Although the international community may have reluctantly accepted their possession of nuclear weapon**s, the transition to operational deployments will likely lead to sanctions and isolation. **This** factor **is unique to South Asia and constrains the implementation of deterrence strategies by Pakistan and India.** For example, **during the Kargil conflict, reports that both countries had activated and deployed their nuclear missile forces** triggered intense international pressure on both countries.6 **National actions,** such as signaling, **that play a role in deterrence strategy may thus be constrained by international pressure**. In contrast, offensive conventional force deployments do not seem to engender the same level of concern in the international community.

#### Indo-pak won’t go nuclear

**Enders 2** (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely) \* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan \* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland \* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council

University political science Prof. Ashutosh **Varshney** becomes animated **when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully**, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "**The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."** The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous. "**The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.** "Watching **the evening news**, CNN, I think they **have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war,"** political science Prof. Paul **Huth said. Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war. "India is committed to** a **no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to** go for a **first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."** Political science Prof. Kenneth **Lieberthal,** a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, **agreed**. "Usually a country that is in the position that **Pakistan** is in **would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction,**" Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal. "**American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."**

### 2NC---Defense: Climate Change

#### The environment is resilient and tipping point theory is wrong.

Brook 13 Barry Brook, Professor at the University of Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Corey Bradshaw is an Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide and a joint appointee at the South Australian Research and Development Institute, Brave New Climate, March 4, 2013, "Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats", http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/

Barry Brook We argue that **at the global-scale, ecological “tipping points” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable. Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern**. This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important consequences for both science and policy. Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled. A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate change. Many local- and regional-level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, **there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale**. **At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”**. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform, or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet. **These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world**. **First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected. Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors**, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for example, greenhouse gases, **this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation**. **Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations**. From a planetary perspective, **this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points**. This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically. Why does this matter? Well, one concern we have is that **an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred**. After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds. Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science. Corey Bradshaw (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com) Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline. But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support. Specifically, I’m referring to **the latest “craze” in environmental science writing – the idea of “planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”.** **It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters** – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face. Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as: a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states and “tipping point” as: the critical point at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis. Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems shifting to new (apparently) stable states. However, **claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems** (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, **is simply not upheld by evidence**. **Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales**. The paper provides a framework against which one can test the existence or probability of a planetary tipping point for any particular ecosystem function or state. To date, the application of the idea has floundered because of a lack of specified criteria that would allow the terrestrial biosphere to “tip”. From a more sociological viewpoint, the claim of imminent shift to some worse state also risks alienating people from addressing the real problems (foxes), or as Brook and colleagues summarise: framing global change in the dichotomous terms implied by the notion of a global tipping point could lead to complacency on the “safe” side of the point and fatalism about catastrophic or irrevocable effects on the other. In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.

#### Environment improving across the board – their impacts are hype

Hayward, 11 [Steven P, 2011 Almanac of Environmental Trends by Steven F. Hayward April 2011 ISBN-13: 978-1-934276-17-4, http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20110419\_almanac2011.pdf]

Quick: **What’s** **the largest** public-policy **success story in America**n society over the last generation? The dramatic reduction in the crime rate, which has helped make major American cities livable again? Or welfare reform, which saw the nation’s welfare rolls fall by more than half since the early 1990s? Both of these accomplishments have received wide media attention. Yet **the** right **answer** might well be **the environment**. As Figure 1 displays, the reduction in **air pollution** is comparable in magnitude to the reduction in the welfare rolls, and greater than the reduction in the crime rate—both celebrated as major public-policy success stories of the last two decades. **Aggregate** **emissions** of the six “criteria” pollutants1 regulated under the Clean Air Act **have fallen** by 53 percent since 1970, while the proportion of the population receiving welfare assistance is down 48 percent from 1970, and the crime rate is only 6.4 percent below its 1970 level. (And as we shall see, this aggregate nationwide reduction in emissions greatly understates the actual improvement in ambient air quality in the areas with the worst levels of air pollution.) **Measures** for water quality, toxic-chemical exposure, soil erosion, forest growth, wetlands, and several other areas of environmental concern show similar positive trends, as **this** Almanac reports. To paraphrase Mark Twain, **reports of the demise of the environment have been** greatly exaggerated. Moreover, there is good reason **to believe that these kinds of improvements will be experienced in the rest of the world over the course of this century**. **We’ll examine** some of the early **evidence that this is already starting to occur.** **The chief drivers of environmental improvement are economic** **growth**, constantly **increasing resource efficiency**, **technological innovation in pollution control**, **and the** **deepening of environmental** **values among the American public that have translated** **to changed behavior and consumer preferences**. Government regulation has played a vital role, to be sure, but in the grand scheme of things regulation can be understood as a lagging indicator, often achieving results at needlessly high cost, and sometimes failing completely. Were it not for rising affluence and technological innovation, regulation would have much the same effect as King Canute commanding the tides. INTRODUCTION introduction 3 figure 1 a comparison of crime rate, Welfare, and air Pollution, 1970–2007 -60.0% -40.0% -20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 % of Population on Welfare Crime Rate (per 100,000 population) Aggregate Emissions Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, EPA 4 Almanac of Environmental Trends **The** American **public remains largely unaware** **of these trends**. **For most of the last 40 years, public opinion about the environment has been pessimistic, with large majorities—sometimes as high as 70 percent—telling pollsters that they think environmental quality in the United States is getting worse instead of** **better, and will continue to get worse in the future**. **One reason for this state of opinion is media coverage, which emphasizes bad news and crisis; another reason is environmental advocacy groups, for whom good news is bad news**. As the cliche goes, you can’t sell many newspapers with headlines about airplanes landing safely, or about an oil tanker docking without a spill. **Similarly, slow, long-term trends don’t make for good headline copy**. INTRODUCTIONintroduction 5Improving Trends:Causes and ConsequencesMost environmental commentary dwells on the laws and regulations we have adoptedto achieve our goals, but it is essential to understand the more important role of technologyand economic growth in bringing about favorable environmental trends. Thebest way to see this is to look at some long-term trends in environmental quality thatpredate modern environmental legislation.To be sure, the earliest phases of the Industrial Revolution led to severe environmentaldegradation. But the inexorable process of technological innovation andthe drive for efficiency began to remedy much of this damage far earlier than iscommonly perceived. In addition, **new technologies that we commonly regard as environmentally destructive often replaced older modes of human activity that were far worse by comparison**. A good example is the introduction of coal for heating andenergy in Britain.

### 1NC---Turn: Brain Drain

#### Indian brain drain turns the advantage---it undermines tech development and economic growth

**Das 17** (Jitendra, director, FORE School of Management, New Delhi, 3/15, "US H1B visa: From brain drain to brain gain, but it will require building an Indian Silicon Valley," https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/us-h1b-visa-from-brain-drain-to-brain-gain-but-it-will-require-building-an-indian-silicon-valley/668339/)

The US is the most important market for India’s $110-billion IT services export industry. Some of the worst hit by this new Bill will be Indian companies such as Infosys, TCS and Wipro who together have around 3.5 million employees on their payrolls. Besides Indian companies, global giants such as Apple, Facebook, Google, Accenture, Microsoft, etc, who use the H-1B visa to hire non-Americans would also be severely impacted. While this has prompted India to raise the concerns of its IT industry with the Trump administration, the American firms are equally concerned as their costs of service delivery, in the absence of their H-1B visa enabled employees, will shoot up.

So, could there be any beneficial outcome of this crisis as far as India is concerned? If the cards are played right, then the answer is yes. Considering that today a lot of business activities can be done in a virtual mode and on the cloud, India must look at the H-1B visa issue as a boon in disguise. Considering our capabilities, India should not be lobbying with the US or any other government to take our highly trained human assets out of the country; they have the potential to be the engines of the country’s economic growth and prosperity. The government should rather attempt to recreate an environment that has been fostered in the US—India will do well to, for example, create an Indian Silicon Valley.

The task isn’t easy, but who says achievements are attained easily. A virtuous cycle in the IT sector linked with all other sectors of the economy needs to be nurtured with the objective to make India a global powerhouse hub to provide IT services the world over.

At the recently held India Today Conclave in Mumbai, Reliance Industries Ltd chairman Mukesh Ambani echoed a similar sentiment. In his address, he said, “It’s high time our brightest and the best work for the benefit of India and Indians … by whatever fate they are brought back to this country, they can help improve the lives of 1.3 billion citizens and put together a new developmental model … there cannot be a better blessing in disguise.” He added there is a need to retain data generated domestically as “keeping our data onshore will ensure that talent, technology, know-how and investments will flow into the country rather than flow out, and will create more jobs for us” and urged the government to start a “Keep in India” initiative for this.

If India could develop its own navigation technology, one of the reasons was that India didn’t want to rely on the US Global Positioning System (GPS). This, and the way India has moved ahead on developing jet fighters and other technologies, is proof enough that the country has the potential to go the extra mile to meet challenges.

The Indian IT services companies need to play their part in this process, and could work towards finding strategic ways of bringing more work to India—suitable to national priorities and availability of resources. Thus, instead of encouraging the exodus of the highly-trained Indians to foreign shores, they should be persuaded to become part of the needed economic, social and cultural resurgence in the country. Let’s look forward to the emergence of an Indian Silicon Valley.

### 1NC---Warming: Inevitable

#### President Trump means 2 degree warming is inevitable – leadership is impossible

Roberts, energy and climate change writer at Vox, 16

(David, 11/9, “Trump’s election marks the end of any serious hope of limiting climate change to 2 degrees”, http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/11/9/13575684/trump-2-degrees)

The nations of the world have agreed that allowing global average temperature to rise more than 2 degrees from preindustrial levels would be a disaster — that 2 degrees should be avoided at all costs, and that prudence suggests aiming for closer to 1.5 degrees. Those targets, agreed upon in December in Paris, are now almost certainly out of reach. The fight to prevent dangerous climate change was lost last night with the election of Donald Trump. I’m seeing a lot of whistling past the graveyard about this. "The main forces determining emission levels of heat-trapping carbon dioxide will be just as much out of President Trump’s hands as they were out of President Obama’s," writes New York Times columnist Andy Revkin. There’s only so much damage Trump can do, right? This is bigger than him. Right? Sorry, but I don’t think so. In the long-term, obviously, the forces shaping climate are bigger than any one president or administration. But we are past the point when long-term perspectives should comfort us. Limiting global temperature to 2 degrees would require large-scale, coordinated action now. And Trump means that isn’t going to happen. So we won’t stop at 1.5 degrees. We won’t stop at 2 degrees. We’ll be lucky to stop at 3 or 4 degrees. The story of US leadership on climate is dead The truth is, hitting the 2-degree target (much less 1.5 degrees) was always a long shot. It would require all the world’s countries to effectively turn on a dime and send their emissions plunging at never-before-seen rates. It was implausible, but at least there was a story to tell. That story began with strong US leadership, which brought China to the table, which in turn cleared the way for Paris. The election of Hillary Clinton would have signaled to the world a determination to meet or exceed the targets the US promised in Paris, along with four years of efforts to create bilateral or multilateral partnerships that pushed progress faster. With steady leadership, the US and China would exceed their short-term goals. Other countries would have their willpower fortified and steadily ratchet up their commitments. All this coordinated action would result in a wave of clean energy innovation, which would push prices down lower, which would accelerate the transition. The promise of US leadership was never about tons of US emissions; they are only 15 percent of the world’s total. (Though, as Chris Mooney notes, pledged US reductions accounted for about 20 percent of total reductions pledged in Paris.) It was about the US acting as a catalyst that sparked a virtuous, self-reinforcing cycle of escalating ambition, eventually building up the momentum necessary for a chance at 2 degrees. That story is gone now. Dead. The US will not provide leadership — it will be an active, and very powerful, impediment. Under unified Republican leadership, progress on lowering emissions in the US will halt and reverse and US participation in international efforts to combat climate change will cease. (I will have more to say on the scope of the coming Republican policy disaster in another post.)

### 1NC---UQ: Econ Up

#### India’s economy is up

Reuters 5/31 (2018, Reuters Staff, Prominent News Outlet, “Indian economic growth hits highest rate in almost two years”, https://www.reuters.com/article/india-economy-gdp/update-2-indian-economic-growth-hits-highest-rate-in-almost-two-years-idUSL3N1T24RL)

The Indian economy grew 7.7 percent year-on-year in January-March, its quickest pace in nearly two years driven by higher growth in manufacturing, the farm sector and construction. The figure surpassed China’s growth rate of 6.8 percent in the January-March quarter, confirming India as the fastest growing major economy. For the fiscal year that ended March 31, the Ministry of Statistics reported growth of 6.7 percent, down from 7.1 percent for a year earlier. However, economists expect growth to be robust in the current financial year. “Investment activity has picked up,” Economic Affairs Secretary Subhash Chandra Garg told reporters, adding that the government expected a further acceleration in the coming year. India also reported 4.7 percent growth in annual infrastructure output in April, signalling a recovery after it slipped to a three-year low of 4.2 percent in 2017/18. Construction activity jumped to 11.5 percent during January-March, after a 3.9 percent drop in the year-ago period. Analysts said this reflected the fading impact of the government’s move to scrap high-value bank notes that disrupted supply chains and caused job losses. The data may offer a boost to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is set to seek a second term next year. His government launched a nationwide goods and services tax (GST) but its introduction was botched, nearly scuttling India’s growth prospects in the near term. “(It) seems like we have moved beyond the teething troubles related to GST implementation,” said Tushar Arora, a senior economist at HDFC Bank. “The pick-up in investment activity is also a good sign.” The faster pace of growth in the latest quarter might also strengthen expectations of an interest rate increase by the Indian central bank when it reviews monetary policy next week. About 40 percent of economists polled by Reuters expected a rate rise next week, driven by higher inflation at 4.58 percent in April, above the Reserve Bank of India’s target of 4 percent for the sixth month in a row. Growth in Asia’s third-largest economy, reported by the ministry, trumped forecasts in a Reuters poll of annual growth at 7.3 percent.

### 1NC---UQ: Growth Up

#### India’s growth is and will continue to be booming – World Bank projections

BT 6/6 (2018, Business Today, International Economic News Outlet, “GDP woes over, Indian economy to grow at 7.3% in 2018-19, says World Bank”, BT in New Dehli, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/gdp-woes-over-indian-economy-to-grow-at-7-3-percent-in-2018-19-says-world-bank/story/278574.html)

Indian economy is likely to regain its pace in the current fiscal and once again become the fastest growing emerging economy, a World Bank report said. The Global Economic Prospects report released by the World Bank on Tuesday projects that India will see its gross domestic product (GDP) grow at a rate of 7.3 per cent during the ongoing fiscal and at 7.5 per cent in the two succeeding ones. "Growth in India is projected to accelerate to 7.3 percent in FY2018/19 and 7.5 percent on average in 2019-20, reflecting robust private consumption and firming investment, broadly in line with January projections," the World Bank report said. In comparison, the rest of the South Asia region (SAR), excluding India, will post GDP growth of 5.6 per cent in for the current fiscal and the next one, moving up to 5.7 in 2020-21. "India's GDP growth bottomed out in the middle of 2017 after slowing for five consecutive quarters, and has since improved significantly, with momentum carrying over into 2018 on the back of a recovery in investment. Although investment growth was still moderately lower in 2017 than in 2016, high-frequency indicators suggest that it accelerated into 2018," World Bank said. The Indian economy has also moved past the disruptions caused by the implementation of Goods and Services Tax (GST) in mid-2017, World Bank observed in its report, adding that manufacturing output and industrial production have continued to firm since then. The report also forecasted that the recovering Indian economy will also help economic growth in South Asia region to accelerate to 6.9 per cent in 2018 from 6.6 per cent in 2017. Improving economic conditions in India will help uplift the quality of life too, World Bank said. "Per capita growth rates in the region are strong, and are expected to help bring down poverty in coming years, particularly in India," it said. However, structural weaknesses and macroeconomic vulnerabilities remain key challenges to be addressed by SAR governments.

#### India’s long-term growth is thriving

The Economist 3/28 (2018, International economic news outlet, “India’s economy is back on track. Can it pick up speed?”, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/28/indias-economy-is-back-on-track.-can-it-pick-up-speed)

Similarly, India’s economy can be seen in two lights. Its long-term growth rate of 7% a year has proved far more dependable than the rail timetable. GDP has doubled twice in the past two decades. Yet deep poverty still lingers and jobs are scarce. And Indian growth has been left in the dust by the Chinese express (see chart). After slow running for much of 2017, India is now near to full throttle. Growth of 7.2% in the three months to December put it ahead of China (which grew at a relatively leisurely 6.8%) and made it once again the world’s fastest-expanding big economy. Expectations for the rest of 2018 are similar. Fans of Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, credit structural reforms he has made over the past four years. The more plausible explanation is that Indian growth has returned to trend after a bout of political meddling. “Demonetisation” in late 2016, when most banknotes ceased to be legal tender overnight, squeezed growth to 5.7% in the first half of last year. New notes were printed, but last July, even as life was returning to normal, a new goods and services tax replaced hundreds of local and nationwide taxes, once again throwing the economy into confusion. At least the tax overhaul, which knits India into a single market for the first time, will eventually increase growth. Boosters speak of annual GDP gains of 8-10% in the years ahead. That would not be far short of China in its boom years.

#### India’s growth is flourishing

Crabtree 4/15 (2018, Justina, CNBC Digital News Assistant, “There may be a way for India to achieve double-digit economic growth”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/15/there-may-be-a-way-for-india-to-achieve-double-digit-economic-growth.html)

India surged ahead to become the world's fastest-growing major economy in the last quarter of calendar year 2017. But the South Asian giant can do even better, potentially even hitting double-digit growth rates, according to one business leader. This argument rests on the background of "an already robust growth rate hovering around seven percent, supported by regulatory decisions that favour manufacturing" to create jobs as well as business-friendly policy more broadly, Anil Rai Gupta, chairman and managing director at Indian electricity giant Havells, said. "To achieve GDP (gross domestic product) growth of 10 percent, India would need the service sector to grow close to 20 percent complemented by four and eight percent growth in agriculture and industrial growth," he told CNBC via e-mail on Tuesday, adding that India's economic fundamentals were strong enough to achieve that. The "Make in India" campaign and the country's young demographics "will not just draw a better consumption pattern for the country but also push the overall growth rate towards the double digit mark," he explained. India is the world's second most populous nation after China, with approximately 1.3 billion people.

### 1NC---UQ: Growth Down

#### Indian growth has slipped

Anand 6/1 (2018, Nupur, Quartz India Author, “India’s GDP growth slows down to pre-Narendra Modi days”, Quartz India, https://qz.com/1294390/achhe-din-indias-gdp-growth-is-back-to-pre-narendra-modi-days/)

Narendra Modi came to power with a thumping victory in May 2014, riding on the promise of acche din (good days). Almost four years later, the Indian economy has come full circle with growth slipping back to nearly the same pace as the year before Modi took over the reins. In financial year 2018, India’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to 6.7% from the previous year’s 7.1%. This is nearly as much as the 6.6% growth in financial year 2014, ahead of the general election held that year. It is the slowest pace of growth under Modi who will be seeking re-election in about a year from now. This is also sharply in contrast with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s promise of higher and inclusive economic growth in its 2014 election campaign. The blame for the slowdown goes primarily to the incumbent government’s own policies. The demonetisation in November 2016 affected several businesses, particularly the small ones, and even led to job losses. The economy had barely recovered from the jolt when the government introduced the goods and services tax in July 2017. Even though it’s a vital reform, its implementation has been haphazard and riddled with problems. Private investments have also been a major challenge. In the 12 months ending March 2018, the scrapped projects in India stood at an all-time high, according to a report by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. As a result, the full-year report card is not very heartening. Road ahead In financial year 2018, despite this bumpy ride, India has managed to retain the tag of the world’s fastest-growing economy. In fact, Asia’s third-largest economy is expected to grow at a faster clip than all other major countries for the next three years, according to the World Bank. Recovery in private investments and strong growth in private consumption and services are expected to fuel growth over the next few years. While the economy seems to have overcome the ~~debilitating~~ [negative] effects of demonetisation, the recovery may be hamstrung by rising oil prices. A weakening rupee and the dismal job situation are the other key problems in the short-run.

#### Growth down – Rupee problems, oil prices, and domestic politics

Abrams & Nayak 5/30 (2018, Corinne & Debiprasad, WSJ authors, “Rupee’s Fall Points to Uncertain Future for Investment in India”, Washington Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rupees-fall-points-to-uncertain-future-for-investment-in-india-1527664566

Rupee’s Drop Rattles India’s Growth Story MUMBAI—The rupee is the worst performing currency in Asia this year, flirting with a record low on worries that India is headed for problems as oil prices remain high. The rupee has declined 5.3% against the dollar this year and has underperformed against almost all others. Only those of Argentina, Brazil, Russia and Turkey have done worse. Most currencies have fallen against the dollar since the start of the year over a strong U.S. economy and rising U.S. Treasury yields. The Indian currency is now trading close to its low of 68.90 rupees to the dollar hit in February 2016, and some economists see it sliding to 70 this year. Late Wednesday in New York, the dollar bought 67.43 rupees. Current Account Conundrum The value of India imports of goods and services exceeds that of its exports and the gap is widening. Current account deficit as percentage of GDP % 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ’18 ’15 ’14 ’16 ’17 FY2013 Note: Fiscal years end March 31 Source: Reserve Bank of India India is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices, shipping in 80% of its energy needs due to demand that far outpaces domestic production. Brent crude oil is trading at about $77 a barrel, compared with $63 six months ago. The increased price of oil imports will likely push up inflation in India as the costs of products and services rise and widen the current-account and budget deficits. “As one of the largest importers of oil, the Indian economy is one of the most exposed to this particular shock, so it is not surprising to see some underperformance,” said Kenneth Akintewe, head of Asian sovereign debt at Aberdeen Asset Management Asia Ltd. Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that every $10 increase in oil prices hurts Indian consumption by 0.6% of gross domestic product, threatening to hold back India’s pace of expansion. India had been in a sweet spot since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. Its economic expansion is outpacing even China’s, inflation is in check, its budget deficit seemed to be shrinking and its popular prime minister had looked unbeatable. It is now the world’s fastest-expanding large economy. But the rise in crude prices and an emerging-market selloff has rattled Asia’s third-largest economy. India runs a current-account deficit, meaning that the value of its imports of goods and services exceeds that of its exports. The deficit could move beyond the 2% of GDP expected for the year that ended March 31, to up to 3% this financial year, Nomura estimates. India has in the past been cushioned from oil-price rises by strong foreign investment. But foreign investors this year have pulled $4.4 billion from India, including $2.8 billion in May alone. That outflow comes despite central-bank efforts to increase corporate bond investment limits and relax government bond ownership rules for foreigners. ”You’ve got emerging markets selling off, you’ve got the dollar strength and oil factors which make India and the Indian rupee an easy target,” said Andrew Gillan, head of Asia ex Japan equities at London-based Janus Henderson Investors. Rupee Rattled The Indian rupee is Asia’s worst-performingcurrency so far this year. Source: WSJ Market Data Group % Yuan Rupee Rupiah Yen Won Jan. ’18 Feb. March April May -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 Domestic politics aren’t helping. A year ago, analysts saw a 2019 general election win for Mr. Modi as almost certain, but a series of shaky state polls have made that appear less likely. His party this month failed to win enough seats to control the southern state of Karnataka, a local election seen as a bellwether for its success next year. “The election is still some time away,” said Dhiraj Bajaj, fund manager and head of Asia fixed income at Lombard Odier. “The market knows it’s a long time away and it’s really starting to get nervous.” Mr. Modi will need to persuade voters that last year’s chaotic introduction of a goods and services tax—and his 2016 move to cancel 86% of the currency in circulation—were worth it. Investors worry that Mr. Modi’s government will, in a bid to secure another five-year term, increase spending on populist measures and put the reduction of the fiscal deficit at risk. Opposition parties are also calling for him to reduce taxes on retail fuel prices to soften the blow.

### 1NC---AT: Disease

#### Climate change is not correlated with disease

NIPCC 10. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change citing Sarah Randolph, University of Oxfords’ Department of Zoology. Is Global Warming Driving Outbreaks of Ticke-born Diseases? 28 December 2010. <http://nipccreport.org/articles/2010/dec/28dec2010a1.html>

In a brief review of the roles played by various factors that may influence the spread of tick-borne diseases, Sarah Randolph (2010) of the University of Oxford's Department of Zoology in the United Kingdom begins by noting that many vector-borne diseases "have shown marked increases in both distribution and incidence during the past few decades, just as human-induced climate change is thought to have exceeded random fluctuations." And she writes, in this regard, that "this coincidence has led to the general perception that climate change has driven disease emergence," which concept has been promoted by numerous climate-alarmist publications and pronouncements. However, she wisely notes that "climate change is the inevitable backdrop for all recent events," most of which no one would ever even *dream* of attributing to how the planet's temperature may have behaved concurrently. After describing some of the outbreaks of tick-borne disease in Europe over the past couple of decades, Randolph states that "the inescapable conclusion is that the observed climate change alone cannot explain the full heterogeneity in the epidemiological change, either within the Baltic States or amongst Central and Eastern European countries," citing the work of Sumilo *et al*. (2007). Instead, she writes that "a nexus of interrelated causal factors -- abiotic, biotic and human -- has been identified," and that "each factor appears to operate synergistically, but with differential force in space and time, which would inevitably generate the observed epidemiological heterogeneity." Many of these factors, as she continues, "were the unintended consequences of the fall of Soviet rule and the subsequent socio-economic transition (Sumilo *et al*., 2008b)," among which she cites "agricultural reforms resulting in changed land cover and land use, and an increased reliance on subsistence farming; reduction in the use of pesticides, and also in the emission of atmospheric pollution as industries collapsed; increased unemployment and poverty, but also wealth and leisure time in other sectors of the population as market forces took hold." In concluding, Randolph says "there is increasing evidence from detailed analyses that rapid changes in the incidence of tick-borne diseases are driven as much, if not more, by human behavior that determines *exposure* to infected ticks than by tick population biology that determines the *abundance* of infected ticks [italics added]," as per the findings of Sumilo *et al*. (2008a) and Randolph *et al*. (2008). Hence, she ends her brief analysis by stating that "while nobody would deny the sensitivity of ticks and tick-borne disease systems to climatic factors that largely determine their geographical distributions, the evidence is that climate change has not been the most significant factor driving the recent temporal patterns in the epidemiology of tick-borne diseases."

### 1NC---AT: Heg

#### Warming not a threat to heg

Kagan 08 – Resident Scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, Frederick, Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, Center for a New American Security, June, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley\_Finding%20Our%20Way\_June08.pdf

In recent years it has become clear that the problem of climate change will play an increasing role in the formulation and execution of American economic strategy, a key part of U.S. grand strategy. The relative priority given to climate change in Europe, the United States, China, and elsewhere has introduced new strains into international relations and added further complexity to the problems of modernizing developing states. The challenge of climate change in the coming decades is likely to be indirect—global weather trends are unlikely to affect the United States dramatically and directly in any time frame appropriate for developing grand strategy, nor is it likely that any conceivable combination of American and global policies will affect such trends very much in the coming decades. The determination to address climate change, however, will place additional burdens on the American (and the global) economy, add distortions to the market, and contribute to international tensions. Climate change is not, as many Europeans would have it, the preeminent security challenge of our era, but neither can it be left out of consideration in the development and execution of grand strategy.

### 1NC---AT: Resource Wars

#### Academic consensus votes neg

Gleditsch 12—Nils Petter Gleditsch, Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO & Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict, Journal of Peace Research 49(1): 3–9, http://www.openbriefing.org/docs/JPRclimateconflict.pdf

The study of the relationship between climate change and conflict has advanced noticeably in the past five years. With regard to how changes in precipitation may influence internal conflict, the one area where we now have a fair number of studies, the dominant view seems to be that rainfall abundance is associated with greater risks than drought and that in any case other conflict-generating factors are more important. Studies of how climate change may promote interstate conflict over water resources also seem to point in the direction of a weak or a null relationship. In other areas, the number of studies is still very low, so it is premature to offer a summary. On the whole, however, it seems fair to say that so far there is not yet much evidence for climate change as an important driver of conflict. In recent reviews of this literature, Bernauer, Bo¨hmelt & Koubi (2012) and Gleditsch, Buhaug & Theisen (2011) conclude that although environmental change may under certain circumstances increase the risk of violent conflict, the existing evidence indicates that this is not generally the case.

### 1NC---AT: War

#### No climate wars

Tertrais 11, Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, and a Washington Quarterly editorial board member [“The Climate Wars Myth,” Summer, The Washington Quarterly • 34:3 pp. 1729]

So much for ‘‘climate wars.’’ But the idea according to which climate change is nevertheless a new, important factor to be taken into account in defense and security planning is itself questionable. Of course, nothing precludes us from including it in the growing list of non-military issues that may have a bearing on global security. But this has to be done in a realistic way. It is not unreasonable to state that climate change may be a ‘‘threat multiplier,’’ for instance.47 However, stating this says nothing about the probability of increased violence or instability either at the global level or for a given crisis, or about the likelihood of state failure. Such consequences depend primarily on the reaction of governments and societies, a factor which is impossible to calculate in advance. There are no data to support the vague idea that climate change can have a key role in triggering collective violence that is, be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back, as argued by an alarmist study (citing once again the example of Darfur).48 Climate is ‘‘one of myriad factors in a complex causal web underlying conflict,’’ and the environment is just ‘‘one of manifold and nonessential causal factors’’ which may lead to war.49 The main causes of contemporary conflict are societal, not natural (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., including man-made).50 Conflicts are borne out of human choices and mistakes.

### 1NC---AT: India Solves Warming

#### India doesn’t have the money to solve warming alone

Jaitley 15 (12/9, Arun, Telegraph India author, “India can't go it alone on climate change, The Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/paris-climate-change-conference/12042237/India-cant-go-it-alone-on-climate-change.html)

Even though India has among the lowest per capita contributions to overall global emissions, we are attending the Paris Climate Summit intent on doing our fair share. Our ambitious pledges to tackle climate change – our Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) – show our commitment to addressing the problem, as do our actions: we have introduced a carbon tax on fossil fuel and cut petroleum subsidies. Yet we cannot commit, as some want, to a common global objective of restricting carbon and greenhouse gas emissions without an affordable means of doing so. There is still a huge cost involved in switching to new processes and greener technologies and we simply cannot afford to do it alone. India is a developing nation, and we must first acknowledge her needs; the eradication of poverty must remain our priority. This is why India’s climate change commitments have been designed to address environmental concerns while also enabling us to meet the growth aspirations of our citizens and our overall development ambitions. The effects of climate change are already chipping away at those aspirations and ambitions. India is more vulnerable to the global temperature fluctuations and hard-to-predict seasonal changes because they affect our agricultural output, impoverish our rural communities and burden our economy. It is for this reason that India continues to increase her commitment to reducing emissions and adopting cleaner technologies; we may not be part of the problem, but we want to be part of the solution. “Earth has enough resources to meet people’s needs, but will never have enough to satisfy people’s greed.” Mahatma Gandhi With this in mind we have set up two dedicated funds at national level to address the cost of adopting cleaner technology in sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, water and forestry. To encourage a more considered consumption of fossil fuels, we have cut the petroleum subsidy by about 26 percent. We have also introduced a carbon tax on gasoline and diesel. To encourage energy generation through cleaner sources and to fund renewable energy projects, we have introduced tax-free infrastructure bonds of $794 million for the year 2015-16. Meanwhile, we have allocated $1.4 billion to the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, which aims to target construction of 100 GW of solar generation by 2022. It should help us reduce CO2 volume by almost 85 million tons per year. We have also allocated $31 million for the period 2012-17 under the National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency, which will save around 23 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) and 98.5 million tons of CO2. All these efforts stand to make a huge impact but we do require international support to prioritise and accelerate our initiatives in accordance with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR). If we are to replace coal, we need access to cleaner energy sources and technology at a viable cost. Even with the huge strides we are making in the direction of renewables, to do more, at a faster pace, we need help from developed nations. That’s why international contributions towards the development and generation of greener technologies should be increased at the earliest possible opportunity through global carbon pricing, and by incentivising companies in the developed world to invest and share their research and development in this area. Our preliminary assessment indicates that the implementation of our climate change pledges (the INDCs) up to 2030 would cost approximately $2.5 trillion. India stands ready to meet this commitment, but if we are to accelerate our efforts, then further financial support should be extended to poorer countries via the Green Climate Fund.

#### Other countries are key – India alone fails

Davey 16 (8/5, Tucker, Future of Life climate author, “Developing Countries Can’t Afford Climate Change”, Future of Life, https://futureoflife.org/2016/08/05/developing-countries-cant-afford-climate-change/?cn-reloaded=1)

Developing countries currently cannot sustain themselves, let alone grow, without relying heavily on fossil fuels. Global warming typically takes a back seat to feeding, housing, and employing these countries’ citizens. Yet the weather fluctuations and consequences of climate change are already impacting food growth in many of these countries. Is there a solution? Developing Countries Need Fossil Fuels Fossil fuels are still the cheapest, most reliable energy resources available. When a developing country wants to build a functional economic system and end rampant poverty, it turns to fossil fuels. India, for example, is home to one-third of the world’s 1.2 billion citizens living in poverty. That’s 400 million people in one country without sufficient food or shelter (for comparison, the entire U.S. population is roughly 323 million people). India hopes to transition to renewable energy as its economy grows, but the investment needed to meet its renewable energy goals “is equivalent to over four times the country’s annual defense spending, and over ten times the country’s annual spending on health and education.” Unless something changes, developing countries like India cannot fight climate change and provide for their citizens. In fact, developing countries will only accelerate global warming as their economies grow because they cannot afford alternatives. Wealthy countries cannot afford to ignore the impact of these growing, developing countries. The Link Between Economic Growth and CO2 According to a World Bank report, “poor and middle-income countries already account for just over half of total carbon emissions.” And this percentage will only rise as developing countries grow. Achieving a global society in which all citizens earn a living wage and climate catastrophe is averted requires breaking the link between economic growth and increasing carbon emissions in developing countries. Today, most developing countries that decrease their poverty rates also have increased rates of carbon emissions. In East Asia and the Pacific, the number of people living in extreme poverty declined from 1.1 billion to 161 million between 1981 and 2011—an 85% decrease. In this same time period, the amount of carbon dioxide per capita rose from 2.1 tons per capita to 5.9 tons per capita—a 185% increase. South Asia saw similar changes during this time frame. As the number of people living in extreme poverty decreased by 30%, the amount of carbon dioxide increased by 204%. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living in poverty increased by 98% in this thirty-year span, while carbon dioxide per capita decreased by 17%. Given the current energy situation, if sub-Saharan Africans are to escape extreme poverty, they will have to increase their carbon use—unless developed countries step in to offer clean alternatives. Carbon Emissions Rate Vs. Total Many wealthier countries have been researching alternative forms of energy for decades. And that work may be starting to pay off. New data shows that, since the year 2000, 21 developed countries have reduced annual greenhouse gas emissions while simultaneously growing their economies. Moreover, this isn’t all related to a drop in the industrial sector. Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic demonstrated that countries do not need to shrink their industrial sectors to break the link between economic growth and increased greenhouse gas emissions. Most importantly, global carbon emissions stalled from 2014 to 2015 as the global economy grew. But is this rate of global decoupling fast enough to keep the planet from warming another two degrees Celsius? When emissions stall at 32.1 billion metric tons for two years, that’s still 64.2 billion metric tons of carbon being pumped into the atmosphere over two years. The carbon emissions rate might fall, but the total continues to grow enormously. A sharp decline in carbon emissions is necessary to keep the planet at a safe global temperature. At the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, the United Nations concluded that in order to keep global temperatures from rising another two degrees Celsius, global carbon emissions “must fall to net zero in the second half of the century.” In order to encourage this, the Paris agreement included measures to ensure that wealthy countries finance developing countries “with respect to both mitigation and adaptation.” For mitigation, countries are expected to abide by their pledges to reduce emissions and use more renewable energy, and for adaptation, the deal sets a global goal for “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change.” Incentivizing R&D One way wealthy countries can benefit both themselves and developing countries is through research and development. As wealthier countries develop cheaper forms of alternative energy, developing countries can take advantage of the new technologies. Wealthy countries can also help subsidize renewable energy for countries dealing with higher rates of poverty. Yet, as of 2014, wealthy countries had invested very little in this process, providing only 0.2% of developing countries’ GDP for adaptation and mitigation. Moreover, a 2015 paper from the IMF revealed that while we spend $100 billion per year subsidizing renewable energy, we spend an estimated $5.3 trillion subsidizing fossil fuels. This fossil fuel subsidy includes “the uncompensated costs of air pollution, congestion and global warming.” Such a huge disparity indicates that wealthy countries either need stronger incentives or stronger legal obligations to shift this fossil fuel money towards renewable energy. The Paris agreement intends to strengthen legal obligations, but its language is vague, and it lacks details that would ensure wealthy countries follow through with their responsibilities. However, despite the shortcomings of legal obligations, monetary incentives do exist. India, for example, wants to vastly increase its solar power capacity to address this global threat. They need $100 billion to fund this expansion, which could spell a huge opportunity for U.S. banks, according to Raymond Vickery, an expert on U.S-India economic ties. This would be a boon for the U.S. economy, and it would set an important precedent for other wealthy countries to assist and invest in developing countries. However, global leaders need to move quickly. The effects of global warming already threaten the world and the economies of developing countries, especially India. Global Impact of Climate Change India relies on the monsoon cycle to water crops and maintain its “nearly $370 billion agricultural sector and hundreds of millions of jobs.” Yet as the Indian Ocean has warmed, the monsoon cycle has become unreliable, resulting in massive droughts and dying crops. Across the globe, scientists expect developing countries such as India to be hit hardest by rising temperatures and changes in rainfall. Furthermore, these countries with limited financial resources and weak infrastructure will struggle to adapt and sustain their economic growth in the face of changing climate. Nicholas Stern predicts that a two-degree rise in temperature would cost about 1% of world GDP. But the World Bank estimates that it would cost India 5% of their GDP. Moreover, changes such as global warming act as “threat multipliers” because they increase the likelihood of other existential threats. In India, increased carbon dioxide emissions have contributed to warmer temperatures, which have triggered extensive droughts and increased poverty. But the problems don’t end here. Higher levels of hunger and poverty can magnify political tensions, potentially leading to conflict and even nuclear war. India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons—if drought expands and cripples their economies, violence can more easily erupt. Alternatively, wealthy nations could capitalize on investment opportunities in developing countries. In doing so, their own economies will benefit while simultaneously aiding the effort to reach net zero carbon emissions. Global warming is, by definition, a global crisis. Mitigating this threat will require global cooperation and global solutions.

### **2NC---Turn: Brain Drain**

#### **Visa restrictions boost the Indian economy – offshoring and domestic tech hiring**

Aiyar 17 [Swaminathan Aiyar, research fellow at the Cato Institute, 5-16-2017, "How India will benefit from Trump’s protectionist visa curbs," The Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/3378ee36-3589-11e7-99bd-13beb0903fa3]

Protectionism usually backfires. To protect US software workers, President Donald Trump has issued executive orders to ensure that only the “most skilled and highest paid” foreigners receive visas for on-site work in the US. One official said Indian software companies paid $65,000 a year for temporary Indian workers, the minimum wage for H-1B visa holders, compared with the median software pay of $150,000 in Silicon Valley. If the rules, which are yet to be fleshed out, are stringent, they may create more American jobs in the short term. But they will also raise wage costs and erode US competitiveness. So, in the medium term, IT work will shift from the high-wage US to lower-wage countries such as India. The net result could be fewer, not more, US jobs. Mr Trump’s executive order has sent tremors through India’s $150bn IT industry, which typically receives two-thirds of the H-1B visas issued by the US and depends on that country for 60 per cent of its exports. Top Indian companies have sought to mollify the US president. Infosys says it will hire 10,000 Americans and open four technology centres in the US during the next two years. Cognizant and Wipro have pledged to ramp up US hiring. Indian companies hope for not-too-stringent rules but have seen the writing on the wall for some years, and have adjusted accordingly. The Obama administration had already raised visa fees and toughened rules. Indian companies have acquired several small American groups, expanded their US development centres and reduced their H-1B visa applications. They may aim for more L-1 visas (for intra-company transfers), which are less regulated. The US offers a maximum of 65,000 H-1B visas a year to skilled temporary foreign workers, plus another 20,000 to students graduating from American universities. US industry complains of a chronic shortage of skilled workers and says H-1B workers are essential for business. But US software workers say many companies use foreign workers simply to undercut local wages. Indian companies claim they pay competitive salaries depending on the location and skills level, but that’s a stretch. The US operates a lottery system for allocating H-1Bs to a multitude of applicants. A spokesperson for the Trump administration has accused Indian companies of gaming the system by applying for enormous numbers of visas beyond their true needs, ending up with two-thirds of the allocations, many of which go to workers with very moderate technical qualifications. So the lottery will be replaced by a process of scrutiny to ensure that only the most skilled, best-paid foreigners are granted visas. Other changes include blocking spouses of visiting employees from working locally. Many US legislators are contemplating bills to increase the minimum wage for H-1B visa holders from $65,000 a year. The most ambitious of these is Democratic Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren’s bill to double it to $130,000. Silicon Valley is lobbying against excessive stringency, and the betting is that the minimum wage may rise to $75,000. Nomura Securities estimates that such an increase will raise the wage costs of the three top Indian IT companies by between 4 and 13 per cent, and squeeze their operating margins by between 40 and 120 basis points. However, this focus on minimum wages ignores the threat of automation in the IT industry, which is killing jobs in India just as it is in more developed economies. Indian companies have sacked thousands of low-tech workers even as they hire more high-tech workers to move into for example artificial intelligence and cloud computing. Vishal Sikka, Infosys chief executive, says that artificial intelligence contributes 5 or 6 per cent to his company’s revenue, up from zero three years ago. This rise up the value chain has transformed the IT work that Indian companies do. Those winning contracts in the US 15 years ago completed 30 per cent of their work offshore (in India) and 70 per cent on-site. That proportion has reversed: 70 per cent is now offshore. Tough visa rules could, unwittingly, raise the offshore share to 75 or 80 per cent within a few years. Another trend has been the expansion of multinationals’ global in-house centres (GICs) in India. These would use the subcontinent for low-end back-office work but have steadily diversified into high-end areas as India’s skills pool expands. IBM and Accenture have more employees in India than in the US, and this is vital for their competitive edge. If President Trump raises IT wages and curbs visas significantly in the US, more work will shift to Indian companies as well as the global in-house centres of US companies in India. The subcontinent has more than 1,000 in-house centres, says Nasscom, the country’s IT trade association, of which two-thirds are American. These centres add 50,000 to 70,000 jobs a year. The tougher Mr Trump becomes, the more jobs they will add.

#### **Reverse brain drain jumpstarts the Indian tech industry.**

ET 18 [1-5-2018, "US President Donald Trump's new disruptive H-1B visa move can be a boon for India," Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/visa-and-immigration/trumps-new-disruptive-h-1b-visa-move-can-be-a-boon-for-india/articleshow/62365964.cms]

More than 500,000 skilled Indian workers might have to come back from the US if a proposal by the Donald Trump administration not to extend H-1B visa of those waiting for permanent residency (Green Card) is implemented. The move would not only disrupt careers but also families. On top of that, India is already passing through a jobs crisis. The grim outlook, however, has a silver lining. While it will be a big loss for individuals, it could be a huge gain for the country. Just when India's new-age enterprise is taking off as innovative startups mushroom in all big cities and the government is keen to make doing business easier, the return of such a large number of Indian tech workers can give a big push to Indian business. Most of these workers are the brightest Indians who have passed out of elite Indian institutions. While Indians are proud of Sundar Pichai who heads Google and Satya Nadella who heads Microsoft, they are still American success stories. It's true that it is easier for bright Indians to make a mark in the U.S. given the right ecosystem and an overall helpful atmosphere. A Pichai or a Nadella won't have been as successful in India as they are in the US. But it is also true that India is changing. The startup sector has just taken off and the government has shown commitment to reforms, as reflected in India's jump of 30 spots in World Bank's Ease of Doing Business rankings. Of America’s 87 unicorns— as startups valued at more than $1 billion are called—were founded or co-founded by Indian entrepreneurs, the highest among 44 by all immigrants. 26% of all startups in the US have been founded by Indians. If India gets back even a small part of such a huge pool of talent, there is bound to be a new rush of blood in India's business sector. Even if some of these people are working in India—innovators that they are—Indian business will get a big boost. That's why Anand Mahindra, Chairman of Mahindra Group, welcomes them. Responding to the news of changes in the H-1B rules that can led to return of these Indians, Mahindra tweeted a few days ago: "If that happens, then I say 'Swagatam, Welcome Home.' You're coming back in time to help India Rise..." For long, India has lost it's best talent to the West in what has come to be called brain drain. Trump's decision can trigger a reverse brain drain. This could be an unintended benefit of an otherwise disruptive move. In the long term, the move can also help Indian information technology (IT) industry evolve beyond its labour-arbitrage model. From being called "body shoppers", Indian IT firms can turn into true innovators, something they can't do without in times when emerging technology is already roiling their business prospects.

#### Status quo H1-B caps mitigate Indian Brain drain and preserve Indian developmental growth

Gautier 17 (6/28, Francois, editor-in-chief of the Paris-based La Revue de l’Inde, “H-1B visa issue: The great Indian brain drain”, The Times of India, https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/francois-gautiers-blog-for-toi/h-1b-visa-issue-the-great-indian-brain-drain/)

Narendra Modi’s visit to the US has come and gone. Though it can be termed a success, nothing much of substance has been signed and @Donaldtrump, in his own characteristic unpredictable manner, has not offered anything of value, bare the selling of weapons to India – but not even the ones that India really needs. On top of that, the contentious visa issue for Indian expatriates, particularly the celebrated software engineers, has not been solved. Yet, I do think that this H-1B visa problem is a blessing in disguise for India. Why? Because the greatest brain drain in the world is – and has been – that of Indians. What started as a migration of coolies or indented labour from India towards Mauritius, Fiji or Madagascar, turned into the Great Brain Drain from the 60s onwards. Scientist, engineers, doctors, all looking for better salaries or opportunities, started immigrating to the US, UK, Canada and others countries, when it was still easy to obtain visas and eventually citizenships. In turn, in the 70s till now, Indian students applied for scholarships from great American and British universities – and often got them – as Indians are good students, capable of memorizing pages and pages of study materials (see how they always win the Spell Bees competitions). It therefore became a fashion to study in foreign universities for children of upper class and even middle class families. Today, though India is doing much better economically, this trend is still going on and the best brains of India are still deserting their country. Did you know that 75% of British doctors are of Indian origin – and that the whole system would collapse if they would leave? 60 % of the engineers of the famous Silicon Valley are Indians, and in the last 10 years, the migration of Indian engineers and scientists to the United States has increased by a whopping 85 %! In 2017, under Narendra Modi’s rule, when you meet any official in Delhi, bureaucrats or politicians, even from the BJP or RSS, and you ask where are their children, the answer will be: “Harvard, or Cambridge, or even McGill University in Canada.” The sad thing is that these children and their children and their grand-children will never come back to India and are a loss not only to India, but even to the US or the UK, as they quickly lose their Indian-ness and bring nothing novel to their country of adoption. They often do not have even gratitude towards India, who gave them education, most of the time free, and become more Americans than the Americans, more British than the English, sometimes even ashamed to be Indians. This Great Brain Drain MUST BE stopped. Indians, who have succeeded abroad, MUST be coaxed back to their native country and contribute to its present development, economical, political and even cultural. How to do it? Well first, there is the negative indirect consequence of this tightening of visas in the US and elsewhere, because of the refugees’ problem. This is unfortunate but the consequences can be seen as positive, as it lessens the Brain Drain. Good too the fact that westerners, Americans, particularly, are sometimes not able to differentiate between Arab refugees and harmless Indians. It will help Indians in the US to start thinking about immigrating back to India, even if it is out of fear.

#### Indian brain drain causes instability and a host of issues that lack solutions

Dev 17 (9/8, Rishabh, Medium contributor, “The Real Indian Brain Drain”, Medium, https://medium.com/@reachrishabh/the-real-indian-brain-drain-cda1a7b730ee)

For several decade after independence, India faced a severe problem of brain drain — the exodus of talented individuals to developed countries. Most professionals who went abroad, assimilated into the life and culture of their host countries, and became the others in their own home. When some of them tried to return, they faced difficulty in integrating themselves into a life they left behind. However, if we look closely, the real brain drain is not the exodus of the talented to greener pastures. It is the difficulties of life within the country for the ones who stay behind that truly matters. Several factors compound this effect, and lead to larger problems like a highly dissatisfied citizenry ready to explode at the slightest provocation, and a country ready to implode under its own weight. Let’s try to identify some of these factors that are creating an unchecked obstruction in the Indian growth story. Traffic, pollution, and public transportation Public transportation has probably been the biggest mystery for civic administration in India. Cities are overcrowded with people, and there isn’t enough transportation for everyone. Metro rail systems promised a massive improvement, but failed to deliver on most of those promises. An unreliable public transport system leads to more traffic everyday, because people cannot rely on public transportation, so they must make their own arrangements for even the smallest distances within the city. A city like Delhi, where the number of private cars continues to be more than the combined numbers in rest of the metropolitan cities of India, is adding nearly 1400 vehicles on the roads every day. And all of these vehicles are choking our cities, with extremely poor air quality throughout the year. Moral policing, and superstitions beliefs Everywhere you look, there will be at least one advertisement proclaiming the mystical powers of a godman who is born to be a messiah of the people. Or another person who would be claiming to cure people of their ailments for free with a magic potion recipe. And people queue up outside his door, because they don’t know any better. The education system has failed a vast majority of the country, and deprived them of the basic understanding between right and wrong. The same people would be the ones to enforce their false morals on everyone else. Not only do they believe strongly, but enforce their beliefs that as if saying — “since we are stupid, and in a far greater majority than you, you must agree with us and become as stupid as we are.” Garbage disposal At every street corner in India, there is a community garbage point, where everyone is supposed to throw away the refuse from their homes, and conveniently forget about it. Once its out on the streets, it is no longer their problem. In spite of many efforts like the Swachh Bharat Campaign, the garbage refuses to go away from the streets. Landfills are choked to the gills, and pose serious health risks for entire cities. Yet, the authorities refuse to do anything about it, like generate power that can help reduce the burden on the coal and gas turbine power plants. We continue to extol the Scandinavian countries for getting rid of ‘all’ of their garbage while we throw plastic bags on our streets. Everyday Corruption No matter what the Prime Minister thinks, the problem of everyday corruption is so rampant that a life without it is seemingly no longer possible. Right from the grassroots to the highest echelons of power, corrupt practices that favor only a few, favor nepotism, decide policy aimed at benefiting the rich and powerful, has become a societal norm. Poverty and crime All of these factors put a strain on the resources available for the public, and deprives a large section of society from even the basic civic amenities. A large population of youth, who have their own aspirations and dreams, get attracted towards a life of crime to fulfill a lifestyle that they could not afford otherwise. Poverty, therefore, becomes the primary cause of rising crime rates in every part of the country. And there’s not just an increase in the rate of thefts and homicides only, crimes against women, cybercrimes, bank and ATM frauds are on the rise as well. What it boils down to The people who’ve migrated abroad were all witness to this degradation of the Indian society over the years. Some saw it early, some saw it later. But when they did, they chose to move away from their homeland to a place that was foreign to them in every aspect. Yet, they chose to call it home, because most of these problems are deep rooted in our society and require a concentrated effort by the entire population to eradicate them effectively. Until we achieve that, and change our mentality to solve these problems, it would be unwarranted to blame those who migrated to experience a better lifestyle. One, simply because they worked very hard for it, and deserve it. And second, because we the people of India, have not given them a reason to stay.

# Off Case

## States CP

### 1NC---States---H1B

#### Text: The fifty states and relevant subfederal entities should [insert plan]

#### State visas solve cost and adaption better than the fed and ensure follow on---it avoids the DA

**Bier 17** (David, mmigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. He is an expert on visa reform, border security, and interior enforcement, and his work has been cited in the Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Politico, and many other print and online publications. From 2013 to 2015, Mr. Bier drafted immigration legislation as senior policy advisor for Congressman Raúl Labrador, a member and current chairman of the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security. Previously, he worked as the immigration policy analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute and most recently as the director of immigration policy at the Niskanen Center, 5/3, "Members of Congress Announce New State-Based Visa Bills at Cato Event," https://www.cato.org/blog/members-congress-announce-new-state-based-visa-bills-cato-event)

State-sponsored visas would build much-needed flexibility and adaptability into the federal immigration system. We are pleased that members of Congress are finally taking up this innovative and important idea.

The federal government’s monopoly over legal immigration fails to address the diversity of economic needs among the states. A more decentralized visa program could head off local problems before they build into a national crisis, building flexibility into the system that exists in every other area of the market. Giving states greater control would also increase political support for immigration programs and allow Congress to reform the system without needing to agree on every issue.

The federal government determines the number of foreign workers, the type of work that they can perform, and the terms under which they must live. The question today is whether any of these functions could be better handled at the state level.

As a legal matter, this is a question that Congress may answer. Most recently, in the Arizona v. U.S. decision, the Supreme Court held that the states are limited in this area only to the extent that Congress chooses to limit them.

From an economic perspective, the static federal monopoly makes little sense. In a market economy, you want systems that adjust quickly to changes at the local level. The federal system doesn’t change until local problems build into a national one, while a decentralized system could head off issues before a crisis develops. Despite widespread agreement that there has been a crisis for more than a decade, no changes have occurred.

The federal-only system also makes little sense politically. Giving states greater control would increase political support for immigration programs. The fights in Congress that have killed reform efforts in the past could be effectively transferred to state Capitols. Congress could fix the system without finding total agreement.

From an enforcement perspective, guest worker programs have historically reduced illegal immigration, creating an incentive for people to come to the United States legally. And limiting workers to a single state is actually less of a challenge than limiting them to a single employer, as the current federal guest worker programs do. More importantly, according to the Government Accountability Office, about 90 percent of overstays are tourists, not guest workers, because the workers want to be invited back to work legally. This incentive has kept their overstay rate well below 3%.

As is detailed in the Cato policy analysis, this idea has been implemented successfully in two other geographically diverse, former British colonies—Canada and Australia. Both countries use regional visa programs to distribute immigration more fairly and allow rural areas to obtain labor for difficult jobs.

The popularity of these programs can be seen in their rapid growth over the last two decades. They are now the second largest source of economic immigration to these countries.

The United States has a long history of federalism and federal-state partnerships, yet it has so far not applied this tradition to immigration. But some states have already passed bills advocating state-based visas. All states already directly sponsor visa applicants as students through their public universities or workers in their capacity as employers. These protocols could be expanded to allow states to sponsor workers on behalf of their industries.

### 2NC---States---Compact

#### State immigration compacts solve exploding costs and legal precision more efficient than the fed

**Somin 17** (Ilya, Professor of Law at George Mason University, 5/5, "A federalist approach to immigration reform," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/05/a-federalist-approach-to-immigration-reform/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.5214e6c14f21)

Unlike with the current federal H1B visa, Johnson-Buck state visas would not be tied to a particular employer. Workers would be free to change jobs, if they wish. That is extremely important, both because it deters mistreatment of workers by employers and because it enables workers to seek out new positions where they would be more productive, and thereby contribute more to the economy. However, workers would not be allowed to take jobs in a state other than the one that issued them the visa. If they do so, they would lose their legal status, and be subject to deportation. Given the enormous advantages of legal status, that is a significant deterrent to seeking out of state jobs. The proposal does allow participating states to form “compacts” under which guest workers admitted by one could also seek out jobs in the other, and vice versa.

If the bill passes, the guest workers admitted by the states would be among the biggest beneficiaries. Many thousands would get freedom and economic opportunity, and escape having to languish in poverty and oppression. That is important to consider, because it is unjust to make immigration policy without reference to the rights and interests of potential immigrants themselves. But American citizens also stand to gain, because immigrant workers make major contributions to the American economy. By channeling immigrants into legal employment, this program could also diminish deportations, which come at a high cost to taxpayers.

Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Riley and Cato Institute immigration policy expert David Bier have further commentary on the proposal, outlining several of its advantages. They point out that a state-based visa program would enable to states to make adjustments based on different local economic needs. As with political decentralization on other issues, it could also help mitigate the poisonous partisan conflict created by federal control, where a single, one-size-fits all approach is imposed the entire country. Regional visa programs have worked well in Canada and Australia, two diverse federal democracies with histories and political traditions similar to our own.

## Base DA

### 1NC---Link---H1B

#### Everyone hates the plan---it would derail the agenda

**Haniffa 18** (Aziz, Writer for India Abroad, 2/3, "Bill to Raise H-1B Quota Expected to Die in Senate," https://www.indiaabroad.com/bill-to-raise-h--b-quota-expected-to-die/article\_ac6bbaa9-3196-5c35-81e8-611c07699c7f.html)

Republican Sens. Orrin Hatch of Utah and Jeff Flake of Arizona, both of whom are retiring, have introduced legislation to increase the annual quota of H-1B visas but congressional sources said the bill is expected to be dead on arrival.

The sources told India Abroad that besides the lawmakers' lame-duck status, the H-1B program would likely be dismissed on a bipartisan basis. The sources said the White House, and most particularly President Donald Trump, would have no use for legislation co-authored by Flake: The Arizona lawmaker has assailed the president several times on the Senate floor, most recently for his attacks against the media, which the lawmaker decried as Stalinist.

Less than two months ago, Trump traveled to Utah on Air Force One for a rally and took Hatch along with him to give the senator a boost and to help ensure his re-election. But barely a month later, Hatch announced he would not be running.

Both congressional and administration sources said Trump's personal animus towards Flake in particular — and his subsequent disappointment with Hatch — would not even get to first base in terms of any White House endorsement of the bill. Hatch, over the years, has been consistent in his quest for an increase in H-1B visas.

Meanwhile, sources underscored the antipathy toward the H-1B program by both senior Republican Senators like Charles Grassley, chairman of the Judiciary Committee which has jurisdiction over matters pertaining to immigration, and Democratic leader Richard Durbin, who has often joined Grassley in introducing legislation to rail against H-1B fraud and abuse.

The Hatch/Flake legislation seeks to increase the annual H-1B visa quota from 65,000 to 85,000. These visas are initially valid for three years and can be extended for an additional three years. The largest beneficiary since the program's inception nearly 25 years ago have been high-skilled workers from India. The Hatch/Flake legislation, known as the Immigration Innovation Act, or I-Squared, also provides for work authorization for spouses and children of H1B visa holders. Hatch said in a statement that it aims to bring long-overdue reforms to the merit-based immigration laws for high-skilled workers. During the Obama administration, an executive order envisaged spouses of some eligible H-1B holders to apply for work authorization. But there has now been deep concern among these spouses over the Trump administration's announcement that it intends to eliminate this order, putting spouses at risk of deportation.

### 2NC---Link---H1B

#### Everyone would hate the plan---it would get slandered as job-steeling

**Jha 17** (Lalit, Reporter at LiveMint, 8/2, "Home » Politics Reform H1B visa, crack down on outsourcing firms: US lawmakers to Trump," https://www.livemint.com/Politics/gLMsVZe0NYI7CZn1rOknpN/Reform-H1B-visa-crackdown-on-outsourcing-firms-US-lawmaker.html)

Washington: A bipartisan group of influential lawmakers from both the House and Senate has urged US President Donald Trump to crackdown on jobs outsourcing companies and reform the H1B and L-1 visa systems.

“We write because for far too long the H1B visa has been abused by some corporations as a way to displace American workers with cheap foreign labour. We urge you to use your authority as President to the greatest extent possible to stop H1B abuses, but we believe reform also must happen legislatively because of loopholes in the law,” the lawmakers said in a letter to the President.

In the letter dated 27 July, which was released on Tuesday, they said the legislation—H.R.1303 and S.180, the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2017—introduced by them close these loopholes and overhaul these visa programs to protect American workers and crack down on outsourcing companies which deprive qualified Americans of high-skill jobs.

“This bipartisan bill will restore the H1B visa program to its original intent, protect American workers, and preserve the limited H1B visas for high-skilled foreign workers,” the letter said. Led by Congressman Bill Pascrell, the letter was signed by Senator Richard Durbin, Congressmen Dave Brat, Ro Khanna and Paul A Gosar among others .

The lawmakers said their legislation provides protections for American workers and visa holders as it calls for more transparency in the recruitment of foreign workers. The bill, they said, addresses gaps in the current law by requiring that the employers make a good faith effort to recruit and hire American workers before bringing in guest workers.

In addition, the bill also asks for prohibiting employers from replacing American workers or giving preference to visa holders when they are filling open positions. It also proposes to modify existing H1B wage requirements to ensure employers pay foreigners comparable wages in the area of employment.

Current law allows the payment of below-market wages to H1B workers across industries and geographic areas and even allows H1B-dependent employers and employers who have previously wilfully violated H1B program requirements to avoid obligations to recruit US workers and not displace them simply by paying a $60,000 annual wage.

“Merely raising this wage floor to another arbitrary level will not prevent future abuse,” they said.

Instead, the bill would end the “exempt” H1B worker loophole and would peg H1B salaries to current wage levels by requiring employers to pay the highest wage applicable to each occupation and geographic area from three categories.